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iAbstract
The main objective of the reported study was to investigate how biome-
dical ontologies, logically structured representations of various aspects of
the biomedical reality, can help researchers in analyzing experimental data.
High-throughput technologies, such as platforms for microarray gene ex-
pression experiments (MAGE), yield increasingly large amounts of ‘massive’
data; successful analyses of the data require expertise in the application do-
main, and to support researchers with automated methods explicit domain
knowledge representations are often essential. Two attempts to construct
such tools are reported here: one successful — eGOn, a web-based tool for
mapping the results of microarray gene expression experiments onto the
structure of the Gene Ontology; and one unsuccessful — a framework for
knowledge- and case-based enhancement of biological association network-
building tools.
Ontologies — structured, computer-understandable accounts of expert kno-
wledge — are a relatively new invention. Until only recently, biomedical
ontologies were developed with little care for formal semantics, syntactic
and semantic compatibility with each other, and the ontological (in a philo-
sophical sense) commitments made. However, for successful integration of
resources that use different ontologies to describe their content and services,
integration on the ontological level is needed. While one way to achieve this
is to apply some of the much-researched techniques of ontology alignment
and merging, another approach is to organize the ontology creation move-
ment around a common basis — a unique top-level ontology and a set of
design principles. Some of such integrative efforts made by the community
of Open Biomedical Ontologies, in which I have participated, are reported.
Furthermore, the thesis presents a framework for consistently connecting
the Gene Ontology (the most prominent of ontologies covered by OBO)
with the Taxonomy of Species, and discusses the benefits of its prospective
adoption by the OBO community.
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Chapter 1
Outline
This document reflects and partially reports my work done at the Depart-
ment of Computer and Information Science (IDI), Norwegian University of
Science and Technology (NTNU) in the course of a graduate study under
the guidance of professors Jan Komorowski, Astrid Lægreid, Agnar Aamodt,
and Barry Smith. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the work I have done,
and is composed as follows:
– Section 1.1 provides an overview of my research activities, lists pub-
lications, and specifies my contributions. Sec. 1.1.4 summarizes the
research questions, goals, methods, and results.
– Section 1.2 provides an outline of the structure of the remainder of the
thesis.
Much of my work was done as part of a broader collaborative effort; there-
fore, the plural form ‘we’ is extensively used throughout this document, and
the singular ‘I’ is reserved to those parts where the entire work was done by
me.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. OUTLINE
1.1 Research Overview
The initial goal of my doctoral research was to build computational mod-
els of gastric acid secretion, but as the work progressed and my interests
were evolving, biomedical ontologies became the central issue. The work
progressed in three distinct, but logically connected phases, each with a dif-
ferent focus, different results, and directed by different supervisors. Only
the third phase is covered to a larger extent in this thesis. The earlier phases
and the corresponding results are briefly discussed in the following sections,
and are only occasionally mentioned in later chapters.
1.1.1 Phase I: Analysis and Mining of Microarray Data
In the first phase, we explored the possibilities of augmenting research in the
then emerging field of functional genomics1 with methods from computer
science, specifically data mining2 and machine learning.3 In particular, we4
were interested in investigating similarities between expression profiles of
genes which participate in gastric acid secretion under various experimental
conditions, and in reusing the discovered patterns for predicting functions
of so-called ‘unknown’ genes (genes with unknown functions). Our goal
was to develop computational models of gastric acid secretion and of the
pathogenesis of gastrointestinal neoplasia, based on, e.g., the results of mi-
croarray gene expression (MAGE) experiments.5
On the computational side, my responsibilities included the development
1See, e.g., Hieter and Boguski [165] or Winslow and Boguski [386] for a brief introduction, and
Campbell and Heyer [67] for an excellent, comprehensive account of this research field.
2See, e.g., Witten and Frank [387] or Han and Kamber [158] for a comprehensive introduction,
and Duda et al. [96] for an excellent treatment of the closely related field of pattern classification.
3See, e.g., Mitchell [257] for a classic, though somewhat superficial introduction.
4This part of my work was done in collaboration with a team of molecular biologists, clinicians,
and statisticians, under the guidance of proff. Komorowski, Lægreid, and Sandvik.
5A brief introduction to the microarray gene expression technology is given in Sec. 2.4. For more
details see, e.g., Brown and Botstein [60] — one of the earliest articles on microarrays — as well
as The Chipping Forecast I, II, and III, collections of review articles published as supplements to
Nature Genetics [2].
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of a programmatic framework for analyzing microarray experiments, from
raw data analysis to pattern classification. The task consisted of two major
components:
1. Design and implementation of statistical methods for the preprocess-
ing of raw microarray gene expression data.
2. Design and implementation of classifiers for the functional classifica-
tion of gene expression patterns.
While the microarray technology was already relatively advanced at that
time (though rather immature as compared to the most recent developments
in this field), statistical methods for preprocessing and analysis of microar-
ray experiments were largely in an early developmental stage, and ready-
to-use software tools were neither easily available nor sufficiently reliable.
Software packages supporting statistical processing of MAGE data, such as
Bioconductor (Gentleman et al. [125]), Limma (Smyth et al. [337]), or BRB
ArrayTools (McShane et al. [250]), were only emerging during those and
the next few years. Likewise, methods for the classification and functional
analysis of microarray data were under development at that time; relatively
simple tools such as Cluster and TreeView (Eisen et al. [100]) were used
extensively, and functional annotations with terms from the Gene Ontology
(Ashburner et al. [19]) were only becoming popular.
The first of the components mentioned above — statistical preprocessing
and analysis — was realized on the basis of statistical tests designed by us
as well as on those previously published by others. Implementations were
mostly of prototype rather than production quality; We used Perl,6 R,7 and
occasionally S-Plus8 as the underlying implementation languages, primar-
ily because of the availability of built-in regular expression operators (Perl),
6The de facto programming language of bioinformatics, http://www.perlfoundation.org/.
7The R environment for statistical computing, http://www.r-project.org/.
8http://www.insightful.com/products/splus/. Interestingly, the commercial S-Plus has unusual
scoping, unintuitive and inconsistent with the usual lexical scoping rules (adopted in the otherwise
quite similar R); this caused a number of my programs to produce wrong results before I discovered
this flaw. Insightful, the provider of S-Plus, confirmed it to be an intended property of the language
rather than an implementation bug (private conversation with a representative). This ‘feature’ has
not been changed as of 2007.
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statistical and graphical subroutines (R), and ease of rapid prototyping. The
preprocessing included various sorts of normalization and filtering of raw
data, aimed at addressing systematic sources of error such as the effects of
printing, labeling, scanning, etc. Subsequent analyses included statistical
testing for genes differentially expressed in distinct samples of biological
material. Some of the methods designed or adopted by us are briefly dis-
cussed in, e.g., Midelfart [253].
The second of the components mentioned above — functional classification
— was realized with the use of a supervised data mining technology based
on the mathematical theory of rough sets (Rough Set Theory, RST; see, e.g.,
Pawlak [278], the seminal article on RST). In brief, RST-based classifiers
are built by learning from discrete (or discretized) training data in an eager
approach, and consist of a set of decision rules that are combined into en-
sembles and used for classifying previously unseen data. The major benefits
of using this technology were its capability of handling noisy and inconsis-
tent data, human-readable format of the classifiers (sets of logical rules), as
well as multiclass rather than binary classification. In our studies, rough set
classifiers were implemented mainly as prototype Perl scripts or as plugins
for the Rosetta system (Øhrn [273]), developed earlier by the Komorowski’s
team. For more on the use of rough set-based classifiers in bioinformatics,
see Øhrn [273], Hvidsten [177], Hvidsten et al. [178, 179], Midelfart et
al. [254], Midelfart [253], and Lægreid et al. [226].
The results of studies based on microarray gene expression experiments
which involved my contribution have been presented at both Norwegian
and international conferences and workshops, as well as published in scien-
tific journals. Specifically, I contributed to the following publications:
P1. Midelfart, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2002). Learning Yeast Gene Function
from Expression Programs and Gene Ontology. Conference Proceed-
ings of the Winter Meeting of the Norwegian Biochemical Society,
Røros, Norway [254].9
9This work had been earlier presented by Kus´nierczyk and Sonnervik as part of the NTNU course
on Advanced Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery in Molecular Biomedicine (SIF80BG), and
later at the Computer Science Graduate Students Conference (CSGSC2002) in Trondheim, under
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P2. Yadetie, Bakke, Lægreid, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2002). Analysis of Ef-
fects of the PPAR-α Agonist Ciprofibrate on Rat Hepatic Gene Expressions
Using cDNA Microarrays. Proceedings of the 7th IUBMB Conference
on Receptor-Ligand Interactions: Molecular, Physiological and Phar-
macological Aspects, Bergen, Norway [392].
P3. Yadetie, Lægreid, Bakke, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2003). Liver Gene Ex-
pression in Rats in Response to the Peroxisome Proliferator-Activated
Receptor-α Agonist Ciprofibrate. Physiological Genomics [393].
P4. Nørsett, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2003). Gene Expression Profiles in Gastric
Mucosa During Therapeutic Acid Inhibition. Proceedings of the 1st ESF
Functional Genomics Conference, Praha, Czech Republic [268].
P5. Nørsett, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2003). Gene Expression Profiles in Hyper-
gastrinemic Rats and Patients. Conference Proceedings of the Winter
Meeting of the Norwegian Biochemical Society, Geilo, Norway [269].
P6. Hofsli, Thomessen, Yadetie, Langaas, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2005).
Identification of Novel Growth Factor-Responsive Genes in Neuroendoc-
rine Gastrointestinal Tumour Cells. British Journal of Cancer [169].
P7. Nørsett, Bruland, Ween, Hofsli, Thomessen, Misund, Strømmen, Kus´-
nierczyk, et al. (2005). Systems Biology of the Normal and Diseased
Gastrointestinal System. Proceedings of the 2nd ESF Functional Ge-
nomics Conference, Oslo, Norway [267].
P8. Nørsett, Lægreid, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2007). Changes in Gene Expres-
sion of Gastric Mucosa During Therapeutic Acid Inhibition. American
Journal of Physiology — Gastrointestinal and Liver Physiology [270].
My contribution to these studies comprised the design and implementation
of tools for statistical and classificatory processing of microarray data, and,
in some cases, statistical design of the actual wet-lab experiments. Using our
own as well as publicly available gene expression data, we showed, using
the same title (Kus´nierczyk and Sonnervik [225]). The publication by Midelfart et al. [254] was
submitted without the knowledge and consent of the original authors.
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statistical significance tests, that rough set-based classifiers were a reason-
able choice for bioinformatics research in functional genomics, not worse,
and in some cases better than other data mining techniques. The tools
and methods developed for those studies were typically application-specific,
however, and most of them have not been published separately (but see,
e.g., Midelfart [253] and Midelfart et al. [254] for an in-depth treatment of
the rough set-based approach). Work done during the first phase strongly
motivated my further research, but the details are largely irrelevant for what
constitutes the major topic of this dissertation (see Sec. 1.1.3).
1.1.2 Phase II: Knowledge-Guided Microarray Data Analysis
Although the techniques used in our studies mentioned above were largely
data-oriented, annotation of experimental data with terms from the Gene
Ontology did play an important role in the development of our methods for
functional classification of genes. As a consequence, I became interested in
using computationally amenable forms of both general knowledge (domain
knowledge) as well as episodic knowledge (case-specific knowledge) for the
purposes of analyzing biomedical data. In this second phase, we10 were ex-
ploring how model-based and case-based reasoning supported with biome-
dical ontologies can be used to draw biologically interesting inferences from
experimental data.
Exploring the Gene Ontology with eGOn In one line of research, we
were further investigating the applicability of the Gene Ontology to the
analysis of microarray experiments. The success of the GO as a structured
vocabulary for the annotation of biomedical data has motivated developers
to build tools that would enable researchers to use annotations not only for
the purposes of data integration, but also to interpret the data and perform
various inferences based on the structure of the GO using, e.g., statistical
methods. We have implemented eGOn,11 a tool for mapping the results of
microarray gene expression experiments onto the structure of the Gene On-
10This part of my work was done under the guidance of proff. Aamodt and Lægreid.
11The acronym ‘eGOn’ stands for ‘explore Gene Ontology’.
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tology. In eGOn, a collection of statistical tests allows one to compare gene
expression in a number of samples or experiments, and the scope of those
tests can be constrained to genes annotated with a user-defined selection of
GO terms. Three tests are available; in brief, eGOn includes:
– a test used to find those GO terms for which differentially expressed
genes are significantly overrepresented as compared to all genes cov-
ered by the study (the master-target test); this test is based on the
Fisher’s exact test for two binomial proportions;
– a test used for two non-overlapping lists of differentially expressed
genes (the mutually exclusive target-target test); this test is based on
similar assumptions as the master-target test;
– a test defined for two overlapping lists of differentially expressed genes
(the intersecting target-target test); this test is based on the χ-square
distribution.
The tool has been publicly available since it was first presented to the public
in 2002:
P9. Beisvåg, Jølsum, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2002). eGOn: A New Tool for
Mapping Microarray Data onto the Gene Ontology Structure. Proceed-
ings of the 1st Workshop on Standards and Ontologies for Functional
Genomics (SOFG),12 Hinxton, UK [33].
The tests mentioned above and other technicalities are discussed in more
detail in a recent article (Beisvåg et al. [34]), where eGOn is presented as a
component of the GeneTools software suite for gene annotation-related ser-
vices. The tool is accessible from the GeneTools website13 of the Norwegian
Microarray Consortium, and has also been included in the list of GO-related
tools, maintained by the Gene Ontology Consortium.14 It has been eval-
uated both theoretically (the correctness of the statistical procedures) and
empirically (the usefulness of the tool for a wider audience).
12http://www.sofg.org/.
13http://www.genetools.microarray.ntnu.no/.
14http://geneontology.org/GO.tools.shtml.
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Building Biological Association Networks In another line of research,
my motivation stemmed from the fact that researchers in functional ge-
nomics often come up with lists of genes whose participation in the func-
tioning of the studied organisms is conveniently explained in the form of
biological association networks (BANs). Microarray studies have been used
to show how the expression of genes depends on a number of positive and
negative regulation patterns, reflecting interactions between the respective
gene products, as well as interactions between those products and the genes
themselves (e.g., at the level of transcriptional regulation). Building com-
plex models of such regulatory systems is one of the problems in focus of
the relatively young field of systems biology (SB).15
Building biological association networks requires not only expression data
from particular experiments, but also data of other sorts (e.g., known inter-
molecular interactions and metabolic pathways), usually obtainable from
public databases. Together, these data reflect various aspects of the investi-
gated biological system. Integration of distributed sources of biological data
is a hot research topic on its own (see Ch. 2.5). Numerous services have
been designed to facilitate transparent access to data stored in multiple da-
tabases — for example, the Gene Cards service (Safran et al. [304]) which
provides access and uniformly presents information related to human genes,
stored in a number of publicly available databases.
Various tools, such as Pathway Studio (Nikitin et al. [266]), Cytoscape,16
and other (see, e.g., Hanisch et al. [159], Hoffman and Valencia [168],
Jensen et al. [183], and Sohler et al. [338]), are commonly used to build
biological association networks. These tools provide automated or semiau-
tomated support for the retrieval, matching, filtering, processing, and pre-
sentation of data. However, without substantial manual intervention from
the human user, networks built by these tools would either be unilluminat-
ingly simple, or incomprehensibly complex. (Figure 1.1 illustrates this issue
with an image of a comprehensive but not comprehensible gene network.)
This is because the data retrieval is parametrized by the depth of search: in a
15See, e.g., Kitano [202] and others in that volume for an overview, and Alon [11] for a compre-
hensive introduction to Systems Biology.
16http://www.cytoscape.org/.
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shallow search, the tool reports only those pieces of information that can be
accessed via direct links from the initial nodes; in a deep search, all pieces of
information accessible directly an indirectly (in a limited number of steps)
are reported. In either case, information that is accessible but irrelevant will
be reported, as well as information that is relevant but not accessible will
be missed. Borrowing terms from the field of information retrieval,17 it can
be said that neither precision nor recall are perfect with respect to the user’s
expectations.
Figure 1.1: A comprehensive but incomprehensible representation of a bio-
logical association network. From Cytoscape, http://www.cytoscape.org/.
17See, e.g., Bayeza-Yates and Ribeiro-Neto [25] for a slightly dated, but comprehensive introduc-
tion.
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In our studies, we observed that biologists combine general domain knowl-
edge with intuition and previous experience to heuristically build BANs that
are simple enough not to become unreadable, but complex enough to pro-
vide a useful explanation of the studied phenomena. They retrieve data
(e.g., using network building tools such as those mentioned above) in a
number of subsequent steps, at each step deciding which pieces of infor-
mation retrieved in previous steps should be used in subsequent searches,
which databases to query, etc. Based on such observations, I proposed
to enrich network building tools with a reasoning module that would, at
least partially, dispense the user from manually deciding on what to do at
each successive step. Drawing from earlier achievements of the local re-
search team (Aamodt [6, 4, 5], Grimnes [141], Gu [145], Öztürk [274], and
Sørmo [339]), we designed a system for combining model-based reasoning
(MBR)18 with case-based reasoning (CBR).19 In that system, general domain
knowledge would come from biomedical ontologies, such as the Gene Ontol-
ogy and other Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO),20 as well as from sources
of precompiled interaction networks and pathways, such as the Kyoto Ency-
clopedia of Genes and Genomes (KEGG; Kanehisa et al. [193, 192]), Meta-
Cyc (Caspi et al. [68]), etc. On the other hand, episodic knowledge (cases)
would be collected incrementally during interactions with human experts in
the course of network building sessions.
Unfortunately, this project had experienced a number of problems on the
way, including low quality of the available ontologies, limited accessibility to
experts willing to provide the essential input, and implementational issues
with the Creek CBR software system.21 Despite initial progress, this project
has never been completed. The early stages have been documented in two
peer-reviewed publications:
P10. Kus´nierczyk et al. (2004). Towards Automated Explanation of Gene-
18See, e.g., Davis and Hamscher [87].
19See, e.g., Aamodt and Plaza [8] for an introduction, and Kolodner [210] for a comprehensive
account.
20http://obo.sourceforge.net.
21Creek was initially implemented in Common Lisp by Aamodt and colleagues [4], and later
reimplemented in Java by Sørmo [339] and fellow students at NTNU. Its recent versions are used
for commercial purposes and are not freely available.
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Gene Relationships. Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Research in
Computational Molecular Biology (RECOMB), San Diego, USA [224].
P11. Kus´nierczyk et al. (2005). Knowledge-Intensive Case-Based Support
for Automated Explanation of Biological Phenomena. Proceedings of
the Workshop on Case-Based Reasoning in the Health Sciences, 6th
International Conference on Case-Based Reasoning (ICCBR), Chicago,
USA [223].
Parts of this research were also presented at the 2005 Winter Meeting of the
Norwegian Biochemical Society in Meråker, Norway, as an invited talk on
submodeling in systems biology.
1.1.3 Phase III: Biomedical Ontology Engineering
After having gained experience with data-oriented as well as ontology-enha-
nced analysis of microarray experiments, it seemed appealing and natural
to focus further efforts on the biomedical ontologies themselves. The third
phase of my work, therefore, was oriented towards principles of ontological
engineering in the biomedical domain, and in particular on improving the
structure of the Gene Ontology. Prof. Smith involved me in various endeav-
ours related to the goals and work of the biomedical ontology community he
was a member of: the Open Biomedical Ontologies initiative,22 and its suc-
cessor OBO Foundry.23 Prof. Smith’s earlier work focused on philosophical
ontology, including research on a number of issues that have been studied
(and disagreed about) since the times of Aristotle (Smith [333]). Recently,
this philosophical perspective has been employed in investigations on how
to coherently reflect, in the form of ontologies, the knowledge accumulated
and used by biologists.
The issue of explicitly representing knowledge24 has traditionally been of
interest for researchers in artificial intelligence (AI) — specifically, those in
22http://obo.sourceforge.net/.
23http://obofoundry.org/.
24In his Knowledge Representation [340], John Sowa writes: “The words ‘knowledge’ and ‘repre-
sentation’ have provoked philosophical controversies for over two and a half millennia. . . . Plato’s
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the fields of knowledge representation (KR) and its more recent relative on-
tological engineering (OE; Gómez-Pérez et al. [133]). Unfortunately, there
seems to have been a tradition of three different perspectives on ontologi-
cal activity which did not necessarily work well together. Domain experts
(e.g., biologists) have been developing their ontologies with little or no un-
derstanding of the logical and computational properties of knowledge rep-
resentation languages.25 Many ontologies have been built without precisely
specifying the underlying language, as in the case of the early Gene Ontol-
ogy (see, e.g., Smith et al. [329] and Smith et al. [334]) as well as ignoring
the categorial systems developed earlier (see, e.g., McCray [248], Rector et
al. [291], Smith [322, 321], and also Burgun [62] and Cimino [77]). Com-
puter scientists have been focusing on the syntactic, semantic, and compu-
tational properties — decidability, tractability, etc. — of knowledge repre-
sentation languages, often with little understanding and care for the needs
of domain experts, as well as attempting to make their logical languages
as ontology-neutral as possible — as in the case of, e.g., the Semantic Web
language RDF26 or the recent logical formalism IKL.27 Philosophers have
been developing their theories with little regard for the issues of compu-
tational tractability, mostly using the undecidable first-order logic (FOL),
or other highly expressive formalisms such as modal or higher-order logics
(see, e.g., Masolo et al. [244] for the modal axiomatization of DOLCE28 and
some other top-level ontologies). Often, they were occupied with abstract-
ing as much as possible from the details specific to particular domains.
Central to the OBO approach to ontology development is close collabora-
tion between biologists, computer scientists, logicians, philosophers, and
experts of other relevant professions. I became involved in a number of ac-
student Aristotle shifted the emphasis of philosophy from the nature of knowledge to the less
controversial, but more practical problem of representing knowledge.” In the context of biome-
dical ontology, it is argued that it is not knowledge, but that what the knowledge is about that
should be represented (Bodenreider et al. [51], Ceusters and Smith [70], Ceusters et al. [71],
Smith [319, 321, 322], etc.)
25See, e.g., Aranguren et al. [18] for a recent discussion of why it is essential to take care of
formal semantics while constructing a domain ontology.
26Resource Description Framework, http://www.w3.org/RDF/.
27IKRIS Knowledge Language, http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html.
28Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering, http://www.loa-cnr.it/DOL-
CE.html.
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tivities undertaken by the OBO community; together with prof. Smith and
colleagues, I participated in, among others, the development of represen-
tational, terminological, and nomenclatural standards for OBO ontologies.
Most recently, I have been involved in efforts aimed at cleanly linking vari-
ous domain ontologies, such as the Gene Ontology, anatomy ontologies, etc.,
with the taxonomy of species. These efforts are reflected in the following
publications:
P12. Kus´nierczyk (2006). Nontological Engineering. Proceedings of the
4th Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS),
Baltimore, USA [218].
P13. Smith, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2006). Towards a Coherent Terminol-
ogy for Principles-Based Ontology. Proceedings of the 2nd Interna-
tional Workshop on Formal Biomedical Knowledge Representation
(KRMED), Baltimore, USA [331].
P14. Schober, Kus´nierczyk, et al. (2007). Towards Naming Conventions
for Use in Controlled Vocabulary and Ontology Engineering. Proceed-
ings of the 10th Bio-Ontologies SIG Workshop, ISMB/ECCB, Vienna,
Austria [311].29
P15. Kus´nierczyk (2007). Taxonomy-Based Partitioning of the Gene Ontol-
ogy. To appear in Journal of Biomedical Informatics [221].
P16. Kus´nierczyk (2007). Taxonomic Partitioning of the Gene Ontology
Proceedings of the Dagstuhl Seminar Towards Interoperability of Bio-
medical Ontologies, Schloß Dagstuhl, Germany [220].30
P17. Kus´nierczyk (2007). The Logic of Relations Between the Gene Ontology
and the Taxonomy of Species. Proceedings of the 10th Bio-Ontologies
SIG Workshop, ISMB/ECCB, Vienna, Austria [219].
P12 presents a critical assessment of the literature on ontological engineer-
ing, and provides evidence for the claim that there is much terminological
29An extended report on this effort is in preparation for journal publication.
30This article has not been peer-reviewed, but it was presented and discussed at a forum of over
20 leading experts in the fields of knowledge representation and biomedical ontology.
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confusion in this field, which reflects a deeply rooted incoherence between
the philosophical-ontological views adopted by individual developers.31 P13
presents an attempt undertaken to standardize both the terminology and the
underlying philosophical theory of existence, much needed for assuring in-
teroperability between various ontologies developed under the guidance of
OBO Foundry.
Paper P14 discusses a number of terminological, nomenclatural, and ty-
pographical conventions worked out by, among others, the Metabolomics
Standards Initiative (MSI)32 and the Proteomics Standards Initiative (PSI)33
ontology working groups. In that article, we explore how OBO could be im-
proved in this respect, and propose for wider adoption a series of patterns
that have already been tested in practice by the aforementioned groups.
The activity has been directed towards reviewing the existing documenta-
tions in an effort to distill both common and conflicting conventions. The
aim of this analysis was to overcome the present diversity and fragmentation
and to determine what conventions should be commonly applied. In P14,
we describe the results of that study: naming conventions that, we believe,
should provide robust labels for controlled vocabularies and ontologies.
Articles P15–P17 reflect my work on establishing semantically clear links
between the Gene Ontology (and, in an extension, other OBO ontologies)
and the Taxonomy of Species. P15 discusses the problem of subsetting the
Gene Ontology with respect to various criteria, and explores the usefulness
of the so-called ‘GO slims’ (custom, hand-made subsets of GO terms) for au-
tomatically producing species-specific subsets. It also describes, informally,
a framework designed to give support for systematically linking the GO and
the Taxonomy of Species.34 P16 presents a formalization of that framework,
and P17 includes further extensions to what is covered in P16. Recently,
the approach presented in papers P15–P17 has been suggested by the OBO
Consortium as a generic framework for annotating terms in OBO ontologies
31Quite often, this incoherence seems to reflect negligence or ignorance rather than consciously
made decisions.
32http://msi-ontology.sourceforge.net/; see also Sansone et al. [306].
33http://www.psidev.info/; see also Hermjakob [164].
34Specifically, the NCBI implementation of the Linnaean Taxonomy. See Appendix B for more
details and discussion.
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with terms in the NCBI Taxonomy.35
In another article, I present an attempt to logically formalize the meaning
of gene and gene product annotations with terms in the Gene Ontology:
P18. Kus´nierczyk (2007). What Does a GO Annotation Mean? Proceed-
ings of the 10th Bio-Ontologies SIG Workshop, ISMB/ECCB, Vienna,
Austria [222].
That paper describes work in an initial stage; the formalism used in that
article is not discussed in much detail. GO annotations have been informally
discussed in Hill et al. [166] and Blake et al. [47]. The content of P18 is not
further discussed in this thesis.
Parts of the material included in Ch. 2 have also been presented at the 2007
Workshop on Ontologies, Standards and Best Practices in Ghent, Belgium,
as an invited talk on biomedical ontologies — foundations and principles of
design.
1.1.4 Research Summary
This section briefly characterizes the goals, questions, methods, and results
of the three phases of my research introduced above.
Phase I In this phase, the ultimate goal was:
G1. To develop computational models of gastric acid secretion and gas-
trointestinal neoplasia.
One of the central interests of the reseach group was to use microarray data,
and thus it was important to address the following questions (in addition to
questions related directly to the application domain):
35http://www.obofoundry.org/wiki/index.php/Species_specificity.
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Q1. How can microarray data be used for computational modeling in gas-
trointestinal research?
Q2. How should microarray experiments be designed and analyzed to de-
liver high-quality data and meaningful results?
Q3. Which of the available machine learning and data mining technolo-
gies are suitable for the modeling?
Furthermore, one of our primary interests was in applying the rough set-
based technology, and thus the following question was also in place:
Q4. How suitable for the purpose are rough set-based classifiers, and what
improvements can be made to further adapt the technology to the
task?
The research methodology used included:
M1. Laboratory procedures, such as hybridization and scanning of mi-
croarray slides according to established protocols where available (I
have participated in the laboratory part of some of the experiments).
M2. Statistical procedures, including exploratory analysis, filtering, nor-
malization, and hypothesis testing according to established standards
where available.
M3. Data mining procedures, including implementation and application
of rough set-based classifiers, evaluated according to established stan-
dards, e.g., using receiver-operating characteristics (ROC).36
Scientific contributions made in this phase include:
C1. Extending scientific knowledge about the pathogenesis of gastric acid
secretion and gastric cancer, as documented in P2–P8. My contri-
bution includes design and implementation of statistical methods for
36See, e.g., Fawcett [112] for an introduction.
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processing raw data, as well as application of various rough set-based
and other classifiers.
C2. Extending knowledge about the applicability and performance of ro-
ugh set-based classifiers in the context of functional genomics, specif-
ically gene function prediction from microarray gene expression data,
as documented in P1.37 My contribution includes design and imple-
mentation of rough set classifiers, as well as the assessment of statis-
tical significance of the results of subsequent classifications.
Phase II In this phase, the ultimate goal was:
G2. To design and build a tool (or extend an existing one) that would en-
able automated construction of biological association networks using
reasoning over general domain knowledge and past experience (user
profiles).
Questions that had to be addressed include:
Q5. What sources of general domain knowledge are available, what is
their quality, and how can they be accessed?
Q6. What sources of task-specific, episodic knowledge are available, and
how can such knowledge be represented?
Q7. How does a biologist choose relevant pieces of information while con-
structing a biological association network, what sorts of knowledge
are needed for making the decisions?
Since our group had a growing interest in the then newly developed Gene
Ontology, the following more specific questions were also relevant:
Q8. How can the Gene Ontology be used to analyze gene expression pat-
terns, how does the structure of the ontology challenge the estab-
lished statistical methodology?
37As well as Kus´nierczyk and Sommervik [225]; see footnote 9 on page 4.
18 CHAPTER 1. OUTLINE
Q9. How can the Gene Ontology (and other OBO ontologies) be used to
guide automated construction of biological association networks?
The research methodology used included:
M4. Critical review of existing structured sources of biomedical knowl-
edge (i.e., ontologies), assessment of how state-of-the-art automated
text mining can provide additional information.38
M5. Collection of episodic knowledge by direct observation and discussion
of experts’ performance and experiences during network construction
sessions.
M6. Experimentation with various statistical and machine learning ap-
proaches to analyze and classify gene expression data based on the
structure of the Gene Ontology, with theoretical and empirical vali-
dation.
M7. Implementation of some of the ideas and assessment of their utility
based on external users’ experiences.
Contributions made in this phase include:
C3. Extending the field of biomedical data mining with a novel method
and a tool for analyzing gene expression patterns based on anno-
tations with Gene Ontology, as presented in P9. My contribution
includes conceptual support during the design and implementation
phases.
C4. Design and partial implementation of a system for automated reason-
ing over large biological association networks, as presented in P10
and P11. Most of the work here was done by me.
38I have marginally participated in biomedical text mining-related research conducted by my
colleagues at NTNU (see, e.g., Sætre [303]), but this activity was not essential for my further work.
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Phase III In this phase, the ultimate goal was:
G3. To improve the structure of and interoperability between biomedical
ontologies, with particular focus on the Gene Ontology, its relatives
in the Open Biomedical Ontology framework, and their relationships
with the Taxonomy of Species.39
Questions that had to be answered included:
Q10. To what extent are the existing biomedical ontologies based on com-
mon design principles, and what are they, if any?
Q11. Is it desirable and feasible to impose a standard upper-level ontology
which all the biomedical ontologies would have to explicitly refer to?
Since one of the key achievements of the research team led by prof. Smith
was the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO),40 it was natural to pose the following
questions:
Q12. To what extent can the existing biomedical ontologies be forced to
modify their structure and content in order to be BFO-compliant?
Q13. Would such enforcement be desirable and beneficial?
Q14. How should BFO be modified or extended, if necessary, in order to be
better suited for the purpose?
Furthermore, we focused on the issue of explicitly connecting the Gene On-
tology with the Taxonomy of Species, attempting to answer the following
questions:
39One should rather speak of a taxonomy of species, as there are a few competitive approaches to
the classification of organisms. However, the Gene Ontology explicitly refers to the NCBI Taxonomy,
one of a few implementations of the Linnaean Taxonomy of Species, thus my study was focused on
that taxonomy as a reference. See Ch. 4 and Appendix B for more details.
40http://www.ifomis.uni-saarland.de/bfo/.
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Q15. How does OBO address the issue of relations between GO terms and
taxa, is the solution clean and efficient?
Q16. How could this problem be solved alternatively in order to improve
the structure and usability of the Gene Ontology?
Q17. How suitable for the task is the Linnaean Taxonomy, what are its
structural properties as a hierarchical classification system, what are
its implementations and how reliable they are?
The approach to address these questions was based on:
M8. Critical review of existing biomedical ontologies, comparison of their
design principles (if any), identification of weaknesses; the assess-
ment process included extensive communication with both authors
and users of OBO ontologies.
M9. Critical review of the Basic Formal Ontology, comparison with a few
other top-level ontologies, assessment of its applicability in the bio-
medical domain; the process included extensive communication with
both authors and users of BFO.41
M10. Analysis of the structure and content of the Gene Ontology and the
Taxonomy of Species,42 with focus on how relations between these
two are addressed in species-specific subsets of the GO.43
M11. Experimentation with various designs for a framework that would al-
low to connect the GO and the Taxonomy in an explicit and consistent
manner.
These efforts had the following results:
41While BFO is currently in the process of adoption as the top-level ontology for OBO, it is by
no means accepted by all potential users, and there are hot debates on many fundamental issues
addressed, or addressable, by BFO. See http://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss.
42The NCBI Taxonomy database, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=taxonomy.
43The so-called ‘GO slims’; see Ch. 4.
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C5. A collection of design principles for biomedical ontologies have been
proposed, as documented in papers P12–P14. I have contributed to
gathering and presenting evidence for the thesis that the lack of such
standards is undesirable, as well as to defining the core terminology
for OBO ontology developers, and to clarifying basic principles for
ontology design.
C6. A novel framework for connecting the GO and the Taxonomy has
been proposed and discussed with several members of the Gene On-
tology Consortium. As discussed in papers P15–P17, the framework
addresses the issue of partitioning of the GO in various taxonomic
contexts in a more structured and flexible way than it is currently
done using GO slims, and should thus augment the usability of the
GO, as well as provide support for species-dependent error checking
at annotation time. Following a recent decision of the Gene Ontology
Consortium, the framework is currently being experimentally incor-
porated into a non-public copy of the GO, and an empirical evaluation
will follow.44 The framework has also been suggested a candidate
for a plugin to the ontology curation tool OBO-Edit (Day-Richter et
al. [88]).
C7. Paper P18 presents an attempt to formalize the meaning of GO anno-
tations. Its main contribution is to show that the informal explanation
given in Hill et al. [166] is not entirely unambiguous, and that further
specifications are necessary to provide for a shared understanding.
1.2 Thesis Overview
The thesis reflects mostly the third phase of my research (Sec. 1.1.3). The
rest of this document is organized as follows:
– Chapter 2 provides an extensive introduction to the problem of in-
tegration of biomedical data. It discusses sources of the problem —
44Personal communication with Jennifer Deegan, GO curator, most recently in October 2007. See
also http://www.obofoundry.org/wiki/index.php/Species_specificity.
22 CHAPTER 1. OUTLINE
in particular, high-throughput screening technologies (Sec. 2.4); the
need for integration (Sec. 2.5); attempts to standardize storage and
communication protocols (Sec. 2.6); and the role biomedical ontolo-
gies are intended to play in solving the problem (Sec. 2.7).
– Chapter 3 focuses on practices in ontological engineering. It provides
evidence that there is, in many cases, a dose of uncertainty as to what
elements of an ontology represent, and which of the available repre-
sentational elements should be used to represent various entities in
the domain (Sec. 3.2). Section 3.3 describes an effort undertaken by
various parts of the OBO community, aimed at building a coherent ba-
sis for the development of biomedical ontologies. It is an effort I have
joined only recently, and the work is still in progress.
– Chapter 4 introduces the issue of dependency of terms in the Gene
Ontology terms on taxonomic contexts, the problem of subsetting the
Gene Ontology accordingly to a chosen context, and the need for a sys-
tematic approach to link terms in the GO with terms in the Taxonomy
(Sec. 4.1 and 4.2). Section 4.3 examines GO slims, the currently used
approach to (manually) subsetting the Gene Ontology.
– Chapter 5 introduces a framework for systematically linking GO terms
with taxa. Section 5.2 specifies a set of quantification patterns that can
be used to define a GO term’s validity, specificity, and relevance for a
taxon. Section 5.3 shows how these patterns can be propagated up-
and downwards along the hierarchy of both the GO and the Taxonomy,
and Sec. 5.4 provides examples of how the patterns can be used to
automatically partition the Gene Ontology.
– Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis, reconsiders the research questions
and the way they have been addressed, and discusses ideas for further
research.
– Appendix A introduces a logical formalism designed to formally pre-
sent the properties of the framework. Section A.2 specifies a simple
syntax and semantics, and Sec. A.3 defines rules of inference.
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– Appendix B takes a closer look at the Taxonomy of Species and its im-
plementations (i.e., taxonomic databases). It reviews the ontological
problem of species (Sec. B.2), taxonomic classification and nomencla-
ture schemes (Sec. B.3), and discusses some further problems with the
Taxonomy (Sec. B.4).
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides background information on bioinformatics and the
challenge of data integration in molecular biology, and a stepwise introduc-
tion to biomedical ontologies as a proposed solution to problems related to
the integration. Some of the questions addressed here are: What are the
reasons underlying the rapid increase in the amount of experimental data
in molecular biology? How are the data made accessible, how can they
be integrated and turned into information useful for biologists? How can
the data be made understandable to automated agents, how can biomedical
ontologies help?
The chapter is structured as follows:
– Section 2.2 explains what bioinformatics, computational molecular bi-
ology, and other related fields of research are concerned with.
– Section 2.3 briefly discusses the terms ‘data’, ‘information’, and ‘knowl-
edge’, which are often used in the bioinformatics literature.
– Section 2.4 introduces the idea of high-throughput screening, a collec-
tion of technologies that allow biologists to produce massive amounts
of data.
25
26 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
– Section 2.5 reviews attempts targeted at integration of the data so that
it can be uniformly presented to the human user, irrespectively of the
distributed nature of the underlying sources.
– In Sec. 2.6 we take a look at the efforts made to standardize the stor-
age formats and communication protocols, intended to ensure that
automated agents can easily access established and newly appearing
resources with minimized support from the human user.
– Section 2.7 introduces biomedical ontologies as a promise to equip
both human users and computer systems with knowledge necessary
for efficient and successful navigation through the vast amounts of
data.
2.1 Introduction
Scientific inquiry inevitably leads to the production of information that, in
order to be reusable, has to be stored in some form — as images, free-
text scientific publications, structured entries in relational databases, etc.
However, the fact that it is stored is not yet a guarantee for its reusability; it
has to be accessible in such a way that a potential user can browse, search,
filter, or otherwise select parts of the information relevant to the particular
study at hand. Furthermore, the data retrieved from a database have to be
interpreted in the right way to be useful as an information bearer and to
provide support for contributions to the scientific knowledge.
Molecular biology and its close relatives, computational molecular biology
(‘computational biology’ for short) and bioinformatics are currently at a
stage in which data of various sorts are produced with ever increasing speed,
which in turn motivates the development of computational approaches to
processing, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting the data as information
in a form and amount comprehensible for the human user. It is typical for
publications that present new bioinformatics tools to underline the over-
abundance of data and the need for integration; terms such as ‘information
explosion’ are used by their authors (e.g., Lloyd et al. [238]) to stress the
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shifting of modern biology from the so-called ‘one gene one postdoc’ ap-
proach to genomic analyses that include the simultaneous monitoring of
thousands of genes. It is also widely recognized that the amounts of ge-
nomic and other data, which are already too large to be studied by human
researchers in detail element by element, will continue to increase at an
even increasing pace (Brazma [56]).
It is clear that there is an increasing need for efficient access to concise
and integrated biomedical information to support data analysis and deci-
sion making. The complexity of biological systems, and the vast amount of
information now available at the level of genes, proteins, cells, tissues and
organs, requires the development of mathematical models that can define
the relationship between structure and function at all levels of biological
organization (Hunter et al. [176]). It appears, however, that knowledge
discovery in the widely scattered resources relevant for biomedical research
is often a cumbersome and non-trivial task, one that requires significant
training and effort (Rebhan et al. [290]). In an attempt to remedy the sit-
uation, various tools emerge that facilitate interpretation of biological data
in a batch mode, rather than on a gene-per-gene basis. Such tools, how-
ever, often leave the investigator with large volumes of apparently unorga-
nized information (Beisvåg et al. [34]). The use of explicitly represented
general biological knowledge, e.g., in the form of biomedical ontologies, is
often proposed as a solution to the data integration problem (Fedoroff et
al. [113], Smith [323]).
2.2 Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
Bioinformatics is a young research field, focused on the development of
computational tools that help biologists process, store, and draw inferences
from the data they generate in wet-lab experiments. Bioinformatics and
computational biology involve the use of techniques including applied math-
ematics, informatics, statistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, che-
mistry, and biochemistry to solve problems in biomedical research and clin-
ical practice. While the terms ‘bioinformatics’ and ‘computational biology’
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(as well as ‘computational molecular biology’, ‘biomolecular informatics’,
etc.) are often used interchangeably, the Biomedical Information Science
and Technology Initiative Consortium (BISTI)1 of the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) has proposed the following definitions that should help in dis-
tinguishing the fields:
Bioinformatics: Research, development, or application of compu-
tational tools and approaches for expanding the use of biological,
medical, behavioral or health data, including those to acquire, store,
organize, archive, analyze, or visualize such data.
Computational Biology: The development and application of data-
analytical and theoretical methods, mathematical modeling and com-
putational simulation techniques to the study of biological, behav-
ioral, and social systems.2
Some authors (e.g., Krane and Raymer [213]) underline that the primary
interest of bioinformaticians is to develop algorithms that can be applied in
analyses of biomedical data, while the primary interest of computational
biologists is to apply such algorithms in particular biological studies. Both
fields are interested in algorithms and computation, but for one of them
these are research targets, for the other they are research tools.
Fundamental textbooks on bioinformatics and computational biology are
Introduction to Computational Biology (Waterman [379]) and Algorithms on
Strings, Trees and Sequences: Computer Science and Computational Biology
(Gusfield [154]). Other interesting sources are Baldi and Brunak [27],
Krane and Raymer [213], Pevzner [281], Jones and Pevzner [186], and
Ewens and Grant [108], and other. For a recent overview of trends in bioin-
formatics, see, e.g., Perez-Iratxeta [280], or Altman [13].
Related to bioinformatics and computational biology is systems biology, fo-
cused on studying interactions between components of complex biological
1http://www.bisti.nih.gov/ .
2http://www.bisti.nih.gov/CompuBioDef.pdf , NIH Working Definition of Bioinformatics and
Computational Biology, July 17, 2000.
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systems.3 Research in systems biology is highly dependent on the availabil-
ity of the computational methods of bioinformatics. For an introduction to
systems biology, see, e.g., Kitano [203, 202] and Alon [11]; for more on
the application of computer science methods in systems biology, see Dub-
itzky [95], Burrage et al. [64], Lilburn et al. [236], Larrañaga et al. [231],
etc.
2.3 Data, Information, Knowledge
‘Data’, ‘information’, and ‘knowledge’ are three terms often used in the con-
text of bioinformatics. Intuitively, knowledge is usually distinguished from
data and information, while the terms ‘data’ and ‘information’ are often used
interchangeably. It has been argued (see, e.g., Aamodt and Nygård [7]) that
the unclear distinction between data, information, and knowledge impairs
their combination and utilization for the development of integrated systems.
There are a number of attempts to provide concise, comprehensible defini-
tions, and while we are not willing to engage in a lengthy discussion, it is
desirable to provide at least a brief introduction of these terms.
From the knowledgemanagement perspective the following definitions have
been proposed:
Data: unorganized and unprocessed facts; a set of discrete facts
about events — structured records of transactions.
Information: an aggregation of data that makes decision making
easier; facts and figures based on reformatted or processed data.
Knowledge: human understanding of a specialized field of interest
that has been acquired through study and experience. (Awad and
Ghaziri [20])
3In a review of three recently published books on systems biology, Eric Werner says, “Systems
biology is not as new as many of its practitioners like to claim. It is a mutated soup of artificial
life, computational biology and computational chemistry, with a bit of mathematics, physics and
computer science thrown in” (Werner [382]).
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In his Semantic Conceptions of Information, Floridi [115] provides an in-
depth discussion of data, information, and the differences between them.
He provides the following definitions:
Diaphoric Definition of Data: A datum is a putative fact regarding
some difference or lack of uniformity within some context.
General Definition of Information: σ is an instance of information,
understood as semantic content, if and only if:
– σ consists of one or more data;
– the data in σ are well-formed;
– the well-formed data in σ are meaningful.
This, of course, leaves open the question of what ‘well-formed’ and ‘mean-
ingful’ mean; the reader is referred to the original text for further discussion.
Note that, according to this definition, anything can be regarded as data —
just any non-uniformity in the real world is a datum. From the perspec-
tive of artificial intelligence, Aamodt and Nygård [7] suggest to define data,
information, and knowledge as the roles, or in terms of the roles that syn-
tactic entities — e.g., symbolic assertions — may play in decision-making
processes of reasoning agents:
Data: syntactic entities, patterns with no meaning. They are input to
an interpretation process, i.e., to the initial step of decision making.
Information: interpreted data, data with meaning. It is the output
from data interpretation as well as the input to, and output from,
the knowledge-based process of decision-making.
Knowledge: learned information, information incorporated in an ag-
ent’s reasoning resources, and made ready for active use within a
decision process; it is the output of a learning process.
In philosophy, knowledge is usually defined as justified true belief — this is
the so-called ‘JTB’ account of knowledge (Steup [348]) — with a number
of further modifications intended to address various problems inherent in
this definition.4 In essence, according to the JTB view knowledge is a belief
4For example, the Gettier problem (Steup [349]).
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which is true, and the believing agent has good reasons to hold the belief. In
the definition above, the belief is justified by the process of learning, though
there is no explicit demand on the belief’s being correct.
2.4 Biomedical Data
As in the case of any other empirical science, research in biology is based
on experimentation and involves gathering of data as an essential activity.
While the data come from observations of phenomena in the real world,
they are usually treated as an intermediate result that confirms or negates
hypotheses made a priori, and from which theories are inferred by means of
abduction.5 It is general truths about what generally holds in reality — what
some might wish to call the ‘laws of Nature’ — rather than the individual
phenomena, events, etc. reflected in the data, that are the ultimate target
of scientific inquiry. Traditionally, scientific publications only occasionally
include pieces of raw experimental data; observations are usually summa-
rized statistically, and conclusions are presented as theories — generalized
claims.
While the interest of science in general truths has not changed, recent de-
velopments in, among others, database and networking technologies allow
for the storage and reuse of virtually all of the experimental data being pro-
duced, without the need for immediate generalization. Researchers are en-
couraged, and in increasingly many situations even required, to supplement
their publications with raw (unprocessed) experimental data. Recent ad-
vances in molecular biology, genetics, biochemistry, and other related fields
have been accelerated by the availability of newer, faster, and increasingly
more automated technologies. Where only a few decades ago most of the
experimental work was done manually and in a very time-consuming man-
ner, complicated experiments can now be run on computerized devices with
only a few mouseclicks. There has been a decrease in the time needed to
perform measurements of various properties of biological entities — mul-
5Abduction is usually defined as inference to the best explanation, a non-monotonic or defeasible
inference (Josephson and Josephson [187]).
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ticellular organisms, cells, organelles, biomolecules; the number of such
entities that can be simultaneously observed and individually characterized
within a single experiment has increased substantially.
Computational systems biology, or simply systems biology (SB),6 a relatively
new field of study — or, according to some, a whole new research paradigm
— focuses on the observation and description of biological entities as com-
plete functioning systems. This new approach is contrasted with the tradi-
tional reductionistic practice of describing a complex system by means of
combining descriptions of its components observed one at a time. While
the latter approach has successfully identified most of the components of
living organisms and many interactions between them, it does not seem to
offer enough convincing insights and methods to comprehend how the pro-
perties of whole systems emerge from the properties of their parts studied
separately. Rather than from the reductionist viewpoint,7 the pluralism of
causes and effects in biological networks is better addressed by observing,
through quantitative measures, multiple components simultaneously, and
by rigorous data integration with mathematical models. Such a systemwide
perspective (that is, the systems biology approach) on component interac-
tions is required so that whole networks of components can be quantitatively
understood and rationally manipulated (Sauer et al. [307]).
The success of the systems biology approach depends on the availability
of experimental and computational technologies that allow one to gen-
erate, process, analyze, and present huge amounts of data. One of the
cornerstones of the development of SB was the invention of automated
high-throughput screening technologies (HTS);8 In brief, high-throughput
screening is the process of quantitative testing of a large number of enti-
ties — organisms, genes, chemical structures — in particular, molecules of
mRNA, proteins, etc. Compared to traditional screening methods, HTS is
characterized by its simplicity, rapidness, low cost, and high efficiency. Vari-
ous technologies are now available, and the screening of more than 100,000
6For an introduction, see the seminal articles by Kitano [202, 203]; for an overview of recent ac-
tivities in SB, see the website of the Institute for Systems Biology, http://www.systemsbiology.org/.
7For more on genetic reductionism and related issues, see, e.g., Waters [380].
8See, e.g., Burbaum and Sigal [61], Fan et al. [111], Shendure et al. [315].
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samples per day is not unusual. Another important aspect of HTS is that
many variables can be tested simultaneously for the same sample; it is thus
possible, for example, to assess the expression of tens of thousands of genes
from cells of a single line subjected to diverse experimental conditions (Liu
et al. [237]).
Without a doubt, the application of HTS technologies has already dramati-
cally increased the amount of data produced by biological experimentation,
and the increase rate is not linear; parallel high-throughput experiments
are generating increasing data volumes at an ever more rapid pace (Hekkel-
man and Vriend [163]). It is not uncommon nowadays to speak of mas-
sive biological data, and data sets from biological experiments are often the
motivation for work presented on conferences and workshops dedicated to
mathematical and computational approaches to handling massive data, e.g.,
the Workshop on Algorithms for Modern Massive Data Sets (MMDS)9 or the
International Conference on Very Large Databases (VLDB).10
One of the best known and widely established HTS technologies for molec-
ular biology are microarrays (MA).11 Various sorts of microarrays can be
distinguished, depending on the type of biological material used, for exam-
ple:
– DNA microarrays, one of the most important applications for arrays so
far in monitoring of gene expression (Lockhart and Winzeler [239]);
– protein microarrays, which allow for rapid and multiplex screening of
thousands of samples on a single microarray with applications in, e.g.,
drug screening, metagenomics,12 and high-throughput enzyme assays
(Angenendt et al. [15]);
– cell microarrays, with which it is possible to study transfection with
9http://www.stanford.edu/group/mmds/.
10http://aitrc.kaist.ac.kr/˜vldb06/index.html.
11See., e.g., Schena et al. [309] for an early introduction, and Duyk [97] for a more recent
account.
12Metagenomics is the study of genomes from samples obtained from organisms found in their
natural environments, as opposed to artificially cultured ones; see, e.g., Eisen [99].
34 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
thousands of different RNAi13 reagents on a microarray slide (Wheeler
et al. [384]);
– tissue microarrays, where portions of thousands of different tissue
samples can be analyzed on one microscope glass slide simultaneously
(Simon et al. [316, 317]).
Microarrays based on other types of material, such as those focused on
protein-DNA interaction, protein-RNA interaction, on-chip translation, pro-
tein binding, etc., are under development (Hoheisel [171]). The availabil-
ity of high-throughput quantitative screening has led to the invention of a
whole range of new fields of holistic biological inquiry, such as genomics
(the study of entire genomes, complete sequences of an organism’s ge-
netic material); proteomics (the study of proteomes, complete collections
of proteins expressed by a genome); transcriptomics (the study of entire
collections of mRNA molecules — transcripts); metabolomics (the study of
metabolomes, whole collections of small molecules — metabolites);14 in-
teractomics (the study of interactomes, entire sets of interactions between
proteins), etc. Other examples include glycomics, lipidomics, spliceosomics,
phenomics, reactomics, etc. The Cambridge Healthtech Institute maintains
an -omics and -omes glossary and a taxonomy15 with statistics of Google
search hits and references to publications on new omics fields, under the
motto “we have entered the ‘omic’ era in biology”. The top-class scientific
journal Nature maintains what they call the ‘omics Gateway’:
“Biology has become an increasingly data-rich subject, and NPG16 is
committed to helping the community mine those data for novel in-
sight. Many of the emerging fields of large-scale, data-rich, biology
are designated by the suffix “-omics” added onto previously used
terms. The importance to the life science community as a whole of
13RNA interference (RNAi) is the phenomenon of blocking transcription of genes by short inter-
fering RNA molecules (siRNA); see, e.g., Mello and Conte Jr. [251] and other articles in the RNA
Interference volume of Nature Insight.
14“Metabolomics is the newest ‘omics’ science” (Claudino et al. [82]).
15http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/omes.asp.
16Nature Publishing Group.
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such large-scale approaches is reflected in the huge number of cita-
tions to many of the key papers in these fields. The Omics Gateway
provides life scientists a convenient portal into publications relevant
to large-scale biology from journals throughout NPG.”17
While the underlying principle of omics fields is a holistic view of their do-
mains of study, they inevitably divide the domain of molecular biology into
smaller subdomains studied separately. Recently, the term ‘omeomics’ has
been proposed as a name for the science that successfully integrates vari-
ous omics approaches, and ‘omeome’ as a name for the catalog of all omics
sciences.18
DNA microarrays are one of the earliest introduced and most popular mi-
croarray HTS technologies. With DNA microarrays, one can observe (and
quantify) the expression of tens of thousands of genes simultaneously —
indeed, the expression of whole genomes, such as the human genome with
its approximately 25,000 protein-coding genes (the International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium [180]). In brief, a typical microarray gene
expression experiment (MAGE) involves the following steps:
– collection and preparation of biological material from experimental
animals, plants, or cell cultures;
– purification of the material, extraction of the messenger RNA (mRNA)
fraction, and reverse transcription (RT) of the mRNA to complemen-
tary DNA (cDNA), and labelling of the material with fluorescent probes;
– distribution of the cDNA onto a collection of microarray plates (also
called ‘slides’ or ‘chips’) on which there are printed spots containing
small amounts of standardized biological material (probes from probe
libraries) with known biochemical properties, e.g., oligonucleotides;
– incubation of the plates in standard environmental conditions, during
17http://www.nature.com/omics/.
18http://www.omeomics.org/. Omeomics thus defined seems to overlap with Systems Biology;
so far, there are no serious publications under the hood of omeomics, and this example of termino-
logical creativity probably remains in the sphere of mere hype.
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which cDNA molecules from the investigated material hybridize (bind
specifically) with probes on the slides;
– scanning of the slides with a laser scanner, to assess the amount of
cDNA molecules bound to each probe;
– analysis of the images obtained from the laser scanner, a process which
involves the classification of single pixels in the images as correspond-
ing to the spots or to their surrounding background;
– statistical correction of systematic errors due to variation in the effi-
ciency and accuracy of printing, labelling, hybridization, and scanning;
– statistical analysis of the resulting data, e.g., selection of differentially
expressed genes;
– further analysis of the data in the light of previously published evi-
dence, data available from other experiments, and general knowledge.
For a comprehensive introduction to microarray technology, microarray data
analysis, and related issues see, e.g., Knudsen [206], Kohane et al. [207], or
Schena [308]. For a relatively recent overview of the developments in this
field see Barrett [29] and other articles in The Chipping Forecast III issue of
Nature Genetics, as well as previous editions in this series.
The Moore’s law (Moore [259]) predicts an increase in the number of tran-
sistors in an integrated electronic circuit (a microchip) of the order of two
every two years.19 An analogous trend can be described in the case of the
increasing amount of biomedical data.20 For example, in 2002, to study
growth factor-responsive genes in neuroendocrine gastrointestinal tumour
cells, we used custom-made microarray plates manufactured by the Nor-
wegian Microarray Consortium,21 printed with over 5,000 probes22 (Hof-
19http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/.
20In 1996, Hooft et al. [172] observed that “more than 4,700 data sets are available, and the
number is expected to double every 18 months” (about the Protein Data Bank, PDB).
21http://www.mikromatrise.no/
22In the context of DNA microarrays, a probe is a relatively short molecule of DNA (an oligonu-
cleotide) immobilized (printed onto) a microarray slide, to which molecules of RNA or comple-
mentary DNA (cDNA) from the tested sample bind with high degree of sequence specificity (Ko-
hane [207]).
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sli et al. [169]). In 2003, to study liver gene expression in rats in re-
sponse to the peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor-α agonist ciprofi-
brate, we used microarrays printed with over 7,500 elements (Yadetie et
al. [393]). As of 2007, newer, commercially available microarray chips, such
as the Affymterix GeneChip Human Genome U133 Plus Array,23 contain as
many as 1,300,000 oligonucleotide features. (Printed (spotted) cDNA MAs
differ from photolitographic oligonucleotide MAs such as the Affymetrix
GeneChips in that in the latter case the oligonucleotides are shorter, and
the microarrays contain a number (usually in the order of 10) of slightly
different oligonucleotides per gene, so that the numbers of features on a
single array are not directly comparable between these two MA types. Nev-
ertheless, these numbers are illustrative of the trends in miniaturization and
growing coverage of the microarray technology.) The use of microarrays has
contributed substantially to the flood of biomedical data (Hoheisel [171]).
It is said that no other methodological approach has transformed molecular
biology more in recent years than the use of microarrays. Microarray tech-
nology has led the way from studies of the individual biological functions
of a few related genes, proteins or, at best, pathways towards more global
investigations of cellular activity. The development of this technology im-
mediately yielded new and interesting information, and has produced more
data than can be currently dealt with (Hoheisel [171]).
The development and accessibility of hardware and software technologies
for experimentation in molecular biology has been parallelled by a rapid
increase in the number and size of publicly available molecular biology da-
tabases,24 ranging from comprehensive, omics-oriented, multispecies ones
such as Ensembl (Hubbard et al. [174]) and NCBI database resources (Whee-
ler et al. [385]), to those dedicated to narrower domains, such as the tissue-
specific human enhancers database VISTA (Visel et al. [376]) or the HIV
positive selection mutation database (Pan et al. [275]). And, of course,
there are quite a few databases providing microarray gene expression data,
e.g., the Stanford Microarray Database storing data generated from more
than 60,000 microarrays (Demeter et al. [90]), the EMBL-EBI ArrayEx-
23http://www.dnavision.be/pharmacogenomics/affymetrix_expression.php
24For evidence and history of this trend, see the annual summaries of publicly available databases,
published in the Database Issues of Nucleic Acids Research (Galperin [119, 120, 121, 122]).
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press, a rapidly growing database, which currently contains data from over
1,500,000 individual expression profiles (Parkinson et al. [276]), and the
NCBI Gene Expression Omnibus, containing tens of millions of expressions
profiles (Barrett et al. [30]). For orientation, Tab. 2.1 shows the number of
entries in a few other databases.
Database Domain Approximate size
dbSNP genetic variations 34,000,000
EMBL Nucleotide Sequence DNA sequences 80,500,000
Entrez DNA and protein sequences 91,000,000
GenBank DNA sequences 61,000,000
IntAct molecular interactions 126,000
NCBI Taxonomy named organisms 240,000
PubMed scientific publications 16,500,000
UniGene gene-oriented sequence clusters 1,200,000
UniSTS sequence-tagged sites 500,000
Table 2.1: Approximate sizes of selected molecular biology databases as
of December 2006 (Benson et al. [37], Kerrien et al. [197], Kulikova et
al. [214], Wheeler et al. [385]).
The amounts of data that are already available are, on the one hand, en-
couraging: it may seem that the more data we have, the more we know. On
the other hand, it is no longer possible to perform analyses by hand, and
we need tools — computer programs — that can find, download, process
and integrate data automatically. Methods of computer science are essen-
tial for effective handling and making sense of the data, and for rendering
them accessible to biologists working on a wide variety of problems. This is
one of the major challenges of bioinformatics today; we are swimming in a
rapidly rising sea of data — how do we keep from drowning? (Roos [300]).
In the field of information processing, there arises what can be called the
‘database Tower of Babel’ problem: different groups of researchers use their
own idiosyncratic terms and concepts to represent the information they pro-
duce and release to the public. To put this information together, methods
must be found to resolve terminological and conceptual incompatibilities
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(Smith [318]). Many attempts to solve this data integration problem have
been made. One possibility is to implement tools that can present data from
multiple databases in a uniform way, thereby hiding the implementational
details from the user. We shall have a look at such solutions in the next
section.
2.5 Data Integration
To become meaningful, data must be interpreted. For this to make practical
sense, the way in which users interpret the data should closely corespond
to the way in which the creators of the data intended them to be inter-
preted. To ensure this, data must be formatted and tagged in a way that
leaves no doubt as to what the data are about.25 Furthermore, data from
various sources have to be integrated, and only then will they give us an
all-covering image of the biological reality. The true value of the data that
is being generated in omics experiments will become visible come when
we turn from analyzing microarray and proteomic and metabolomic and all
other data sets independently, and rather combine them to provide a single
coherent view of the fundamental biological phenomena. Consequently, we
need to consider methods that will place these diverse data into a common
reference frame that can organize the information in a manner facilitating
its interpretation (Quackenbush [288]).
Until not so long ago, molecular biology databases were organized into
collections of so-called ‘flat files’, where data were formatted in separate,
tagged lines of human-readable text.26 Each database had its own idiosyn-
cratic format, and to retrieve relevant pieces of information one had to use
database-specific tools that could parse, filter, and present a selection of
the content of flat files to the human user. (One could of course manually
browse the files or use a simple text search tool, but for complex queries this
25There is a noteworthy element of circularity or regression in this requirement; any tag attached
to a piece of data is itself a piece of data (and is thus sometimes called ‘metadata’), and that data
must be first interpreted as representing the tag.
26Some databases are still stored, if only partially, as collections of flat files.
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approach is very inefficient.) While relatively convenient for manual cura-
tion, flat file formats severely restrict the usability of databases — to perform
advanced, complicated queries, one had to master system tools such as grep,
sed or awk,27 or write programs in languages such as Fortran or Perl. The
fact that a single database could employ a number of incompatible formats
did not make the situation better. Ideally, the information should be pre-
sented in a way such that it can be parsed by a computer program correctly
pulling out the relevant descriptions from the appropriate fields, and stan-
dard names should be used to describe common properties. In 2001, most
sequence annotations did not meet these criteria. The difficulties in parsing
annotations of most sequence databases were known to anybody who had
tried to develop such parsers (Brazma [56]).
For example, consider the Protein Data Bank (PDB; Berman et al. [39]), a
database that faced this problem:
“One of the most difficult problems that PDB now faces is that the
legacy files are not uniform. Historically, existing data (‘legacy data’)
comply with several different PDB formats and variation exists in
how the same features are described for different structures within
each format.” (Berman [40])
Figure 2.1 shows an excerpt from a PDB character-formatted flat data file,
corresponding to an entry about the glutathione synthetase enzyme mole-
cule. For comparison, Fig 2.2 shows an excerpt from a UniProt (The UniProt
Consortum [368]) database flat file. While it is, arguably, easy to read for
a human, it is not so easy to parse and search automatically. (It is certainly
easy to parse once one has an appropriate parser. From the perspective of a
computer scientist, implementing a parser for a clearly defined flat file for-
mat specific to a biological database is not a challenging task; however, most
early software in computational biology has been created by biologists, and
the obstacle was considerable.)
In their presentation of PDBFINDER, a database that “contains summary
27grep, a command line tool for searching patterns in text files using regular expressions; sed,
a programming language for textual transformations on streams of data; awk, a pattern-matching
programming language for working with text files [299].
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COMPND MOL_ID: 1;
COMPND 2 MOLECULE: GLUTATHIONE SYNTHETASE;
COMPND 3 CHAIN: A;
COMPND 4 SYNONYM: GAMMA-L-GLUTAMYL-L-CYSTEINE\:GLYCINE LIGASE
COMPND 5 (ADP-FORMING);
COMPND 6 EC: 6.3.2.3;
COMPND 7 ENGINEERED: YES
...
Figure 2.1: Excerpt from a Protein Data Bank flat file in the PDB Format.
From PDB, http://www.wwpdb.org/.
information for all PDB data sets”, Hooft et al. discuss a number of problems
they met while writing Perl scripts for extracting information from PDB flat
format files. For example,
“For the ‘Enzyme-Code’ field the program contains seven different
regular expressions (text patterns) that have to be tested sequen-
tially. This is needed to recognize expressions like (E.C. 3.2.1.27)
and EC: 3.2.1.27; as the same reference.” (Hooft et al. [172])
One solution to this problem is to isolate the biologist from the implemen-
tational details by means of an interface that provides a transparent access
to multiple sources of data in a uniform presentation layer. The Sequence
Retrieval System (SRS; Etzold and Argos [104, 105]), for example, was de-
signed as a system for indexing flat file libraries, intended to provide fast
access to individual library entries via retrieval by keywords from various
data fields; it included a “sophisticated parsing engine for information ex-
traction” and effectively isolated the user — a biologist — from the specifics
of flat file formats by means of a web-based graphical user interface (Etzold
and Verde [106]). Another example is the MRS server, which allows for
very rapid queries in a large number of flat-file data banks, such as EMBL,
UniProt, OMIM, dbEST, PDB, KEGG, etc. (Hekkelman and Vriend [163]).
However, this solution works only if the biologist is interested in brows-
ing or searching through the databases via a graphical, typically web-based
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ID GRAA_HUMAN Reviewed; 262 AA.
AC P12544;
DT 01-OCT-1989, integrated into UniProtKB/Swiss-Prot.
DT 01-OCT-1989, sequene version 1.
DT 07-FEB-2006, entry version 77.
DE Granzyme A preursor (EC 3.4.21.78) (Cytotoxi T-lymphoyte proteinase
DE 1) (Hanukkah fator) (H fator) (HF) (Granzyme-1) (CTL tryptase)
DE (Fragmentin-1).
GN Name=GZMA; Synonyms=CTLA3, HFSP;
OS Homo sapiens (Human).
OC Eukaryota; Metazoa; Chordata; Craniata; Vertebrata; Euteleostomi;
OC Mammalia; Eutheria; Euarhontoglires; Primates; Catarrhini; Hominidae;
OC Homo.
OX NCBI_TaxID=9606;
RN [1℄
RP NUCLEOTIDE SEQUENCE [MRNA℄.
RC TISSUE=T-ell;
RX MEDLINE=88125000; PubMed=3257574;
RA Gershenfeld H.K., Hershberger R.J., Shows T.B., Weissman I.L.;
RT "Cloning and hromosomal assignment of a human DNA enoding a T ell-
RT and natural killer ell-speifi trypsin-like serine protease.";
RL Pro. Natl. Aad. Si. U.S.A. 85:1184-1188(1988).
...
Figure 2.2: Excerpt from a UniProt flat file. Source: UniProt, http://www.-
ebi.uniprot.org/ .
interface. For queries that are not supported by the interface, and for pro-
grammatical analysis of large amounts of information — an activity essen-
tial for doing systems biology — this approach is unhelpful. Fortunately, the
problem of having to parse idiosyncratically formatted flat files is largely
historical; modern databases are stored using high-speed database manage-
ment systems (DBMS),28 though some still use flat files to store parts of
their content. There are various types of database management systems: re-
lational (RDBMS, such as MySQL29), object-oriented (ODBMS; for example,
db4objects30), hybrid object-relational (ORDBMS; e.g., Caché31), and oth-
ers. Many of them are available for a low fee, or at no cost at all, which is
particularly welcome by database developers affiliated with publicly funded
28For the persistence of data a DBMS stores them in a collection of files, but these files are com-
pletely hidden behind an interface provided by a standard query language.
29http://www.mysql.com/.
30http://www.db4o.com/.
31http://www.intersystems.com/cache/.
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research institutions. Furthermore, where data is accessible in files rather
than through a database query language, the common solution now is to use
XML as the basis for syntax definition, which virtually solves the problem of
parsing.
Nevertheless, while data stored in DBMS-managed databases are accessible
through a standardized data definition and query language, typically some
flavour of SQL (Chamberlin and Boyce [73], Kline et al. [205]), and writing
flat file parsers is not any more a prerequisite for programmatic access to
the data, this does not solve the problem of data integration. In fact, one
could argue that the availability of free to download and easy to install and
run DBMSs made the problem even worse: everyone can now create and
publish a database in minutes,32 and as of 2007, there are almost 1,000
publicly available molecular biology databases (Galperin [122]). Despite
being accessible through a standardized query language, the databases are
still speaking in tongues: they are built using different and often incompat-
ible schemas and nomenclatural conventions, and more often than not it is
meaningless to run the same SQL query against two databases that provide
data of the same sort.
Analogously as in the case of flat file-based databases, one solution is to
build centralized services which allow a user to browse the content of multi-
ple databases through a unified interface — for example, SOURCE (Diehn et
al. [92]) or GeneCards (Safran et al. [304]). Datawarehousing is a solution
based on bringing all the relevant data from multiple distributed sources
into one integrated database; an example of biomedical datawarehouse is
the Annotation Tool suite implemented by the Norwegian Microarray Con-
sortium (Beisvåg et al. [34]). This approach, however, has not always been
successful; one of the most ambitious attempts of this kind was the Inte-
grated Genome Database (IGD; Ritter [297]) project, which aimed at com-
bining human genome sequence data with multiple genetic and physical
maps that were in the focus of human genomics at the time. At its peak,
IGD integrated more than a dozen source databases, including GenBank,
the Genome Database (GDB) and the databases of many human genetic-
mapping projects. The IGD project survived for slightly longer than a year
32Populating the database may take much more time, though.
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before collapsing (Stein [347]).
Some services offer programmatic access to integrated data via an appli-
cation programming interface (API). For example, Ensembl (Hubbard et
al. [174])33 stores genome-centric data from a number of eukaryotic spec-
ies, and provides a comprehensive set of APIs that serve as a middle layer34
between the underlying database schemas and application programs. The
APIs aim at encapsulating the database layout by providing efficient high-
level access to the tables, and at isolating applications from changes in
the underlying database schema. The Ensembl Perl API is based on the
BioPerl Toolkit provided by the BioPerl community, an international open-
source collaborative effort of biologists, bioinformaticians, and computer
scientists.35 BioPerl has evolved over the past decade into a comprehensive
library of modules available for managing and manipulating life-science in-
formation (Stajich et al. [345]). While Bioperl enables a researcher to pro-
grammatically access various databases in a relatively uniform fashion, it
still relies on database-specific implementational details provided in, e.g.,
separate modules supplied by the developer of the database. Figure 2.3
illustrates the issue with an excerpt from a Bioperl program that accesses
the EMBL database to retrieve the sequence identified by the UniProt ID
‘U14680’. Note that it is necessary to use an EMBL-specific module.
Other examples of code libraries that allow to programmatically access var-
ious molecular biology resources include BioPython (de Hoon et al. [89]),
BioJava and BioJavax (Pocock et al. [285]), BioLingua and BioBike (Massar
et al. [245]), etc. For a recent overview of libraries of molecular biology-
related code written for a number of diverse programming languages, see,
e.g., McGuffee [249] and the Open Bioinformatics Foundation website.36
Stajich and Lapp [346] provide a survey of open source tools and toolkits
for bioinformatics.
The challenge of integration, however, is not constrained to having to com-
municate with multiple sources of data. In parallel to the development of
33http://www.ensembl.org/.
34Some would use the term ‘middleware’ (Bernstein [42]) in this context.
35http://www.bioperl.org/.
36http://www.open-bio.org.
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use Bio::DB::EMBL;
use Bio::SeqIO;
my $db = new Bio::DB:::EMBL();
my $seq = $db->get_seq_by_a("U14680");
my $seqout = new Bio::SeqIO(-format => "genbank");
if (defined $seq) {
$sequot->write_seq($seq);
}
Figure 2.3: A fragment of Bioperl code for retrieving a sequence from a
remote database, using the Bio::DB::EMBL module (Stajich [345]).
databases, there is an even more rapid production of new tools for doing
all sorts of analysis of the available data. The annual Database Issue of the
Nucleic Acids Research journal was first released in 1993; since 2002, it has
been accompanied by the Web Server Issue, which highlights many servers
that are available on the internet to perform useful computations on DNA,
RNA and protein sequences and structures; furthermore, it lists as a few
servers that help to mine scientific literature or cover other aspects of biol-
ogy (Nucleic Acids Research Database Issue 2006, Editorial [3]). As of 2006,
there are over 1,000 web servers listed in the Bioinformatics Links Directory
(Fox et al. [116]). Instead of implementing libraries of separate modules
necessary to access every newly created database or analysis tool, enforc-
ing those distributed resources to use standard representation schemas and
communication protocols may, as one could expect, be a better solution to
challenge of data integration. We shall discuss some of such standards in
the next section.
2.6 Standardization
High-throughput technologies generate large amounts of complex data that
have to be stored in databases, communicated to various data analysis tools
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and interpreted by scientists. Data representation and communication stan-
dards are needed to implement these steps efficiently (Brazma [58]). The
underlying idea is that once a representation or communication standard
is established, tools may be implemented that would be able to access pre-
viously existing and newly created databases and other resources without
knowing their implementational details. If new resources comply with the
standards, there is no need for implementing new parsers, translators, etc.
What is the status of such standardization efforts for information exchange
in biomedicine? A recently published survey conducted by the World Tech-
nology Evaluation Center (WTEC)37 compared activities of system biolo-
gists in the United States, Europe and Japan. The survey revealed absence
of a suitable infrastructure for systems biology, particularly for data and
software standardization, which is a major impediment to further progress
(Cassman [69]).
Standardization efforts are aimed at solving the challenge of integration in
a variety of ways. On the side of database architecture, the Generic Model
Organism Database Toolkit (GMOD)38 is a noteworthy example of an open
source project providing a complete set of software components for creating
and administering a model organism database. It includes a number of mod-
ules — genome visualization and editing tools, literature curation tools, a
robust database schema, biological ontology tools, etc. Unfortunately, its de-
sign may impede integration with resources which are not based on GMOD.
The design of the relational database schema Chado,39 for example, includes
a number of optimizations40 which may make programmatic access to the
database via object-relational mapping (ORM) frameworks (e.g., Hibernate
for Java41) more difficult than necessary.
The extensible markup language (XML)42 is one of the most successful at-
tempts to standardize data exchange between applications; XML is a general-
37http://www.wtec.org/.
38http://www.gmod.org/.
39http://www.gmod.org/wiki/index.php/Schema/.
40The term ‘optimization’ was used by one of the developers of Chado to explain some of the
peculiarities of the design (private conversation).
41http://www.hibernate.org/.
42http://www.w3.org/XML/; see also Harold and Means [160].
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purpose, human- and machine-readable language43 with a strict, easy to
learn, write, and parse syntax. However, XML itself is not a data exchange
language; it is a language which provides the basis for defining application-
specific or domain-specific data (information, knowledge) representation
languages. By imposing a strictly hierarchical structure of a well-formed
(XML-valid) document, the standard greatly simplifies the implementation
of parsers for languages based on XML. Any XML parser can parse a docu-
ment written in any XML-based language. However, XML does not specify
how elements of an XML-based language should be interpreted and pro-
cessed; providing such specifications is the task of the developers of an XML-
based representation standard. Similar comments apply to generic repre-
sentation languages such as the Resource Description Framework (RDF).44
While some explore the possibility of using RDF to represent, store and
query both data and metadata across life sciences datasets (e.g., Cheung et
al. [76]), others complain that “putting a bunch of RDF into a bucket is not
the same as integration, just like exporting two databases as RDF doesn’t
necessarily mean you can link their content” (Goble [128]).
In bioinformatics, many standards for the exchange of experimental data
have been based on XML.45 For example, the Microarray Gene Expression
Data Society (MGED Society) defined a standard for the storage and trans-
fer of microarray data, Minimum Information About a Microarray Exper-
iment (MIAME; Brazma et al. [57]). A MIAME-compliant record from a
microarray experiment must contain, in addition to the raw data, informa-
tion about the experimental design, array design, preparation of samples,
hybridization procedure, scanning process, statistical analysis, etc. In ad-
dition, the UML-based MAGE Object Model (MAGE-OM) provides a formal
model of the domain, and its XML-based counterpart, the Microarray Gene
Expression Markup Language (MAGE-ML; Spellman et al. [343]) provides
a means for data exchange. Some microarray gene expression databases,
notably ArrayExpress (Parkinson et al. [276]) and GEO (Barrett et al. [30]),
43Arguably, XML is not a language, but rather a language template. The human-readability of
XML-based documents is also subject to dispute.
44http://www.w3.org/RDF/.
45For some time, ‘BioXML’ used to be a trendy buzzword; there were a number of related web
sites, e.g., bioxml.org, bioxml.com, bioxml.net, etc., but they are no longer under active develop-
ment. A more recent bio-buzzword is ‘BioRDF’ (http://esw.w3.org/topic/BioRDF_Top_Level_Task).
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support the MIAME standards. Similar standardization efforts are made in
other biomedical domains; see, e.g., Strömback et al. [357] for a recent
review.
Unfortunately, while the relative effortlessness with which XML-based lan-
guages can be defined greatly enhances the development of representation
and exchange standards, the job may easily be overdone — everyone can
now create a language for which parsers are already available. The Data-
base Tower of Babel problem may thus be converted, rather than success-
fully solved, to what one could appropriately call the ‘Standards Tower of
Babel’ problem. Consequently, standardization has not only become a pop-
ular topic in bioinformatics, but it has almost developed into a field of its
own. New standards-related acronyms, such as MAGE, MO, MIAPE, MISFI-
SHIE, MIRIAM and MIACA,46 are appearing almost monthly. Most of these
initiatives for developing standards are community-based and involve close
collaboration of biologists, bioinformaticians and information technologists.
Nevertheless, the sheer number of different standards and the pace at which
the field is changing is making it difficult, even for professionals, to keep
track of all the new developments (Brazma et al. [58]). But while Brazma
complains about the emergence of innumerable ‘standards’,47 he subscribes
to the view that enforcing a top-down, centralized approach to the devel-
opment of standards is not the right way to go (Quackenbush [289]). In-
deed, the Gene Ontology, undeniably one of the most successful terminolog-
ical standards in molecular biology, has emerged as a de facto, bottom-up,
community-built rather than a de jure, top-down, authority-established stan-
dard.
Another line of standardization efforts in computational molecular biology
is related to naming and identification48 of biological entities. The challenge
of data integration is grounded not only in incompatible programmatic da-
tabase interfaces and data exchange formats; it is also the problem of in-
46 ‘Minimal Information on . . . ’, as in MIRIAM = Minimal Information Required In the Annota-
tion of biochemical Models. See http://mibbi.sourceforge.net/, the website of MIBBI, Minimum
Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations.
47Some of those specifications, in particular MAGE and MO, were created by Brazma’s own team.
48Identification in the sense of assigning unique identifiers, not in the sense of recognizing and
establishing the identities of observed entities.
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compatible and incoherent identification schemes. The problems created by
the lack of standards for gene names and their spellings are well known and
have haunted the life sciences for more than a decade (Brazma [56]). Two
notable examples of attempts to standardize the identification of biologi-
cal entities are the Life Science Identifier scheme (LSID; Clark et al. [81])
and the Human Gene Nomenclature (Wain et al. [377, 378]) introduced
and maintained by the Human Genome Nomenclature Committee (HGNC;
Povey et al. [287]). The former effort aims at standardizing the form of
identifiers, while the latter aims at controlling the actual collection of terms
used to name genes — the HUGO Gene Nomenclature Database (Eyre et
al. [109]) provides unique and approved (by HGNC itself) gene names and
symbols. Ideally, each gene mentioned in the scientific literature and de-
scribed by entries in various databases should be referred to by means of
the official HUGO name or symbol. In practice, however, alternative na-
mes and symbols — aliases — are used more often than the official ones
(Tamames and Valencia [363]). Some genes have had their symbols (or na-
mes) changed, and their old symbols serve as aliases for other genes; some
symbols are aliases to more than one gene. For example, the gene with the
HGNC identifier ‘4122’ is assigned the official symbol ‘GALNS’ and the sym-
bol ‘GAS’ as an alias, while the latter symbol had previously (until November
20., 2005) been used as the official symbol of the gene with the HGNC iden-
tifier ‘4164’ and the (currently used) official symbol ‘GAST’. While the use of
symbols should alleviate the problems of identification, in practice it seems
to produce even more ambiguities. For example, the comparison of microar-
ray data from different sources requires exact mapping of the names used
by different authors; this task is greatly complicated by ambiguous symbols,
which in different publications identify different genes. The identifier ‘PAP’
can refer to five different human genes, and in the absence of additional
information it is impossible to correctly judge which one is the intended tar-
get (Tamames and Valencia [363]). As of July 2007, there are seven human
genes that can be referred to with ‘PAP’ as a symbol; see Table 2.2.
The other mentioned above example of an attempt to standardize identifi-
cation in molecular biology is the initiative undertaken by the Interoperable
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Official symbol Official name
DDEF1 development and differentiation enhancing factor 1
DDEF2 development and differentiation enhancing factor 2
MRPS30 mitochondrial ribosomal protein S30
PAPOLA poly(A) polymerase alpha
PDAP1 PDGFA associated protein 1
REG3A regenerating islet-derived 3 alpha
TUSC2 tumor suppressor candidate 2
Table 2.2: Genes with ‘PAP’ registered as an alias or previous symbol. Sour-
ce: HGNC, http://www.genenames.org/.
Informatics Infrastructure Consortium (I3C; no longer on the web):49
“Current bioinformatics applications and databases each have uni-
que formats for the identifiers that they generate and maintain. In
order to integrate disparate applications it is necessary for bioinfor-
matics developers to include code to parse and identify the identi-
fiers. This problem is made thornier by the fact that identifiers can
often not be recognized simply by looking at the identifier itself out
of context, e.g., is GI000197 a GenBank accession number or a GI
(GenInfo) number? If we were to write this identifier as an LSID
instead:
urn:lsid:genbank.nbi.nih.gov:genbank.gi:000197
then it becomes immediately recognizable to a program: that is look-
ing at an identifier; what kind of identifier it is; and what authority
to contact for resolution, methods queries and so forth.” (Clark et
al. [81])
Unfortunately, despite the initial enthusiasm and adoption of LSID by the
Object Management Group (OMG)50 and a few other institutions (Martin
49See http://xml.coverpages.org/lsid.html.
50http://www.omg.org/.
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et al. [243]), the LSID identification scheme is not universally used and
does not seem to be considered superior to other identification schemes,
e.g., employing URIs.51 However, problems with identification of resources
available on the web are by no means specific to the domain of molecular
biology. The International World Wide Web Conference52 regularly features
papers focused on what became called the ‘Identity Crisis of URIs’.53 While,
for example, Parsia and Schneider [277] and Connolly [83] put forward
proposals for how to solve the problem in technological terms, Halpin [156]
and Ginsberg [127] call for a more careful philosophical analysis of the
issue of identity, reference, and meaning in the context of the semantic web,
and Gagnemi and Presutti [118] propose an ontology of web resources and
their referencing kinds. LSIDs, as well as other biological identifiers, are
all subject to the identity problem; indeed, much of the recent discussions
on the mailing list of the W3C Semantic Web Health Care and Life Sciences
Interest Group (HCLSIG)54 have been devoted to questions such as whether
a UniProt ID identifies a class of proteins or rather a database entry, etc. See
also Good and Wilkinson [135] for more discussion.
Related to, and actually dependent on the efforts to standardize commu-
nication protocols (as well as on the development of biomedical and other
ontologies) are attempts at data integration based on web services tech-
nologies.55 The myGrid project (Goble et al. [129], Stevens et al. [353])56
is probably the most prominent example of this approach. With a dedicated
tool (Taverna; Hull et al. [175], Kawas et al. [194]), myGrid allows rese-
archers in computational biology to dynamically combine various sources
of data and services into so-called ‘workflows’, using a graphical user inter-
face and without exposing implementational details of the resources used.
Unfortunately, despite much effort devoted recently to the development of
51Uniform Resource Identifiers; Berners-Lee, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1630/.
52WWW, http://www2006.org/.
53K.G. Clark’s Identity Crisis, http://xml.com/pub/a/2002/09/11/deviant.html, is one of the
earliest to point out the issue. There is a relevant and interesting discussion between, am-
ong others, Tim Berners-Lee and Pat Hayes available from the W3C mailing lists archives
(http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-tag) under the title ‘Resources and URIs’.
54http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/hcls/.
55http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/.
56http://www.mygrid.org.uk/.
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methods for automated web service discovery and composition (see, e.g.,
Küngas [217]), myGrid workflows can only be constructed manually. Fur-
thermore, while workflows can be stored and reused by others, there does
not seem to be any way of systematically organizing existing workflows,
based on a structured description rather than on keyword search.
2.7 Biomedical Ontologies
While the standardization of data representation and exchange formats im-
proves the ability of automated agents to retrieve data of specific types, it
hardly makes them understand what the data are about. Without an explicit
representation of general knowledge about the domain, the agents have to
be hard-coded with procedures for processing the data; this approach is
not flexible enough — our knowledge about life is dynamic and changes
rapidly,57 and so do our needs for data representation and retrieval. Unfor-
tunately, large parts of biological knowledge are available only in forms that
require substantial processing effort to make them understandable for au-
tomated agents. Free-text descriptions are (ideally) informative to humans,
but need to be parsed and converted to structured, computer-understan-
dable forms using some sort of natural language processing technology
(NLP)58 — and NLP is considered one of the so-called ‘AI-complete’ tasks, a
collection of problems such that solving one of them is equivalent to solving
the entire AI problem: producing a generally intelligent computer program
(Shapiro [314]).
As an example, consider the UniProt59 entry for the protein gastrin precur-
sor (name ‘GAST_HUMAN’, accession ‘P01350’). This entry provides some
highly structured information, mostly in the form of alternative names and
symbols, organism identifiers, and cross-references to other databases that
describe various aspects of the protein. However, information about its func-
57Undoubtedly, it is the case for what we think we know about complicated interactions between
entities at low levels of granularity — at the level of genomes, proteomes, etc.
58See, e.g., Jurafsky and Martin [189] for an introduction.
59http://www.ebi.uniprot.org/.
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tion is available mostly in a non-structured form; while the protein is anno-
tated with the rather general GO terms ‘hormone activity’ (GO:0005179;
molecular function ontology) and ‘signal transduction’ (GO:0007169, bio-
logical process ontology), further details are available only as free-text com-
ments and references to publications reporting original experimental studies
of the protein. The corresponding entry in the Online Mendelian Inheri-
tance in Man database (OMIM; Hamosh et al. [157]) consists entirely of a
free text description and a list of references.60 Recently, Belleau et al. [35]
have proposed Bio2RDF,61 an integrative system for biomedical knowledge.
It contains, among others, OMIM entries translated into a structured form,
encoded in RDF. Figure 2.4 shows an excerpt from the OMIM entry on GAST,
and Fig. 2.5 shows a fragment of this information encoded in Bio2RDF.
Database: OMIM
Entry: 137250
MIM Entry: 137250
Title:
*137250 GASTRIN; GAS
Text:
Gastrin, whih is normally formed by muosal ells in the gastri antrum
and by the D ells of the panreati islets, is a hormone whose main
funtion is to stimulate seretion of HCl by the gastri muosa. HCl, in
turn, inhibits gastrin formation. Human gastrin has a moleular weight
of 2,117 and ontains 17 amino aid residues. Gastrin I and gastrin II
...
Figure 2.4: An excerpt from the OMIM entry on the gene GAST. From
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/omim/.
It is often suggested that manual searching or browsing is no longer a rea-
sonable approach to the exploration of vast resources of biomedical data.
Typically, a user or a bioinformatics tool developer is left trying to deal with
the following issues: which resources to use; how to use these resources;
understanding the content of the resources and interpreting results; trans-
ferring data between resources and reconciling values. All these steps are
60Interestingly, the OMIM entry still uses the gene symbol ‘GAS’, even though it has been officially
(by the HGNC) replaced with the symbol ‘GAST’.
61http://www.bio2rdf.org/. Bio2RDF should not be confused with BioRDF.
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<http://bio2rdf.org/omim:137250>
- <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type> <http://bio2rdf.org/omim#GenetiDisorder>
- <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-shema#label> <"GASTRIN; GAS [omim:137250℄">
- <http://purl.org/d/elements/1.1/identifier> <"omim:137250">
- <http://purl.org/d/elements/1.1/title> <"GASTRIN; GAS">
- <http://bio2rdf.org/bio2rdf#lsid> <urn:lsid:bio2rdf.org:omim:137250>
- <http://bio2rdf.org/omim#TEXT> "TEXT Gastrin, whih is normally formed by muosal ells
in the gastri antrum and by the D ells of the panreati
..."
...
Figure 2.5: An excerpt from the Bio2RDF entry on GAST. From
http://bio2rdf.org/.
dependent on knowledge of the biological domain, as well as of the more
technical specificities of communication protocols etc. It is no longer tenable
for an individual biologist to acquire and retain this range and complexity
of knowledge; bioinformatics needs computational support for storing, ex-
ploring, representing and exploiting knowledge (Stevens et al. [352]). It is
claimed that a solution to the challenge of data integration and interpreta-
tion must involve explicit representation of domain knowledge, in the form
of so-called ‘ontologies’. There is also a need for systems that can apply the
domain expert’s knowledge to biological data, systems that can reason about
what the data represent (Stevens et al. [351]).
What are ontologies? Despite (or perhaps because of) decades of research in
ontological engineering, there seems to be no unique, commonly agreed def-
inition of what an ontology is (Guarino [148, 146], Kus´nierczyk [218]).62
Smith et al. propose the following definition, which attempts to clearly dis-
tinguish between the represented and the representation:
An ontology: a representational artifact, comprising a taxonomy as
proper part, whose representational units are intended to designate
some combination of universals, defined classes, and certain rela-
tions between them (Smith et al. [331]).
62The problem is also reflected in titles of ontological engineering-related publications such as,
e.g., The Karlsruhe View on Ontologies (Ehrig et al. [98]).
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To fully apprehend this definition, one has to have an understanding of the
terms ‘taxonomy’, ‘universal’, ‘class’, ‘representation’, etc., used in it. Unfor-
tunately, as in the case of ‘ontology’, these terms have been used in a number
of conflicting ways, which often reflect incompatible philosophical views on
what (and how) there is in the reality, though sometimes it rather indicates
a mere failure (or negligence) to note that there are such different views
and that one of them should be consistently adhered to for an ontology to
be both technically and philosophically coherent (see Ch. 3). Many other
definitions have been proposed. Perhaps most often cited are various ver-
sions of the one provided by Gruber [143]: “an ontology is a specification
of a conceptualization”. For the purpose of this introductory chapter, it shall
be enough to adopt the view that an ontology is a logically structured repre-
sentation of some domain (a portion of reality), which reflects our general
knowledge about that domain. The qualifier ‘logically structured’ refers to
the technical side of the representation: it is expressed within a controlled
syntax and is given semantics that can be used to perform logical inferences.
The qualifier ‘general’ underlines the scope and purpose of the ontology: to
provide a framework for characterizing individual entities, rather than to
describe each individual separately.
During the past decade there has been a rapid growth of interest in ontolog-
ical engineering (OE), the discipline concerned with designing, implement-
ing and deploying ontologies; consult, e.g., Mizoguchi [258], Devedžic´ [91],
and Gómez-Pérez et al. [133]. The first workshop dedicated to OE was held
in 1996, in conjunction with the 12th European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (ECAI). Since then, many other conferences have been accom-
panied by workshops on OE. There are also events entirely dedicated to
ontological issues in computational sciences, e.g., the International Confer-
ence on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS).63 As a result of
intense activity in the field, various methodologies for the development of
ontologies have been designed; for an introduction, see, e.g., Ontological
Engineering by Gómez-Pérez et al. [133].
One of the most visible testimonies of the trend is the ontological activity
in biomedicine and bioinformatics, perhaps best represented by the Open
63http://www.formalontology.org/.
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Biomedical Ontologies project (OBO)64 and its successor OBO Foundry.65
OBO ontologies can be browsed through the BioPortal of the National Center
for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO),66 or, alternatively, through the Ontology
Lookup Service (OLS)67 provided by the European Bioinformatics Institute
(EBI), and at a few other websites. The Gene Ontology (GO), which served
as the initial kernel of OBO and successfully continues to be its driving force,
is the result of an effort aimed at providing a structured, precise, shared
vocabulary for describing roles of genes and gene products in any organism
(Ashburner et al. [19], The Gene Ontology Consortium [366, 367]). One of
the major motivations for the development of the Gene Ontology was the
observation that the terminology used by biologists tends to be ambiguous,
which can severely impair the goal of data integration. In his Integrating
biological databases, Stein comments:
“A more subtle problem is the clash of concepts as users move from
one database to another. An extreme example, first noted byMichael
Ashburner, considers the use of the term ‘pseudogene’ by different
researchers and research communities. To some, a pseudogene is a
gene-like structure that contains in-frame stop codons or evidence
of reverse transcription. To others, the definition of a pseudogene is
expanded to include gene structures that contain full open reading
frames (ORFs) but are not transcribed. Some members of the Neis-
seria gonorrhea research community, meanwhile, use ‘pseudogene’
to mean a transposable cassette that is rearranged in the course of
antigenic variation. There are also more subtle disagreements. The
human genetics community uses the term ‘allele’ to refer to any ge-
nomic variant, including silent nucleotide polymorphisms that lie
outside of genes, whereas members of many model-organism com-
munities prefer to reserve the term ‘allele’ to refer to variants that
change genes. Even the concept of the gene itself can mean radically
different things to different research communities. Some research-
ers treat the gene as the transcriptional unit itself, whereas others
extend this definition to include up- and downstream regulatory el-
64http://obo.sourceforge.net/.
65http://obofoundry.org/.
66http://www.bioontology.org/.
67http://www.ebi.ac.uk/ontology-lookup/.
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ements, and still others use the classical definitions of cistron and
genetic complementation.” (Stein [347])
Questions such as “What is a gene?”, or “What does ‘gene’ mean?”, are not
of marginal importance. Recently, it has been argued that the lack of a clear
idea of what a gene is may hinder collaboration between researchers, while
reaching a consensus over the definition may be impossible (Pearson [279]).
The Gene (sic) Ontology avoids defining ‘gene’ altogether. But if the term
‘gene’ is used to describe database entries and form queries, how can we
know — how can a computer know — what those genes are? How can
an ontology help? Biomedical ontologies range from structurally simple
controlled vocabularies and dictionaries to complex graph-like structures of
linked terms, though typically they are not extensively axiomatized.68 They
have, roughly, the following few application scenarios (Stevens et al. [351,
352], Smith [323]):
– Ontologies can be used for defining database schemas. An ontology
may provide a high-level view of the data stored in a database, a view
that hides the implementational details of the database, an interface
between the schema and an application that accesses the data. In
the RiboWeb database (Altman et al. [14]), for example, four ontolo-
gies were used to specify different aspects of the covered domain: the
physical-thing ontology was a specification of the ribosome’s molecular
components and cofactors, and specified the objects and relations crit-
ical for representing data about ribosomal structure; the data ontology
specified the types of data that are gathered from biomedical experi-
ments; the data and molecule ontologies interact heavily, because the
data ontology’s attributes are often constrained to be instances from
the physical-thing ontology; the reference ontology specified the pub-
lication types; and the methods ontology specified the types of actions
RiboWeb could perform.
– Ontologies can be used to provide a translation between the schemas
of multiple databases. For example, in the Transparent Access to Mul-
68See, e.g., Lassila and McGuinness [232] for an attempt to classify representational artifacts
according to their structural complexity.
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tiple Bioinformatics Information Sources project (TAMBIS; Goble et
al. [130], Stevens et al. [350]), an ontology — the TAMBIS global do-
main ontology, TaO, an ontology of biomedical terminology (Baker et
al. [26]) — was intended as a mediator for accessing multiple biologi-
cal information sources round the world. The Semantic Meta Database
(SEMEDA; Köhler et al. [208]) is another example of this approach,
though TAMBIS and SEMEDA differ in logical and implementational
details. To my best knowledge, neither TAMBIS nor SEMEDA had ever
been used in an actual biological investigation.69
– Ontologies can be used as controlled vocabularies for annotation of
individual database entries. One of the best known examples of this
approach are the so-called ‘functional annotations’ with terms from the
Gene Ontology (Camon et al. [65], Lee et al. [233], Blake et al. [47]).
Recently, many other ontologies from the OBO family have been used
for such annotations. The Gene Ontology has been extensively used
for this purpose, and to date, arguably, most efforts within the GO
community have been dedicated to the annotation process (Blake and
Bult [48]).
– Ontologies can be used for reasoning over sets of appropriately an-
notated data. For example, annotations with terms from the Gene
Ontology can be used to analyze results from microarray gene expres-
sion experiments (Khatri and Draghici [198], Beisvåg et al. [33, 34],
Alterovitz et al. [12]).
– Ontologies can be used to annotate and retrieve scientific publica-
tions. The Medical Subject Headings terminology (MeSH; Lowe and
Barnett [240]) has been one of the most successful structured vocab-
ularies used to annotate biomedical literature.70 Other examples are
given, e.g., by Bodenreider [49], Suomela and Andrade [359], etc.
69Confirmed for TAMBIS (private conversation with one of its developers). Its development,
however, is continued as part of the ComparaGRID project (http://www.comparagrid.org/). My
attempts to contact the authors of SEMEDA have not been successful.
70Arguably, MeSH is not an ontology, but rather a hierarchically structured controlled vocabulary
with no underlying semantics.
2.7. BIOMEDICAL ONTOLOGIES 59
For details on further application scenarios and development tools, see,
e.g., Bodenreider et al. [50], Bodenreider and Stevens [53], Cimino and
Zhu [78], Lambrix [227], Lambrix et al. [228], Smith [323], and others.
It is commonly recognized that ontologies should be developed based on
well-defined, commonly agreed principles, and carefully evaluated before
public release (Gómez-Pérez [132]). While there have been reported at-
tempts to build bio-ontologies in a decentralized, non-curated approach
(Good et al. [134]), these studies did not provide substantial evidence that
ontologies developed in this way are useful for a wider community, and
that they have desirable representational and computational properties. It
should be noted, though, that folksonomies — subject taxonomies gener-
ated by users of various online services in a distributed and uncontrolled
manner, based on tags (terms assigned by users to pages, images, etc.) —
are often claimed to have been successful in facilitating search through vast
amounts of online data at a cost much lower than that needed to develop an
ontology in a top-down approach. Folksonomies, however, are structurally
much simpler than logically consistent ontologies, and are sometimes called,
somewhat pejoratively, ‘mob-indexing’ (Golder and Huberman [131], Kipp
and Campbell [201]).
Ontologies are intended to be a solution to the challenge of data integration
(Draghici et al. [94], Khatri et al. [199]), but when developed by separate
teams adopting different design principles, they lead to what could be called
the ‘Ontology Tower of Babel’ problem:
“Ontologies tend to be everywhere. They are viewed as the silver
bullet for many applications, such as database integration, peer-
to-peer systems, e-commerce, semantic web services, or social net-
works. However, in open or evolving systems, such as the semantic
web, different parties would, in general, adopt different ontologies.
Thus, merely using ontologies, like using XML, does not reduce het-
erogeneity: it just raises heterogeneity problems to a higher level.”
(Euzenat and Shvaiko [107])71
71To appear.
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During the past decade, much effort has been devoted to the definition and
implementation of knowledge representation languages with precise logi-
cal semantics, often with an XML-based syntax, such as the Web Ontology
Language (OWL; Antoniou and van Harmelen [17]).72 OWL is available in
three versions (sublanguages) with semantics based on a family of exten-
sively studied and computationally well-characterized logical formalisms,
Description Logics (DL; Baader et al. [22]).73 OWL-DL, the most expressive
and yet still decidable OWL dialect,74 is one of the most commonly used
knowledge representation languages within the Semantic Web. Its relative
simplicity, as well as the availability of a number of tools that facilitate its
use, have undoubtedly contributed to the recent explosion in the number
of ontologies being developed and deployed — anyone, without much prior
experience with knowledge representation, can now build an ontology in
minutes (Noy and McGuinness [271]). But while the application of a com-
mon ontology language helps to remove syntactical and semantic barriers
for communication between agents that use different ontologies,75 it does
not address problems arising from different and often incompatible views
on the same reality, reflected in the ontologies.76
One way to assure the compatibility between different ontologies (and thus
to improve the interoperability of software based on those ontologies) is to
provide a unique top-level ontology (TLO; an upper-level ontology) and force
domain ontologies to connect their top-level nodes to appropriate nodes in
72http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL/.
73For a detailed study of the complexity of various DL formalisms see, e.g., Tobies [370] and
Donini [93].
74OWL-DL is one of the three sublanguages of OWL 1.0, officially acknowledged by W3C. Re-
cently, a family of slightly more expressive languages has been proposed in the unofficial OWL
1.1 specification; the SHOIN logic underlying OWL-DL has been replaced with the more ex-
pressive logic SROIQ. Several tractable fragments of OWL 1.1 have also been defined. See
http://www.webont.org/owl/1.1/.
75If agents using different ontologies are to communicate successfully, their ontologies should be
aligned first; see, e.g., Sampson [305] and Euzenat and Shvaiko [107] for a comprehensive review
of ontology matching techniques and tools. Lambrix and Tan [229] describe an approach targetted
specifically at aligning and merging biomedical ontologies.
76Focusing exclusively on the syntactic and model-theoretic correctness of ontologies may lead to
what is sometimes called the ‘nonsense in nonsense out’ problem (Spear [342]): ontologies may be
well-formed and logically valid, but still inaccurate content-wise. Unfortunately, many believe that
for an ontology to be a good one it suffices to encode it in a logical formalism (e.g., a description
logic) and no inconsistencies are found when the ontology is checked with a reasoner.
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the top-level ontology. Unfortunately, it seems highly unlikely that a single,
non-trivial top-level ontology would be agreed by all ontology developers,
and the project of building such an ontology has largely been abandoned
(Smith [318]). Nevertheless, a number of competitive TLOs have been built
and adopted for use by distinct communities. Some of the most prominent
examples of those are:
– the Basic Formal Ontology77 (BFO; Grenon [136, 140], Smith and
Grenon [328], Spear [342]; see also Ch. 3);
– the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering78
(DOLCE; Gangemi et al. [123], Masolo et al. [244]);
– the Sowa’s top-level ontology79 (Sowa [340]);
– the Cyc top-level ontology,80 and others.
Attempts have been made to combine several top-level ontologies into one
structure, as in the case of the Multi-Source Ontology (MSO);81 however,
the ontologies differ not only in terms of the formalisms used, but also in
terms of the underlying philosophical doctrines, and mapping between them
is neither obvious nor complete (see, e.g., Masolo et al. [244] for an attempt
to provide such a mapping).82
In the case of OBO, one of the most recent and significant attempts at stan-
dardizing the development of its member ontologies is the adoption of BFO
as the top-level ontology. Substantial efforts are being dedicated to system-
atize OBO ontologies in this and a number of other aspects. The goal of
Ch. 3 is, among others, to present this effort in more detail, with focus on
BFO as the common core.
77http://www.ifomis.uni-saarland.de/bfo/.
78http://www.loa-cnr.it/DOLCE.html.
79http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/toplevel.htm.
80http://www.cyc.com/cycdoc/vocab/top-vocab.html.
81http://www.webkb.org/doc/MSO.html.
82Masolo compare DOLCE with BFO and OCHRE using a trivial example, and the example is
already biased towards a particular theory of existence.
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Chapter 3
A Standardization Effort in
Biomedical Ontology
This chapter discusses the issue of incoherent terminology in literature on
Ontological Engineering (OE). We provide evidence that there is a load of
confusion in what ontological engineers say. The terminologies they use are
often ambiguous and inconsistent, and these nomenclatural issues reflect
either carelessness of expression, underspecification of the technical mean-
ing of terms, or an unfortunate lack of a common, coherent philosophical
foundation. Terminological issues lead to problems when ambiguous plain
language characterizations are to be turned into formal definitions, as dis-
cussed by, e.g., Guarino and Giaretta [148] and Guarino [146].
The chapter is structured as follows:
– Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction into the problem.
– Section 3.2 discusses a number of definitions or characterizations of
some of the terms most commonly used in Ontological Engineering.
– Section 3.3 describes a framework for ontological development that is
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currently being adopted by the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO)1
community.
3.1 Introduction
Ontology, a branch of philosophy occupied with the study of being, has had
a long history. Questions such as What is there? and What is existence?,
were disputed by ancient philosophers even before Plato and Aristotle laid
the groundworks of ontology in its modern shape. On the other hand, on-
tologies, artifacts for expressing and exchanging knowledge about selected
portions of reality with the rigor of a formal and computer-understandable
language, are a relatively recent invention (Smith [318]). There is cur-
rently an explosion of efforts in development, publishing, merging and ap-
plying ontologies. This trend has been fuelled, among others, by the rapid
increase, both in number and size, of publicly available online sources of
data, information and knowledge; these sources employ diverse underly-
ing structures and incompatible languages (the so-called ‘Database Tower
of Babel’ problem, Sec. 2.4) that call for a principled approach to integra-
tion at the semantic level. This explosion, in turn, has created a broad niche
for further research on philosophical ontology and ontological engineering
(Guarino and Musen [149]).
Ontologies flourish in just about every imaginable corner of our scientific
and non-scientific activity. This is especially visible in the natural sciences,
e.g., under the umbrella of Open Biomedical Ontologies, where there is
a strong need for semantic integration of otherwise highly distributed data.
But while one of the principal goals behind the effort of constructing ontolo-
gies is to enable both a human user and an automated reasoner to access
and comprehend data from various sources without being forced to investi-
gate their terminological and implementational details, the cure seems often
to be no better than the disease: the ontologies themselves are based on in-
compatible philosophical doctrines, represented in different languages and
stored in custom-made databases whose schemas do not match with each
1http://obo.sourceforge.net/ .
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other. Consequently, the promised benefit may easily become outbalanced
by the burden of having to parse, interpret and match multiple heteroge-
neous ontologies (what can be called the ‘Ontology Tower of Babel’ problem,
Sec. 2.7). Despite a common syntactic commitment, OBO ontologies, for ex-
ample, employ quite different methods and techniques in the modeling of
their domains. (There are, however, intense ongoing efforts to standardize
OBO ontologies also at the level of their ontological commitments.)
3.2 [N]ontological Engineering
Ideally, team of experts who set off to create an ontology of a particular do-
main should consist, at the very least, of domain experts, knowledge model-
ers (usually computer scientists), and those with expertise in philosophical
ontology. Yet given that formal ontology2 is just one of many branches of
philosophy, and that the subject-matter of virtually any science and industry
may be the object of ontological engineering, philosophical ontologists will
likely be greatly outnumbered by ontological engineers. The scale and di-
versity of the attempts to fill up the ontology niche emphasizes the need for
a sound, understandable and reusable basis for this discipline. An attempt to
systematize the foundations should be based on consent rather than on com-
petition, and must be thorough. An account of these foundations should, to
best serve the ontology engineering world, be easily understandable, but by
no means oversimplified or confused; it should allow for a shared under-
standing of how different ontological engineering paradigms may be used
to model the same reality.
Two recently published books seem to be intended as a reference for those
who seek such an account. One of them, the Handbook on Ontologies (Staab
2The phrase ‘formal ontology’ can be interpreted in at least two ways. It may denote the dis-
cipline that studies the most general forms of existence; it is formal because of what it aims to
describe. On the other hand, it may also denote the activity aimed at producing structured, logi-
cally axiomatized descriptions of the reality; it is formal because of how it aims to describe. In this
chapter, ‘formal ontology’ is used to capture both characteristics. The products of formal ontology
are often called ‘foundational ontologies’ (Masolo et al. [244]). See, e.g., Smith [318] for further
details.
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and Studer [344]), “demonstrates standards that have been created re-
cently; it surveys methods that have been developed and it shows how to
bring both into practice of ontology infrastructures and applications that
are the best of their kind”. The other, Ontological Engineering (Gómez-Pérez
et al. [133]), “presents the major issues of ontological engineering and de-
scribes the most outstanding ontologies currently available”. Unfortunately,
a closer look at the books reveals a number of problems, among others
redundant and incoherent introduction of terms, which certainly interfere
with a reader’s understanding. Both books were written, by and large, by
computer scientists for computer scientists to provide guidance through the
world of ontological engineering; yet the result of the authors’ effort may be
no less confusing than what they attempt to disambiguate.
After having presented a number of conflicting definitions of what an ontol-
ogy is (see below), the authors of Ontological Engineering conclude: “We can
say that as there is consensus among the ontology community, no one can
get confused about its usage [of the term ‘ontology’].” But the actual situa-
tion seems to be quite the opposite: there is much confusion as to what an
ontology (a representational artifact) is, what it is that its components rep-
resent, and what the principles for building an ontology are. There has been
much debate between the leading ontologists and ontological engineers3 on
what ontologies — and more specifically, natural, semi-formal, and formal
ontologies — are, how (and whether) they differ from taxonomies, concep-
tual models, controlled vocabularies, thesauri, etc.
In his discussion of principles for the design of ontologies, Tom Gruber says
that ontological commitment is based on consistent use of vocabulary (Gru-
ber [143]). Ontologies are built to provide consistent vocabularies for dif-
ferent domains. But is there any commitment to a consistent vocabulary
in the community of ontological engineers? In the following, we discuss
evidence that the answer to this question is negative. Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?4
3See, e.g., archives of the Ontolog Forum, http://ontolog.cim3.net/ .
4“Who will guard the guards?”, attributed to Decimus Iunius Iuvenalis (Juvenal), I–II AD.
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3.2.1 Knowledge and Models
In philosophy, ontology is a systematic account of being (Hofweber [170]).
It is the existence in reality which is the subject of study and description.
What there exists, exactly, has always been a matter of fierce philosophical
debates. Philosophers characteristically charge each other with improperly
identifying what there is, and in the history of philosophy every kind of
entities will at one time or another have been thought to be a fictitious
result of an ontological mistake (Blackburn [46]). Nevertheless, the term
‘ontology’ seems to have been granted a commonly agreed meaning here.
In computer science, however, there is hardly any agreement as to what
‘ontology’ should mean. While an ontology is usually considered a repre-
sentational artifact, it is not entirely clear what the necessary and sufficient
conditions are for a representational artifact to be called an ‘ontology’ —
what it is that an ontology must represent, and how it must represented.
The meanings assigned to the term ‘ontology’ are often conflicting. In his
Towards Principles for the Design of Ontologies Used for Knowledge Sharing,
Gruber proposed the following definitions:
“A specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared do-
main of discourse — definitions of classes, relations, functions, and
other objects — is called an ontology. . . . An ontology is an explicit
specification of a conceptualization.” (Gruber [144])
The second part has been one of the most often cited definitions, sometimes
with ‘specification’ replaced by ‘formal specification’, and ‘conceptualization’
replaced by ‘shared conceptualization’. However, it is not clear what it is that
an ontology specifies: a conceptualization of the domain, the vocabulary
used to represent the domain, or, perhaps, the vocabulary used to represent
the conceptualization — all of which are usually not the same.5 Further-
more, the term ‘conceptualization’ itself is unclear; as argued by Guarino
and Giaretta [148], Gruber’s use of this term is grounded in its incorrect
(according to those authors) extensional interpretation by Genesereth and
5Except for some rather pathological (in this context) cases of homoiconicity or metacircularity.
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Nilsson [124].
In his Formal Ontology and Information Systems, Guarino provides another
definition:
“An ontology is a set of logical axioms designed to account for the
intended meaning of a vocabulary.” (Guarino [147])
In this sense, an ontology is a theory of a domain — a portion of reality
— expressed formally, i.e., using a logical language equipped with formal
semantics. The axioms of the theory are built of terms that are used to
describe the domain, and thus the theory specifies formally (by way of the
semantics of the language) the meaning of those terms. This view is on par
with those of some other authors:
“Ontologies are quintessentially content theories, because their ma-
in contribution is to identify specific classes of objects and relations
that exist in some domain.” (Chandrasekaran et al. [74])
“An ontology is a hierarchically structured set of terms for describing
a domain that can be used as a skeletal foundation for a knowledge
base.” (Swartout et al. [360])
Gruber’s ontologies are specifications of conceptualizations. However, Guar-
ino’s and Chandrasekaran’s ontologies are conceptualizations; a conceptual-
ization is an abstract model of some aspect of the world, taking the form of a
definition of the properties of important concepts and relationships (Baader
et al. [22]). Other authors seem to propose that ontologies are representa-
tions of one’s imagination — a cognitive representation, conceptualization
— of the domain, thereby increasing the distance of indirect representation
between an ontology and the actual domain. Other authors suggest that
“Ontologies can be used to provide a concrete specification of term
names and term meanings. . . . An ontology is a specification of the
conceptualization of a term.” (Lassila and McGuinness [232])
“Ontology languages allow users to write explicit, formal conceptu-
alizations of domain models.” (Antoniou et al. [17])
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“Ontologies are explicit representations of agents’ commitments to
a model of the relevant world. . . . Ontologies are specific, high-
level models of knowledge underlying [sic] all things, concepts, and
phenomena.6 . . . Generally, an ontology is a metamodel describing
how to build models.” (Devedžic´ [91])
“Ontologies are agreements about shared conceptualizations.
Shared conceptualizations include conceptual frameworks for mod-
eling domain knowledge, . . . and agreements about the representa-
tion of particular domain theories.” (Uschold and Gruninger [374])
Many other definitions, more or less coherent with some of the above and
conflicting with others, have been given. The issue is not merely nomenclat-
ural; some biomedical terminological systems — e.g., the Medical Subject
Headings (MeSH),7 or the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS)8 and
its relatives — are sometimes used as if they were ontologies,9 although it
has been shown that logical reasoning with such systems is problematic and
may lead to erroneous conclusions (Burgun and Bodenreider [63], Schulze-
Kremer et al. [312]). Ontologies are commonly built for the purpose of
drawing inferences about the part of reality they are intended to represent.
Any misuse of the term ‘ontology’ may lead to confusion with potentially
disastrous consequences — particularly in the biomedical domain.
Some of the definitions above employ the term ‘term’, as in “an ontology
is a specification of the conceptualization of a term” (Lassila and McGuin-
ness [232]). There is, however, a substantial difference between a term and
what the term represents, between the term as an element of a statement
and the term as an object of the proposition expressed by that statement;
unfortunately, this difference is blurred in definitions such as the above. The
distinction has been christened the ‘use-mention’ distinction (Kenyon [196],
Spear [342]).
6Perhaps the best illustration to the claim that knowledge about reality also underlies that reality
is the graphic Drawing Hands by M. C. Escher (1948).
7http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/ .
8http://umlsinfo.nlm.nih.gov/ .
9Librelotto et al. [235], for example, use the ‘MeSH ontology’ to build an ‘ontological index’ for
PubMed.
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Three issues are in focus in the above characterizations of an ontology as
a representational artifact: what the domain of an ontology is; how an on-
tology represents that domain; and why the ontology has been built — the
purpose of the representation. Although the issue of representational for-
malisms has been researched by the knowledge representation community
for decades, there is little consensus on what structure is essential for a
representational artifact to be called an ‘ontology’. See, e.g., Lassila and
McGuinness [232] or Studer et al. [358] for more discussion. As to the
‘what?’ question, it has only recently been pointed out that often it is not
sufficiently clear what the subject matter of an ontology is: specific individ-
uals, or rather general patterns in a domain; our knowledge about them —
or the lack of such knowledge — or even terms in that very same ontology
(Bodenreider et al. [51], Smith [319]). The few example definitions cited
above clearly illustrate this uncertainty. Is an ontology an abstract model of
a domain, a conceptualization of such a model, or a specification of such a
conceptualization? What is the domain represented by a specification of a
conceptualization of a model?
In the context of biomedicine — specifically, within OBO Foundry commu-
nity — we propose to focus on what it is that an ontology represents, irre-
spectively of the expressivity of the underlying representation language or
the actual structural complexity of the artifact (Smith et al. [331], Kus´nier-
czyk [218], Schober et al. [311]). The issue may seem, superficially, to be
of purely terminological nature. However, as it is argued in, e.g., Smith
and colleagues’ Wüsteria [327], dire consequences follow if it is not made
perfectly clear what the represented domains are: whether a term in an
ontology represents an entity in reality, a belief about an entity, an act of
observation of an entity, a documentation of an observation or belief, a be-
lief about an observation, etc. Where communities of ontology developers
do not share a single coherent view on these matters, the result is a confu-
sion. But even if the problem were purely terminological, one motivation for
building and using ontologies is to standardize vocabularies — why should
we not speak in standard terms about these very standardization efforts
themselves?
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3.2.2 Concepts and Classes
The problem of imprecise definitions of the term ‘ontology’ is accompanied
by the equally untidy use of terms such as ‘concept’, ‘class’, ‘type’, ‘kind’,
‘instance’, ‘property’, ‘relation’, ‘role’, etc. to refer both to the elements of
an ontology, and to the corresponding elements of the domain, which are
represented by the former. These terms are commonly used in the literature
on ontological engineering. What do they mean? What are they supposed to
mean?
In some cases, typically in the tradition of description logics (DL; Nardi and
Brachman [262]), the term ‘concept’ is used to speak of those elements of
an ontology that represent what is called ‘classes’ in the reality. Likewise, in
conceptual graphs concepts are representational elements:
“A class is a set of entities.” (Chaudhri et al. [75])
“Concepts are terminological descriptions of classes of individuals.”
(Welty [381])
“In a conceptual graph, the boxes are called concepts, and the circles
are called conceptual relations.” (Sowa [340, p. 476])
Others, however, use these terms in quite a different way:
“Classes represent concepts, which are taken in a broad sense.” (Gó-
mez-Pérez et al. [133])
“A class has an intensional meaning (the underlying concept) which
is related but not equal to its class extension.” (Bechhofer et al. [32])
“The most basic concepts in a domain should correspond to classes
that are the roots of various taxonomic trees.” (Smith et al. [336])
In many cases, the terminology is even less clear:
“A concept is a meaning. There are major groupings of semantic
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types for organisms, anatomical structures, biologic function, chem-
icals, events, physical objects, and concepts or ideas.”10
“[Concepts] can be concrete (like a patient) or abstract (a prototypic
patient).” (Plaza and Arcos [284])
“Just as in the object-oriented paradigm, there are two fundamental
types of concepts in KM: instances (individuals) and classes (types
of individuals).” (Clark and Porter [80])
The terms ‘instance’ and ‘individual’ enjoy a similarly casual treatment:
“Individuals are assertional, and are considered instances of con-
cepts.” (Welty [381])
“Each of the entities in a class is said to be an instance of the class.”
(Chaudhri et al. [75])
“Instances are used to represent elements or individuals in an ontol-
ogy. . . . Individuals represent instances of classes. . . . Individuals
represent instances of concepts.” (Gómez-Pérez et al. [133])
Both in actual ontologies and in their documentation, there can be found
statements such as “living subject is a code system”, “the term ‘house’ is
not a month in the real world, though ‘January’ is”, or “normal cell is a
subclass of microanatomy”. Behind this terminological diversity there also
hides the problem of what it is that classes (or concepts) are instantiated
by, and whether there are (or can be) classes (concepts) whose instances
are not individuals but rather other classes (concepts), and what the criteria
are for deciding whether to represent an entity as an individual or as a class
(concept).
Some representation languages — including Semantic Web languages such
as RDF/RDFS11 and OWL12 in its unconstrained version (OWL-Full) — al-
low classes to have classes (including themselves) as instances:
10UMLS Semantic Network, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/meta3.html.
11The Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the RDF Vocabulary Description Language
(RDF Schema, RDFS), http://www.w3.org/RDF/.
12The Web Ontology Language, http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-ref/.
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“A class can be an instance of a class.” (Chaudhri et al. [75])
“The class rdfs:Class defines the class of all classes.” (Gómez-
Pérez et al. [133])
This freedom of expression comes at a high cost: the languages are in-
tractable, and some serious foundational philosophical questions arise (e.g.,
the Russell’s paradox; Irvine [181]). The so-called ‘intensional semantics’
of KIF are an example of an attempt to escape such paradoxes (Hayes and
Menzel [162]). But some authors suggest that higher-order instantiation
(classes as instances of classes) is indeed necessary:
“The canonical example . . . is species/animal. While most introduc-
tory courses teach the difference between classes, such as Mammal
or Human, and instances, such as Chris, they stop short of explaining
how second-order classes, such as Species, would fit into the picture.
Human is a subclass ofMammal, and Chris is a Human and therefore
a Mammal. Is Human also a subclass of Species? . . . In fact, Human
turns out to be an instance of Species.” (Guarino and Welty [150],
original emphasis)
(We return to this example in Appendix B to show that there can be a reason-
able solution given which does not require admitting higher-order classes.
Such solutions are essential, at least if a tractable language, e.g., OWL-DL,
is to be used.)
3.2.3 Classes and Individuals
What are the criteria for considering, and correspondingly representing, an
entity as a class or as an individual? In other words, how to decide whether
an entity should be represented with a class-representing element or with
an individual-representing element? Some authors suggest that the choice
depends on the particular application of the ontology:
“Deciding whether a particular concept is a class in an ontology or
an individual instance depends on what the potential applications
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of the ontology are. Deciding where classes end and individual in-
stances begin starts with deciding what is the lowest level of gran-
ularity in the representation. The level of granularity is in turn de-
termined by a potential application of the ontology. . . . Individual
instances are the most specific concepts represented in a knowledge
base. . . . If concepts form a natural hierarchy, then we should repre-
sent them as classes.” (Noy and McGuinness, Ontology Development
101: A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology13)
“In certain contexts something that is obviously a class can itself
be considered an instance of something else. For example, in the
wine ontology we have the notion of a Grape, which is intended
to denote the set of all grape varietals. CabernetSauvingonGrape
is an example instance of this class, as it denotes the actual grape
varietal called Cabernet Sauvignon. However, CabernetSauvignon-
Grape could itself be considered a class, the set of all actual Cabernet
Sauvignon grapes.
It is very easy to confuse the instance-of relationship with the sub-
class relationship. For example, it may seem arbitrary to choose to
make CabernetSauvignonGrape an individual that is an instance of
Grape, as opposed to a subclass of Grape. This is not an arbitrary
decision. The Grape class denotes the set of all grape varietals, and
therefore any subclass of Grape should denote a subset of these va-
rietals. Thus, CabernetSauvignonGrape should be considered an
instance of Grape, and not a subclass. It does not describe a subset
of Grape varietals, it is a grape varietal.” (Smith et al., OWL Web
Ontology Language Guide14)
Here, apparently, representational elements are conflated with what they
represent (compare: “the Grape class denotes”, “CabernetSauvignonGra-
pe . . . is an instance of Grape”, and “CabernetSauvignonGrape does not
describe a subset of Grape varietals, it is a grape varietal”). Furthermore, the
naming convention is rather confusing: while CabernetSauvignonGrape is
the class (called ‘Cabernet Sauvignon’) of all actual grapes — individual
fruits — of the varietal Cabernet Sauvignon, Grape is not the class of all
13http://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology_development/ontology101.pdf.
14http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-guide/.
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actual grapes of any varietal, but rather the class of varietals. (The examples
given by Smith et al. come from the Wine Ontology,15 available online.) The
Ontology Development 101 provides a similar discussion:
“Consider the wine regions. Initially, we may define main wine re-
gions, such as France, United States, Germany, and so on, as classes
and specific wine regions within these large regions as instances. For
example, Bourgogne region is an instance of the Frenh region
class. However, we would also like to say that the Cotes d'Or
region is a Bourgogne region. Therefore, Bourgogne region must
be a class (in order to have subclasses or instances). However, mak-
ing Bourgogne region a class and Cotes d'Or region an instance of
Bourgogne region seems arbitrary: it is very hard to clearly distin-
guish which regions are classes and which are instances. Therefore,
we define all wine regions as classes.” (Noy and McGuinness, Ontol-
ogy Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First Ontology)
One problem here, again, is that the representation is conflated with the
represented. We can, of course, represent a wine region with either a class
(if ‘class’ is used to speak of representational elements) or an instance (if,
likewise, ‘instance’ is taken to be a representational rather than ontological
term); the choice may be application dependent, or may be enforced by the
underlying formalism (OWL in this case).16 However, a wine region — a
particular wine region, such as the Bourgogne region — is not, and cannot
possibly be, a class — irrespectively of the corresponding representational
element used in some ontology. No French region, including the Bourgogne
region, is a class, and there is no arbitrariness in making it such — a region
just can’t be made a class, irrespectively of the intended application of an
ontology. With some dose of uncritical creativity on the side of the ontologi-
cal engineer, a French region can be represented as a class. But whether this
makes sense should be carefully judged before publishing the ontology.17
(Furthermore, note that Côte-d’Or is, administratively, not a region — it is a
15http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-owl-guide-20040210/wine.rdf.
16None of which really justifies the ontologically inaccurate use of a class-representing element
to represent a non-class entity.
17These and other problems inherent in the examples above were discussed at FOIS’2006 [218].
As a result, Chris Welty expressed the will to re-edit the OWL Guide (private conversation).
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department, and as such, it is a part of the Bourgogne region. Côte-d’Or is
certainly an instance — it is a particular department, an instance of, among
others, the class of all French departments; but it is not an instance of Bour-
gogne — or of what Noy and McGuinness would wish to call the ‘Bourgogne
region-class’. If there is a class of Bourgogne regions, the Bourgogne region
in France is surely its unique instance.)
Interestingly, this example also provides an illustration of a related, often
misunderstood issue — the difference between levels of specificity and lev-
els of granularity. France (an individual, an instance of, e.g., the class of all
countries) is divided into non-overlapping regions; each of these regions is,
in turn, divided into departments, and the departments into arrondisements.
Both the regions and the departments are parts of France; at different lev-
els of granularity, France is divided into 26 regions, 100 departments, 342
arrondissements, etc. Each of these administrative units is an instance of
some class. For example, 22 of 26 French regions are metropolitan regions,
21 of those are mainland regions, etc. These three classes of regions — that
of French regions, that of metropolitan French regions, and that of main-
land French regions — are defined at different levels of specificity, but at the
same level of granularity (they are all classes of first-order administrative
divisions of the territory of France). On the other hand, the class of French
regions and the class of French departments are defined at the same level
of specificity, but at different levels of granularity (they are classes of first-
order and second-order divisions, respectively). For more on the distinction
between specificity and granularity, see, e.g., Spear [342].
3.2.4 Further Notes
There seems to be no coherent interpretation of the most commonly used
terms in Ontological Engineering; unfortunately, the issue is not merely
terminological, and the underlying philosophical disagreements render the
problem difficult to solve generally. Similar complaints have been raised ear-
lier, e.g., about incoherent views on what an ontology is (Guarino [146]),
about misuses of the term ‘concept’ (Smith [319, 320, 322]), etc. Neverthe-
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less, this ‘state of the art’ persists; the terminology proposed by Guarino and
Giaretta [148], in which they suggest to replace the ambiguous ‘ontology’
with more the precise (according to those authors) ‘conceptualization’ and
‘ontological theory’, has not been widely adopted. On the one hand, it is
certainly a property of natural language that the meaning of expressions is
context-dependent — it is specified not only by the semantics, but also by
the pragmatics (Korta and Perry [212], Leech and Weisser [234], Steven-
son and Wilks [354]). On the other hand, this is usually undesirable in
automated knowledge-based systems, whether in the case of biomedical on-
tologies (Tuason et al. [371]) or in the case of the Semantic Web in general
(Booth [54], Ginsberg [127], Parsia and Patel-Schneider [277]).
While global disambiguation of terms may be unachievable,18 it may well
be worth heading for in well-defined communities, such as the community
of Open Biomedical Ontologies. In the next section I present an initiative
which I had the opportunity to participate in, undertaken within the commu-
nity of biomedical ontologists and aimed at resolving the problems of am-
biguity by delineating a coherent philosophical and terminological frame-
work for the development of biomedical ontologies. These the efforts are
supported by organizations such as the National Center for Biomedical On-
tology (NCBO),19 the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Consortium, the
OBO Foundry, and others (see, e.g., Rosse and Mejino [302]).
3.3 A Philosophical Framework for the Integration
of Biomedical Ontologies20
As argued in Sec. 3.2 (and also in, e.g., Smith et al. [319] and Kus´nier-
czyk [218]), the term ‘concept’ is somewhat problematic in ontological en-
gineering. But also other terms, such as ‘class’, ‘object’, ‘instance’, ‘individ-
18See, e.g., In Defense of Ambiguity (Hayes [161]) for an interesting discussion of this issue in the
context of the Semantic Web and the URI crisis of identity.
19http://www.bioontology.org/.
20This section is in large parts based directly on the content of Smith et al. [331], without further
discussion.
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ual’, ‘property’, ‘relation’, etc., have been non-uniformly adopted by ontol-
ogy developers, and have been used with multiple, often conflicting mean-
ings. What is needed, then, is a set of terms referring unambiguously to
the different kinds of entities in reality; such a set of terms should serve
as common target for mappings between various knowledge representation
systems, thereby mediating translations between ontologies built in those
systems. It has been found essential that various biomedical ontologies, to
be fully interoperable, must follow the same philosophical, representational,
and terminological conventions (see, e.g., Spackman and Reynoso [341],
Johansson [184], Klein and Smith21). In Schober et al. [311], we provide
details of a recently introduced collection of terminological, nomenclatural,
and typographical conventions based on the results of our research on on-
tology development practices in the MSI,22 PSI,23 FuGE,24 and other related
communities, and suggested for adoption by OBO.
The framework introduced in further text corresponds to and complements
the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO),25 a realist theory of existence,26 adopted
recently by the OBO community as their standard top-level ontology. See,
e.g., Spear [342] and Grenon [137, 138, 136] for more details and a formal
axiomatization of BFO, and Grenon et al. [140] for more on its application
in biomedical ontology. See also Masolo et al. [244] for a comparison of
an early version of BFO with, among others, the Descriptive Ontology for
Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE).27 BFO is under continuous
development; a number of interesting discussions related to its adoption
by the biomedical ontology community can be found in the archives of the
bfo-discuss mailing list.28
21Concept Systems and Ontologies, http://ontology.buffalo.edu/concepts/.
22The Metabolomics Standards Initiative, http://msi-workgroups.sourceforge.net/, a committee
appointed by the Metabolomics Society.
23The Proteomics Standards Initiative, http://www.psidev.info/, a committee appointed by the
Human Proteome Organization (HUPO; [190]).
24The Functional Genomics Experiment Community, http://fuge.sourceforge.net/.
25http://www.ifomis.uni-saarland.de/bfo/.
26Very roughly, realists deny dependence of the existence of entities in reality on human cognition.
See, e.g., Miller [255], Boyd [55], or Khlentzos [200].
27http://www.loa-cnr.it/DOLCE.html/.
28http://groups.google.com/group/bfo-discuss/.
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3.3.1 Reality and Representation
One of the most important distinctions we insist on in what follows (and in
the context of OBO ontologies in general) is the one based on the relation of
representation (or reference) that holds between two entities, the represented
(the referent) and the representing (the reference).29 An entity represents
(or refers to) another entity just in case there is an agent, whether alive
or artificial, who recognizes the former as standing in some respect for the
latter. This informal definition goes in line with that given by Peirce, and
also reflected in the so-called ‘semiotic triangle’ (or ‘triangle of meaning’) of
Ogden and Richard’s [272]:
“A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody,
that is, it creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or
perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call
the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object, not in all respects, but is reference to some sort of idea, which
I have sometimes called the ground of the representation.” (Peirce,
as quoted in Knowledge Representation, Sowa [340, p. 192])
The relation of representation that holds between the representing and the
represented is thus dependent on the observer, rather than fixed for the
two relata.30 One of the goals of ontology development is to provide rep-
resentations that are understood by all users in a like manner. Note that
Peirce’s definition may be seen as suggestive of that it is not the object, but
rather the mental representation (the interpretant) which is represented
by the sign. This view is further discussed — and argued against — in
Sec. 3.3.3. (The issue of the nature of mental representations has been of
29Representation and reference are not necessarily the same; for the sake of simplicity we proceed
here as if they were. See, e.g., Reimer [295].
30It is thus a ternary rather than a binary relation: it holds between the sign, the object, and the
agent who interprets the sign as representing the object. If the mental sign (interpretant, concept) is
to be acknowledged, representation should be seen as a quaternary relation. The role of the observer
is explicitly acknowledged in an extension to the semiotic triangle — the semiotic tetrahedron of
Falkenberg et al. [110].
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interest to cognitive science and artificial intelligence for over half a cen-
tury (Thagard [364]). For an overview of theories of cognitive representa-
tions see, e.g., Aydede [21], Bermúdez [41], Horst [173], Pitt [283], and
Thomas [369].)
In principle, there can be self-referential entities — entities which repre-
sent themselves. Such entities are not uncommon in computer science: the
Scheme [9] statement
(define symbol 'symbol)
and the IKL31 sentence
(= symbol 'symbol')
are typical examples of definitions or assertions about self-referential enti-
ties that can be written in a programming or a knowledge representation
language. Again, in biomedical ontology self-referential representations are
of rather little importance; but see, e.g., Smith and Ceusters [325] for ex-
amples of how self-referential representations have actually been included
— confusedly — in an international standard for healthcare records.32
3.3.2 Three Levels of Reality
Grounded in the above, we distinguish three levels of entities which have a
role to play wherever biomedical ontologies are used:
Level 1. The entities — physical objects, the processes they participate
in, their qualities, states, etc. — existing independently of the
cognitive activities of an observer (for example, on the side of a
patient examined by a clinician or a researcher).
31http://www.ihmc.us:16080/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html.
32Health Level 7 (HL7), http://www.hl7.org/.
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Level 2. The cognitive representations of those entities made by an ob-
server (for example, on the part of a clinician or a researcher
examining a patient).
Level 3. The textual, graphical, and other representations of the objective
reality, reflecting (but not representing) the cognitive represen-
tations.
Level 1 is indispensable even in situations where the representations are
‘data models’ rather than models of patients and their diseases — here, real
data gathered by the clinician are the objects of the representation. Level 2
reflects the fact that a crucial role is played in ontology and terminology
development by the cognitive representations made within the minds of hu-
man subjects. Level 3 reflects the fact that cognitive representations can be
shared, and serve scientific ends, only when they are made communicable in
a form whereby they can also be subjected to criticism and correction, and
also to implementation in software. Level 3 representations represent the
same portion of reality as Level 2 representations — namely, they represent
Level 1; the first are not representations of the second.33
Note that the distinction into three levels is relative to the particular goals
of an ontology development project. The textual and graphical artifacts,
for example, distinguished in Level 3 are, of course, themselves objects on
Level 1 in situations where such artefactual representations should them-
selves be represented — as in the so-called ‘knowledge representation’ on-
tologies such as Gruber’s Frame Ontology (Gruber [144]), the Open Knowl-
edge Base Connectivity framework (OKBC; Chaudhri et al. [75]), etc. Note
also that while Level 1 might be called the ‘objective’ reality, and Level 2
might be called the ‘subjective’ reality, this would not always be accurate.
There may be, on the side of the patient, perceptual experiences, feelings,
delusions, hallucinations, etc., which are, of course, subjective, and as such
cannot be observed by the physician, but may nevertheless need to be repre-
sented in specific cases. The physician may actually want to (artefactually)
33In cases where one does intend to represent cognitive representations, these representations
are themselves Level 1 entities, but then there are also cognitive representations of those represen-
tations, which are Level 2 entities and are not represented at Level 3.
82 CHAPTER 3. STANDARDIZATION IN BIOMEDICAL ONTOLOGY
represent his own subjective experiences in relation with the patient, which
does not make these experiences objective, even if treated as Level 1 enti-
ties. However, most biomedical ontologies deal with objective reality, not
with subjective experiences.34
3.3.3 (Against) The Concept Orientation
According to the realist approach to ontological engineering,35 ontologies
should consist exclusively of representational units which are intended to
designate entities in the target domain, and not conceptualizations thereof.
Defenders of the concept orientation in medical terminology development
(whom we shall refer to as ‘terminological conceptualists’) have offered a
series of arguments against this view, to the effect that such terminologies
should include also (or even exclusively) representational units referring to
what are called ‘concepts’ (Cimino [77]). These arguments can, roughly, be
classified as follows.
1. The argument from intellectual modesty: domain experts disagree, and
thus a terminology should embrace no claims as to what the world is
like, but rather make efforts to represent the concepts that different
experts have.
2. The argument from non-existence: there is a need for terms that would
refer to what does not exist, or what does not exist yet. For example,
a patient may hallucinate that she hears voices when there actually
are none; drug designers may talk about substances that haven’t been
synthesized yet. Terms corresponding to such non-existent entities are
taken to represent concepts.
3. The argument from history of medicine: some terms are historically
grounded in beliefs, which were only later proved to be false. Such
34Subjective experiences are the subject of study of phenomenology (Smith [335]). Recently, I
have participated (together with Arild Faxvaag and Barry Smith) in an effort to develop an ontology
of subjective experiences.
35See, e.g., Smith et al. [331].
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terms are often needed in biomedical ontologies, even if they do not
in fact represent real phenomena, but rather (false) concepts.
4. The argument from syndromes: many entities in the biomedical do-
main are abstractions, and as such they are mere concepts. Syn-
dromes, for example, are not real entities, but rather clinicians’ con-
cepts corresponding to a number of signs and symptoms occurring to-
gether.
5. The argument from error: in medical records, it is often necessary to
record statements that are known to be incorrect. Such statements do
not speak of the reality, but rather about concepts about it.
6. The argument from multiple perspectives: patients, physicians, and sci-
entists look at the reality from different perspectives, and may make
mutually exclusive statements about it. Since there is just one objec-
tive reality, such conflicting statements cannot be about that reality,
but must be about the persons’ concepts of it.
In what follows, we briefly address the last two arguments; for a more in-
volved discussion, the reader is refer to Smith et al. [331].
When erroneous statements are made in a clinical record, and are subse-
quently interpreted as being about Level 1 entities, then logical conflicts can
arise. If both p and not p are asserted, there is an apparent contradiction,
since in logic (at least in classical logics) these two cannot be simultaneously
true. However, such conflicting assertions are often needed to record what
has been stated by different people. It has been proposed (e.g., Rector et
al. [293]) that this implies that the use of a meta-language should be made
compulsory for all statements in electronic health records (EHR). That is,
these records should be not about entities in reality, but rather about what
are called ‘findings’. Instead of the contradictory ‘it is that p’ and ‘it is that
not p’, records should state that ‘X observed that p’ and ‘Y observed that not
p’, or ‘X stated that p’ and ‘Y stated that not p’, so that logical contradiction
is avoided. The terms in terminologies devised to serve such EHRs would
then all have to refer not to patients, diseases, drugs, etc., but rather to X’s
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and Y’s concepts of them. This, however, blurs the distinction between en-
tities in the patient-side reality (Level 1) and the corresponding cognitive
representations on the clinicians’ side (Level 2), and opens the door to the
inclusion in a terminology of problematic findings-related expressions such
as ‘absent nipple’, ‘absent leg’, etc.36 Certainly clinicians need to record such
findings. But then their findings are precisely that a leg is absent; not that
an absent leg is present.
Different patients, clinicians and biologists have their own perspectives on
one and the same reality. To do justice to these differences, it is argued, we
must hold that their respective representations point, not to this common
reality, but rather to their different ‘concepts’ thereof. This argument has
its roots in the work of Ogden and Richards, and specifically in their dis-
cussion of the so-called ‘semiotic triangle’. The latter is of importance not
least because it embodies a view of meaning and reference that still plays a
fateful role in the terminology standardization work of ISO (see, e.g., Smith
et al. [327]). As Fig. 3.1 makes clear, the triangle in fact refers not to con-
cepts, but rather to what its authors call ‘thought or reference’ (Ogden and
Richards [272]). To understand what this means, we note that Ogden and
Richards’ account is rooted in a theory of psychological causality.37 When we
experience a certain object in association with a certain sign, then memory
traces are laid down in our brains in virtue of which the mere appearance of
the same sign in the future will, they hold, evoke a thought or reference di-
rected towards this object through the reactivation of impressions stored in
memory. The two solid edges of the triangle are intended to represent what
are held to be causal relations of ‘symbolization’ (evocation) and ‘reference’
(perception or memory) on the part of a symbol-using subject. The dashed
edge, in contrast, signifies that the relation between the symbol and the ref-
erent — the relation that is most important for the discussion of terminology
— is merely imputed.
The background assumption here is that multiple perspectives are both ubiq-
uitous and (at best) only locally and transiently resolvable. The meanings
36From the Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terms (SNOMED CT), a “universal
healthcare terminology”, http://www.snomed.org/index.html.
37See, e.g., Robb and Heil [298] for an overview of this subject.
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Thoughtor reference
ReferentSymbol
Symbolizes Refers to
Stands for
Figure 3.1: The semiotic triangle (Ogden and Richards [272]).
words have for different people depend on their past experiences of uses of
these words in different contexts. Ambiguity must be resolved anew (and a
new ‘imputed’ relation of reference spawned) on each successive occasion
of use. From this, Ogden and Richards infer that a symbolic representa-
tion can never refer directly to an object, but rather only indirectly, via a
‘thought or reference’ within the mind. It is a depsychologized version of
this latter thesis which forms the basis of the concept orientation in con-
temporary terminology research. The terms in terminologies do not refer to
entities in reality (via the Ogden and Richards’ imputed relation). Rather,
it is held that they refer to concepts occupying a special concept realm. On
this view, concepts are not transparent mediators of reference; rather they
are its targets, and the job of the ontology developer is to build a list of
terms representing not the reality, but rather this special realm of concepts
(Smith et al. [327]). The relation between terms in a terminology and the
reality beyond becomes hereby obscured. Reality exists, if at all, only behind
a conceptual veil — and hence apparently confused statements according to
which, for example, the concept of bacteria would cause an experimental
model of disease, or the concept of vitamin would be essential in the diet of
man.38
38From the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS), http://semanticnetwork.nlm.nih.gov/.
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3.3.4 BFO — A Basic Formal Ontology
A top-level ontology (an upper-level ontology, a formal ontology) is a doma-
in-independent ontology that addresses the most general categories of en-
tities common to all domains. While a top-level ontology does not, by def-
inition, describe any particular domain with a satisfactory level of detail, it
provides (ideally) a set of precise, logically formalized and axiomatized cat-
egories that can be further extended (‘subclassed’) by a number of domain
ontologies. The purpose of a top-level ontology in this context is to provide
a standard system of categories and relations between them, which, if sha-
red by the domain ontologies, should ensure (or at least contribute to) their
interoperability.
Unfortunately, there appears to be no chance for a single top-level ontology
agreed by all ontology designers — and there are various reasons (see, e.g.,
Smith [318]). There have been quite a few top-level ontologies proposed,
none of which is in complete agreement with the others in the underlying
philosophical perspective, categorization of entities, and terminology. In the
world of biomedicine, however, some successful attempts have been made
to organize the development of domain-specific ontologies in compliance
with a unique upper-level ontology, the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO; Smith
and Grenon [328], Grenon [136, 137, 140]).39 The OBO Foundry initia-
tive40 has collected a number of biomedical ontologies which are now being
developed according to a set of organizing principles.41 These include:
1. The ontologies must be expressed in a commonly shared syntax. Cur-
rently, this includes OWL as well as an OBO-specific ontology lan-
guage.42
2. The ontologies have clearly specified and clearly delineated content,
and should cover different domains or different perspectives on the
same domain, e.g., human anatomy, physiology, and pathology. See
39http://www.ifomis.uni-saarland.de/bfo/.
40http://www.obofoundry.org
41For the complete list of all 10 principles, see http://www.obofoundry.org/crit.shtml.
42The OBO Syntax, serialized into a flat file format and a number of XML-based formats (OBO-
XML, RDF-XML, OboInOwl); see http://www.geneontology.org/GO.format.shtml.
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Fig. 3.2 for a systematic overview of a selection of OBO ontologies,
organized according to the level of granularity covered and the top-
most categories in BFO (see below for further details).
3. The ontologies use relations defined in the Relations Ontology (Smith
et al. [326]), a member of the OBO family.
Figure 3.2: Selected members of the OBO family of ontologies, systematized
according to levels of granularity (rows) and top-level distinctions in BFO
(columns). From Haendel et al. [155].
While not an explicit requirement, the use of BFO as a unique formal ontol-
ogy has been adopted by the OBO community as another guiding principle.
It should be noted that OBO does not encompass all existing biomedical on-
tologies, with most prominent examples being the UMLS and SNOMED.43
43Both UMLS and SNOMED CT have been criticized for a number of mistakes and poor design
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Entities
BFO is a relatively small, hierarchically organized ontology with single in-
heritance (see Fig. 3.3). Its top-level category is called ‘entity’. An entity
is anything which exists, including objects, processes, qualities and states
on all three levels of reality (see Sec. 3.3.2) — thus including represen-
tations, models, beliefs, utterances, documents, observations, etc. Entities
need not be material, or even physical. For example, a spatial region (but
not what resides in it) is an immaterial physical entity; the concept of a uni-
corn is an abstract (non-physical) entity.44 ‘Entity’ understood as above is a
well-established term in philosophy, though this does not imply any sort of
agreement on what there actually exists. The term ‘existence’ itself is quite
problematic, and an attempt to define it inevitably engages one in disputes
on the opposition between actualism and possibilism, presentism and eter-
nalism, etc. In some formalisms — for example, in the possibilist version
of intensional logics (Fitting [114]) — physical existence is expressed ex-
plicitly, e.g., by the predicate ‘E!’, and is opposed to mere logical existence
expressed with the quantifier ‘∃’. The axiomatization of DOLCE employs
the predicate ‘PRE’ for asserting presence (roughly corresponding to phys-
ical existence). For an overview of various doctrines on what there exists
and of different modes of existence, see, e.g., Bacon [24], Menzel [252],
Miller [255], Miller [256], Reicher [294], Wolen´ski [389], Yagisawa [394].
principles (Kumar and Smith [215], Ceusters et al. [71, 72], Bodenreider et al. [52], and others).
44Whether the concept of a unicorn is a representation or not, is perhaps a matter of taste. If for
a mental image to be a representation there must exist — or must have existed, at least — an actual
entity recognized by the agent as the object of the representation, then the concept of a unicorn is
not a representation. Barry Smith argues (private conversation) that an intention to represent, on
the side of the agent, is enough to call a concept a representation.
The term ‘abstract’ is by no means an unambiguous one. The abstract/concrete distinction has a
curious status in contemporary philosophy: it is widely agreed that the distinction is of fundamental
importance, but there is no standard account of how the distinction is to be explained (Rosen [301]).
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Figure 3.3: Top-most levels of BFO. From http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1.
Universals and Particulars
Among the central distinctions made in the theory of existence underly-
ing BFO is the one made between universals and particulars.45 A number
of attempts have been made to characterize this distinction both formally
and informally; see, e.g., Bealer [31], Bittner et al. [45], and Neuhaus et
al. [264]. One possibility is to take as primitive the relation of instantiation;
universals are entities that can have instances, while particulars are entities
that cannot have instances. Again, there are definitions to be found that
blurr this distinction, e.g.,
“A particular is a single thing, thought of in contrast to qualities
or universals, or in contrast to an aggregate of things. Universals
45The term ‘particular’ is sometimes taken to be synonymous with ‘individual’ or ‘token’, though
the latter is often considered to have a more specific meaning (Wetzel [383]).
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themselves can be regarded as particulars [sic], themselves having
higher-order properties and relations. However, a universal can be
instanced by particular things, whereas a genuine particular can-
not.” (Blackburn [46])
BFO allows no higher-order instantiation: universals have only particulars
as instances, and no particular is a universal. In the Aristotelian version
of realist ontology endorsed by BFO, universals exist only in virtue of their
being instantiated by particulars, i.e., there are no universals of which there
are no instances. In this view, then, universals are entities that do have
instances, and particulars are those that don’t (thus we are dispensed with
the possibilist ‘can’ or ‘may’). If time is considered, universals may exist
at some times — precisely, when some particulars instantiating them exist;
universals do not exist those times when there are no particulars which
would instantiate them (Neuhaus et a. [264]). Interestingly, in DOLCE all
top-level universals46 are asserted non-empty, i.e., they are instantiated at
all times, but it does not have to hold for more specific universals.
The distinction between universals and particulars is sometimes explained
in terms of the way natural languages are used to talk about reality. It is
said that universals are referred to by general terms, such as ‘dog’, ‘fracture’,
or ‘biosynthesis’. In contrast, particulars are referred to by means of proper
names, such as ‘Osama Bin Laden’ or ‘Fido’, or by means of complex expres-
sions involving general terms, indexicals, etc., as in ‘this dog here’ or ‘your
intervention yesterday’. This, however, does not mean that every general
term denotes a universal, and that every proper name denotes a particular.
Likewise, in a logical formalism predicates (corresponding to general terms
in natural language) may be seen as denoting universals, and constants and
variables (corresponding to proper names) may be considered as denoting
(or ranging over) particulars. This does not have to be true, however:
– it is held (by realist ontologists endorsing the so-called ‘sparse’ the-
ory of universals) that composite predicates, such as ‘P-or-Q’, do not
46DOLCE has its own notion of top-level universals, called ‘basic categories’. See Masolo et
al. [244, p. 14].
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denote universals, even if their component predicates ‘P’ and ‘Q’ do;47
– there are general terms purported to denote universals, for which there
has never happend to exist an instance, e.g., ‘unicorn’;
– there are general terms purported to denote universals, for which there
can never exist an instance, e.g., ‘cubic sphere’ or ‘square circle’.
Furthermore, it is (obviously) possible to use, in a logical formalism, con-
stants to denote not only particulars, but also universals. This is what, for
example, Neuhaus et al. [264] do in their formal theory of substances, qual-
ities, and universals, and Bittner et al. [45] in their formal theory of indi-
viduals, universals, and collections. There, however, care is taken not to
confuse particulars and universals — referred to by means of constants and
variables — by the use of multisorted logic. But in some biomedical on-
tologies care is not taken to keep these distinct. For example, in their Cell
Component Ontology (CCO),48 Karp et al. suggest that it is a matter of taste
whether an entity is represented as a class (roughly corresponding to a uni-
versal in that context) or as an individual; thus they have the class-terms
‘organelle’, ‘vacuole’, etc., but ‘nucleus’ as an individual-term:
“We could have chosen to make “nucleus” be a class instead of an
instance, however, for the purposes for which this ontology was de-
signed, we wished to emphasize in our model the notion of cellular
structures as the base-level objects of discourse. . . . Our instance
“nucleus” refers to whatever cell or population of cells the user of
our ontology is choosing to treat as a single entity (an instance) in
their model.”49
In the OBO community, it has been agreed50 to adopt the policy that it is
exclusively universals that should be represented in bioontologies. This,
however, is by no means a comfortable decision. Numerous, sometimes
47The (Boolean) composition in this case is such that the extension of P-or-Q is the union of the
extensions of P andQ.
48http://brg.ai.sri.com/CCO/.
49Peter Karp, private communication.
50It may, at least, seem so.
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fierce debates on BFO- and OBO-related discussion lists51 provide evidence
that the criteria for distinguishing general terms that denote universals from
those that do not are still far from obvious, and that further clarifications are
needed.
The problem of universals has been debated for centuries (Klima [204]),
and the recent literature is confusing in terminology, incompatible stan-
dards for evaluating theories, and “philosophers talking past one another”
(Swoyer [361]). The view that universals exist as entities in the objective
reality is by no means the only possible one. Against this realist stance var-
ious arguments have been proposed; very roughly, conceptualists claim that
general terms refer not to universals (because, according to them, there
are no such entities), but rather to concepts within the minds of cognitive
agents.52 Nominalists claim that general terms do not refer to anything else
than to (multiple) particulars (and, similarly to conceptualists, that there
are no such entities which would correspond to the name ‘universal’).53
Continuants and Occurrents
Another top-level distinction essential for all OBO ontologies is the one be-
tween continuants and occurrents (Smith et al. [326, 331]; see Fig. 3.3),
corresponding to the division of BFO into two forms, the time-instant form
(the snapshot form, SNAP) and the time-interval form (the span form, SPAN).
Continuants are those entities that exist wholly or fully at any time at which
they exist at all, even if they may have different parts at different times
of their existence. Occurrents are those entities whose existence extends in
time, and at a particular time only some of their temporal parts are pre-
sent. (More accurately, BFO takes an eternalist view with respect to occur-
rents; occurrents exist throughout the whole of time (which is an occur-
51For example, bfo-discuss@googlegroups.com and obo-cell-type@lists.sourceforge.net
52Conceptualism is the theory of universals that sees them as shadows of our grasp of concepts.
(. . . ) A concept is that which is understood by a term, particularly a predicate. (Blackburn [46])
53Nominalism is the view that things denominated by the same term share nothing except that
fact: what all chairs have in common is that they are called ‘chairs’. The doctrine is usually associ-
ated with the thought that everything that exists is a particular individual, and therefore there are
no such things as universals.” (Blackburn [46])
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rent itself), and are located (rather than present) in various temporal and
spatio-temporal regions.) Continuants and occurrents are sometimes called
‘endurants’ and ‘perdurants’, respectively, though these terms are not neces-
sarily taken by all philosophers as synonymous with the other. Continuants
are further divided into independent and dependent continuants, and spa-
tial regions (Fig. 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Continuants in BFO. From http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/1.1.
The continuant-occurrent distinction is not a universally accepted one; four-
dimensionalists, for example, hold that both continuants and occurrents are
only partially present at time instants, and that entities of both these kinds
have temporal parts (temporal slices). The nature of time — its density,
continuity, and the possibility of perception of time instants (indeed, the
very existence of time instants) — is also far from enjoying a uniform view
among philosophers (Markosian [242], Poidevin [286]). For a recent de-
fense of the continuant-occurrent distinction endorsed by BFO, see Grenon
and Smith [139].
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Dependent and Independent Entities
The third major distinction essential to BFO is that between dependent and
independent entities. More accurately, the distinction is between depen-
dent and independent continuants, as BFO does not apply the dependent-
independent criterion to occurrents. A dependent entity is an entity that for
its existence requires the existence of another entity, its bearer, in which the
former inheres. Functions, such as those represented in the Molecular Func-
tion branch of the GO, are dependent entities; they inhere in other entities,
such as molecules. Other dependent continuants are qualities (e.g., colors,
shapes, weights), roles (e.g., the role of a person as a surgeon), and disposi-
tions (e.g., of the blood to coagulate).54 Further distinctions are made, e.g.,
between specifically dependent entities (entities that depend specifically on
some other particular entities) and generically dependent entities (entities
that depend on instances of some universals, but not necessarily on the same
instances at all times).55 For the purpose of biomedical ontology, qualities
are specified in much more detail in the Ontology of Phenotypic Qualities
(PATO).56
Relations
The term ‘relation’ is pervasively used in ontological engineering to speak
of both what holds between two universals and what holds between two
particulars; instantiation of a universal by a particular is sometimes seen as
a relation as well. However, it is useful to keep these two types of relations
distinct, and to provide a consistent rule of quantification for relations be-
tween universals. Early versions of the Gene Ontology, for example, did not
provide precise specifications of what the links ‘is a’ and ‘part of’ mean, and
how the corresponding relations are to be quantified (Smith et al. [318]).
Recently, the OBO community has adopted and continuously develops a
54Recent discussions on BFO-related mailing lists prove that the distinction between functions,
roles, and dispositions is, in the context of biomedical ontologies, still unclear. There is an ongoing
effort aimed at clarifying this branch of BFO.
55Again, this distinction has been recently subject to hot debates among OBO developers.
56http://www.bioontology.org/wiki/index.php/PATO:Main_Page.
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specification of formal relations to be used in biomedical ontologies (Smith
et al. [326]). One of the leading principles is that universal-universal rela-
tions have the all-some quantification: a universal U1 is R-related to another
universal U2 just in case all instances of U1 are r-related to some instances
of U2 (r is the instance-instance counterpart of R; see Smith et al. [326] and
Kus´nierczyk [218] for more details).
Chapter 4 presents the specific problem of defining relations between terms
in the GO and terms in the Taxonomy of Species, and chapters 5–A show
how they can be defined so as to enable various patterns of inference. One
of the core ideas in the framework presented in those chapters is that it
may be useful to depart from the default all-some quantification pattern
and provide a means for explicitly acknowledging patterns some of which
are not available in common description logics-based formalisms.
3.3.5 Discussion
This chapter discusses the need for a unique, coherent top-level ontology
and terminology that could be used to guide and bridge the development
of different domain-specific ontologies. A possible candidate is the Basic
Formal Ontology, BFO, which is briefly covered here; for more details the
reader is referred to the numerous publications related to BFO mentioned
in this chapter, and to BFO’s official website for most recent news. While
BFO itself is in a relatively stable form, there has recently been much effort
dedicated to its adoption as the basis for the development of Open Biomed-
ical Ontologies (Smith et al. [324]). The work is in progress, however, and
many issues remain to be resolved. Despite the sound philosophical founda-
tion that BFO provides for ontologies developed according to its principles,
it is not entirely clear whether it would or would not be possible to achieve
the same or better performance using a different philosophical basis; it is
not clear whether the distinctions made in BFO, e.g., between bona fide and
fiat entities, between dependent and independent entities, or between re-
lational, dispositional, and functional entities are helpful for the purposes
of biomedical ontologies. Discussions on BFO-related mailing lists provide
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evidence that often it is not clear to domain experts how to classify an entity
using BFO’s top-level categories. It is also unclear whether enforcing a single
view on how to represent the biological domain helps or rather suppresses
the development of biomedical ontologies; in general, the idea of having
a unique top-level ontology for all purposes and all communities has been
largely abandoned in ontological engineering. While one of the goals of the
activities reported here is to establish a commonly agreed top-level ontol-
ogy in the rather limited context of biomedicine, it remains to be proved
that such an approach is both feasible and desirable, the whole community
taken into consideration.
The OBO Foundry approach has been successful in unifying multiple on-
tologies that cover the same domain but were developed by different teams;
for example, the cell type ontology of Bard, Rhee and Ashbuner [28], the
cell type ontology of Kelso et al. [195], the cell type-related terms in the
Gene Ontology, and the cell type-related terms in the Foundational Model
of Anatomy (FMA; Rosse and Mejino [302]) have all been merged into the
OBO cell type ontology (CL; Mabee et al. [241]). The role of so-called ‘ref-
erence ontologies’,57 such as the FMA and a few other OBO ontologies, in
the integration of the Semantic Web has also been established (Brinkley et
al. [59]). Furthermore, there are ongoing efforts to adopt the OBO Foundry
principles and reuse its member ontologies in projects such as the NeuronDB
database,58 BIRNLex, the controlled vocabulary designed to annotate data
sources of the Biomedical Informatics Research Network (BIRN),59 or the
Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations initia-
tive (MIBBI).60 Nevertheless, the correctness, usefulness, or superiority of
the OBO Foundry approach has not been the subject of any benchmark test
yet.
57Ontologies intended to be reused in multiple application contexts rather than designed for a
single, specific application.
58http://senselab.med.yale.edu/neurondb/.
59http://www.nbirn.net/.
60http://mibbi.sourceforge.net/.
Chapter 4
Subsetting the Gene Ontology
with GO Slims
In this chapter we introduce the idea of partitioning the Gene Ontology
based on criteria corresponding to various taxonomic contexts. We analyze
how suitable for this task are the so-called ‘GO slims’, manually created sub-
sets of terms from the three branches of the Gene Ontology, the molecular
function, biological process, and cellular component ontologies. The chap-
ter is structured as follows:
– Section 4.1 motivates the need for subsetting the Gene Ontology.
– Section 4.2 discusses the issue of generality and species-specificity of
GO terms.
– Section 4.3 introduces GO slims, the current approach to providing
subsets of the GO. We discuss a number of issues related to how the
slims are constructed and maintained, and assess their reliability as a
source of species-specific subsets of GO terms.
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Chapter 5 and Appendix A provide a detailed description of a framework
designed specifically to address the issue of aligning1 the Gene Ontology
with the Taxonomy of Species.
4.1 Introduction
During the past decade there has been a rapid growth of interest in on-
tological engineering, i.e., in designing, implementing and deploying struc-
tured representations of various real world domains (Devedžic´ [91], Gómez-
Pérez [133], Mizoguchi [258]). One of the most visible testimonies of this
trend is the ontological activity in biomedicine and bioinformatics, perhaps
best represented by the Open Biomedical Ontologies project (OBO) and its
successor OBO Foundry (Smith et al. [324]).2 The Gene Ontology (GO;
Ashburner et al. [367]), which served as the initial kernel of OBO and suc-
cessfully continues to be its driving force, is the result of an effort aimed
at providing a structured, precise, shared vocabulary for describing roles
of genes and gene products in any organism (the Gene Ontology Consor-
tium [366, 367]).
Ideally, ontologies should be built to enable automated agents to commu-
nicate and process information as if they had the understanding of the do-
main that human experts possess. On the other hand, ontologies are valu-
able sources of explicit, systematized knowledge for human users, especially
those who are not experts in the domain represented by a particular ontol-
ogy (Mizoguchi [258]). Automated agents use an ontology to retrieve rele-
vant pieces of information (e.g., entries in a database) or whole documents
(e.g., scientific publications) annotated with its terms, but it is human users
that must understand the ontology to provide such annotations. Even if
annotations are suggested by automated services, such as text mining of sci-
entific literature, it is still human experts that must curate — accept, modify,
1Ontology alignment is typically defined as the (semi)automatic discovery of correspondences
between ontologies that are distinct representations of the same domain (Davies et al. [86]). Re-
cently, the OBO community has adopted the term ‘bridge’ for describing connections between mod-
ularized ontologies, as sketched in Rector [292].
2http://obo.sourceforge.net/; see also Sec. 2.7.
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or reject — those suggestions. This dual role of ontologies is reflected in,
e.g., the principle of intelligible definitions: definitions within an ontology
should be both humanly intelligible and formally specifiable (Smith [321]).
Biomedical ontologies grow considerably in number, size and coverage; this
trend is clearly illustrated by the expanding list of bioontologies available on
the OBO Foundry website.3 It has long been recognized that large ontologies
and knowledge bases need to be partitionable into subsets tailored for the
convenience of both a human and an automated agent (see, e.g., Wouters
et al. [390], Bhatt et al. [43]). On the one hand, focusing on a narrow
partition improves the efficiency of inference; on the other hand, human
users may be presented with a constrained and tersely expressed portion of
knowledge, relevant to the particular problem at hand. In the case of OBO,
partitioning of the represented biomedical domain is realized in two ways:
– Firstly, the whole of our biomedical knowledge is divided into a num-
ber of separate ontologies covering different subdomains, such as gross
anatomy of Drosophila, human diseases, cellular components, protein-
protein interactions, etc. This partitioning reflects the perspective on
reality taken by the authors of the ontologies.
– Secondly, terms within a single ontology may be selected or hidden
to provide a partial view of the partition of reality represented by the
ontology. This subpartitioning reflects a user-defined perspective on
reality (its part captured within the scope of the chosen ontology).
The Gene Ontology was originally designed to be a vocabulary that could
be applied to all eukaryotes (Ashburner et al. [19]), but now includes a
large number of terms that cover gene products found in prokaryotes and
viruses as well. The vocabulary of the Gene Ontology is comprehensive,
in that its taxonomic scope ranges from species-specific terms to the most
general terms representing features found in organisms of all sorts. One
consequence of this development is that not all GO terms are necessarily of
interest to a researcher focused on organisms of a particular kind, such as
3http://www.obofoundry.org/.
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viruses, flowering plants, or fruit flies; not all terms need to be visible to
every user, and many terms will be irrelevant to the inferences a particular
experiment may require to be carried out. In Ch. 5, we show that by relating
terms in the Gene Ontology to terms in the Linnaean Taxonomy of Species
(TS; see, e.g., Ereshefsky and Matthen [103]) one is able to partition the
GO according to various taxon-related criteria, and answer taxon-specific
queries such as ‘What biological processes take place in vertebrates but not in
humans?’, ‘What are the most specific classes of molecular functions that can be
found in all vertebrates?’, or ‘What are the most general classes of cellular com-
ponents that cannot be found in organisms other than yeasts?’. Furthermore,
the system should also be able to process inversed queries, e.g., “What are
the organisms in which syncytia can be found?”, etc. The approach is novel,
in that it substantially departs from how species-specificity is currently ad-
dressed with the GO slims technology.
Material The analysis of the structure and content of GO slims is based on
data obtained from the Gene Ontology downloads site.4 Where taxonom-
ical information is involved, my reference is data obtained from the NCBI
Taxonomy downloads site.5 Both databases were most recently accessed in
January 2007; both sources are also available for online browsing. It should
be noted that many of the problems with species-specificity of GO terms
mentioned in this chapter have been recently repaired, or at least addressed
in some way by the developers of the Gene Ontology, partially following the
criticism and suggestions included in theis and the next chapters.
4.2 The Generality and Specificity of GO Terms
From its very beginning, the Gene Ontology project has been a collaborative
effort to construct and use ontologies to facilitate the biologically meaning-
ful annotation of genes and their products in a wide variety of organisms
(the Gene Ontology Consortium [367]), initially in eukaryotes. Currently,
4http://www.geneontology.org/.
5http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Taxonomy/.
4.3. THE GO SLIMS 101
the GO aims at providing a controlled vocabulary that can be used to de-
scribe any organism. How should the stress on ‘wide variety of organisms’
and ‘any organism’ be understood? Clearly, a number of functions, pro-
cesses and components are not common to all life forms. There are many
such non-universal features6 — features that are not found in some kinds
of organisms — represented within the GO; more or less trivial examples
are discussed later throughout this chapter.
In fact, many high-level GO terms represent features that do not appear in
all life forms — features that have never been, and are not supposed to be,
found in organisms of some specific types. (In this chapter, the terms ‘high-
level GO term’ and ‘general GO term’ are used to speak of those GO terms
that are placed relatively close to the root term of the ontology they belong
to, irrespectively of how well the term-wise distance from the root reflects
what a domain expert would consider a term’s specificity.) As an example,
consider structures of the type represented by the term ell — i.e., cells, the
basic structural and functional units of all organisms; clearly, cells are not
components of viruses. Likewise, structures of the type represented by the
term virion — i.e., virions, complete viral particles — are not (canonically, at
least) components of cellular organisms. I constrain myself here from the
discussion of whether viruses — acellular structures— should be considered
live organisms, or even simply organisms, or not; it suffices to note that the
Gene Ontology does provide a vocabulary that describes features found only
in viruses. The terms bioluminesene, photosynthesis, loomotion, and hathing
are other relevant examples, and many other can be easily found.
4.3 The GO Slims
How is the dependence between GO terms and types of organisms addressed
currently in the Gene Ontology? Can this approach be improved or ex-
6A terminological note: henceforth, molecular functions, biological processes and cellular com-
ponents will collectively be referred to as features of organisms, or just features. This shorthand
allows for an easier to read text; my use of the term ‘feature’ here should not be confused with its
various other uses in biological terminology.
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tended? The observation that there are terms which do not represent uni-
versal features — features found in organisms of all sorts — has, among
many other reasons, led to the implementation of a simple approach to
creating constrained views of the GO, the so-called ‘GO slims’. Slims are
versions of the GO ontologies in which the more specific terms (and there-
fore their annotations) have been collapsed up into the more general parent
terms; for example, style development can be collapsed into its ancestor ower
development (Clark et al. [79]). In general, if g1 and g2 are two GO terms
such that g1 is an ancestor of g2, then in a slim that would include g1 but
not g2 all annotations made with g2 would be shifted up to the term g1
(within the slim). That is, effectively, every gene product annotated with g2
is annotated with g1 in the slim. In the example given by Clark et al., the
hypothetical slim contains the term ower development but not the term style
developement. Since, according to the Gene Ontology, style developement is
a part of flower development, the latter inherits all anotations of the for-
mer; specifically, the annotations of the A. thaliana genes STY1 and STY2
with style development are inherited7 by oral organ development.
According to the online documentation of the Gene Ontology, slims are cut-
down versions of GO ontologies containing a subset of the terms in the
whole GO; they give a broad overview of the ontology content without the
detail of the specific fine grained terms. Slims are created by users accord-
ing to their needs, and may be specific to species or to particular areas of
the ontologies.8 Slims are not constrained to providing only general views
(views including only general terms). One may thus create any view of the
ontology, in particular one that contains only ‘fine-grained’ terms. There are
a few officially supported slims: the Plant slim, the Yeast slim, the Generic
slim (a slim that is not species specific, and should be suitable for most
purposes), and the Gene Ontology Annotation Database (GOA) slim,9 all of
which can be found in the official OBO-format file distribution of the GO.
Many other slims, e.g., the Honey bee ESTs slim, the Drosophila slim, the
Rice slim, etc., have been archived and are available for download from the
7Note the upward direction of this inheritance pattern.
8GO slim guide, http://geneontology.org/GO.slims.shtml.
9The GOA slim contains ‘high-level terms’ that cover the main aspects of each of the three GO
ontologies (http://www.ebi.ac.uk/GOA/).
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GO website.
To analyze data annotated with a subset of GO terms, one may use any of
the existing slims, or create one anew. To create a slim with some particular
intended coverage, all GO terms deemed relevant for that purpose have to
be manually selected. In practice, within an OBO format file, the subsetdef
tag is used to introduce the slim’s identifier and name, and every term to be
included in that slim is marked with the subset tag together with the slim’s
identifier; see the GO File Format Guide10 for further details and examples.
Figure 4.1 shows an excerpt from the Generic GO slim, including a fragment
of the preamble and a modified entry for the term reprodution.
To constrain the view of the whole of the Gene Ontology to what is covered
in a particular slim, one simply needs to select all those terms that are tagged
correspondingly. This can be easily done with an OBO-compliant tool, such
as OBO-Edit (Day-Richter et al. [88]). For example, in the standard OBO-
format file the term bud is tagged as belonging to the Yeast slim, while the
term synapse is not; therefore, the former will appear in the yeast-related
view of the Gene Ontology based on that file, while the latter will not.
This approach to contextualization of the Gene Ontology is fairly straight-
forward. A number of publications can be found in which GO slims are
reported to have been used, e.g., to provide an overview of the functional
composition of proteomes (Kanapin et al. [191]), categorize proteins ac-
cording to the processes they participate in (Wohlschlegel et al. [388]), or
to improve estimation of missing values in microarray experiments (Tuikkala
et al. [372]). However, as the following observations make clear, one should
be careful in making assumptions about a GO slim’s generality or species-
specificity, which would have impact on the correctness or relevance of an
analysis based on the slim.
10http://geneontology.org/GO.format.shtml.
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format-version: 1.2
date: 21:06:2007 16:45
saved-by: jane
auto-generated-by: OBO-Edit 1.101
subsetdef: goslim_generi "Generi GO slim"
subsetdef: goslim_goa "GOA and proteome slim"
subsetdef: goslim_plant "Plant GO slim"
subsetdef: goslim_yeast "Yeast GO slim"
subsetdef: gosubset_prok "Prokaryoti GO subset"
[Term℄
id: GO:0000003
name: reprodution
namespae: biologial_proess
def: "The prodution by an organism of new individuals that ontain
some portion of their geneti material inherited from that organism."
[GOC:go_urators, GOC:isa_omplete, ISBN:0198506732
"Oxford Ditionary of Biohemistry and Moleular Biology"℄
subset: goslim_generi
subset: goslim_plant
subset: gosubset_prok
synonym: "reprodutive physiologial proess" EXACT [℄
is_a: GO:0008150
Figure 4.1: A modified fragment of the Generic GO slim. The preamble
includes a few subset definitions (note the subsetdef tags). The term repro-
dution is assigned to three of theses subsets (note the subset tags). From
http://www.geneontology.org/GO_slims/goslim_generic.obo.
4.3.1 GO Slims Have Imprecisely Defined Scope
Slims are created by users according to their needs, but, due to this very
fact, they do not necessarily satisfy the needs of a broader community. The
existing slims lack definitions that would precisely describe their content.
Slims were introduced early on in the life of the Gene Ontology (Adams et
al. [10]), and have since remained ad hoc customized views. For research
purposes, it is not advisable to guess a slim’s scope and goals from its name
alone; e.g., one should not make assumptions about yeast-specificity of the
Yeast slim. Unfortunately, the documentation of GO slims is not very helpful
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in this respect.
GO slims have no explicit, precise criteria for the inclusion of terms. Specif-
ically, it is not clear what it means that slims give a broad overview of the
ontology content without the detail of the specific fine-grained terms; the
notion of ‘fine-grainedness’ of GO terms is rather intuitive and imprecise.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.2, there are terms excluded from the Generic slim
despite their ancestors and successors being included in this slim. What-
ever intuitive understanding of the specificity of GO terms one may have, it
seems to be contradicted by this example.
[GO:0008150 biologial proess℄
GO:0009987 ellular proess
[GO:0007154 ell ommuniation℄
[GO:0007267 ell-ell signalling℄
[GO:0008037 ell reognition℄
GO:0009988 ell-ell reognition
GO:0050875 ellular physiologial proess
[GO:0007049 ell yle℄
[GO:0007582 physiologial proess℄
GO:0050875 ellular physiologial proess
[GO:0007049 ell yle℄
Figure 4.2: A partial view of the biological process branch of the Gene On-
tology. Indentation reflects subsumption of terms. Terms included in the
Generic slim are in square brackets. The term ellular proess is excluded
from the slim, although both the term biologial proess (its ancestor) and
the term ell reognition (its successor) are included in it.
A simple approach to estimate a term’s specificity (or its inverse, generality)
is to use the count of ancestors of the term. The terms biologial proess and
physiologial proess (see Fig. 4.2) would have, following this line, equal gen-
erality; the term ell-ell signalling would be more specific than the term el-
lular physiologial proess, though the former is not actually a successor of the
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latter.11 An alternative approach, implemented in the Gene Ontology Par-
tition Database (Alterovitz et al. [12]), is to employ information-theoretic
calculations, based on the count of annotations associated with GO terms.
However, in general, such count of still incomplete annotations seems to
reflect the interest and activity of particular research communities rather
than any sort of term generality. This approach will not necessarily be re-
liable until all genes and gene products in all organisms have been fully
annotated.
These two approaches are based on the static structure of the GO and on its
so-called ‘information content’, respectively. In either case, the result may
not correspond well to the specificity of terms as it could be understood by
domain experts. Computational assessment of the specificity of GO terms is
not an infrequent topic of discussion on the GO-friends12 mailing list.
4.3.2 ‘Species-Specificity’ Has Imprecise Meaning
Until only recently, many terms in the Gene Ontology were said to be species-
specific, and marked as such by a ‘sensu . . . ’ inclusion in the name and an
‘as in, but not restricted to, . . . ’ inclusion in the definition (where the el-
lipses stand for a taxon name and a taxon description, respectively). As an
example, Fig. 4.3 shows the term proteasome omplex (sensu Eukaryota), en-
coded in the OBO file format. In an effort to clarify the intentions, ‘sensu
. . . ’ has been replaced by ‘sensu . . . research community’, but this change
was later reversed; currently, ‘sensu’ terms are being modified so that their
names reflect the actual differentiating criteria rather than the use of a term
by a particular research community. For example, vauolar lumen (sensu Mag-
noliophyta) has been replaced with lumen of vauole with ell yle-independent
morphology, etc.
‘Species-specificity’ is also invoked in the description of slims. For exam-
11This simple approach is somewhat complicated by the fact that the Gene Ontology allows for
multiple inheritance, i.e., a term may have more than one path to the root of the ontology, and the
paths may be of different lengths. Ad hoc solutions to this problem include considering the maximal,
minimal, or average distance from the root as a measure of specificity.
12http://www.geneontology.org/go.list.gofriends.shtml.
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[Term℄
id: GO:0000502
name: proteasome omplex (sensu Eukaryota)
namespae: ellular_omponent
def: "A large multisubunit omplex whih atalyzes protein degradation.
This omplex onsists of the barrel shaped proteasome ore omplex
and the regulatory partile that aps the proteasome ore omplex.
As in, but not restrited to, the eukaryotes (Eukaryota,
nbi_taxonomy_id:2759)."
[GOC:rb℄
synonym: "26S proteasome" NARROW [℄
is_a: GO:0043234 ! protein omplex
is_a: GO:0044424 ! intraellular part
Figure 4.3: The OBO-format entry for the term proteasome omplex (sensu
Eukaryota).
ple, the Prokaryotic GO subset is “a prokaryote-specific subset of GO terms,
[which] contains only terms that are applicable to prokaryotes”.13 The
subset may thus include terms that are applicable not only to prokaryotes
(the definition does not state that it contains only terms that are applicable
only to prokaryotes); it may also exclude some terms that are applicable to
prokaryotes (the definition does not state that it contains all terms that are
applicable to prokaryotes). The Plant slim contains the term biologial pro-
ess, which clearly is not plant-specific (plants are not the only organisms in
which biological prcesses take place). It also contains the term extraellular
matrix (sensu Metazoa), whose name suggests specificity to animals; it should
rather include a term such as extraellular matrix (sensu Viridiplantae).14
4.3.3 Relations Between Taxa Are Neglected
Although some of the slims seem to have been intended as collections of
terms corresponding (in a rather underspecified sense) to particular taxa,
13From http://geneontology.org/GO.slims.shtml.
14Not an actual GO term, I made this up for the sake of the example.
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the taxonomic relations which hold between the classes of organisms re-
ferred to by the slims have not been taken into consideration. Thus, for
example, the Plant slim contains only some of the terms included in the
Rice slim, and the latter contains only some of the terms included in the
former. For most of the taxa that are explicitly associated with the so-called
‘species-specific’ terms (terms with a ‘sensu’ clause in their names), there
are no slims defined (see Fig. 4.4).
Archaea (superkingdom) . . .
Bacteria (superkingdom) . . .
Eukaryota (superkingdom)
Apicomplexa (phylum/division)
Viridiplantae (kingdom) . . .
Fungi (kingdom)
Candida albicans (species)
Schizosaccaromyces (genus)
Saccharomyces (genus)
Metazoa (kingdom)
Protostomia . . .
Deuterostomia
Vertebrata (subphylum)
Mammalia (class)
Actinopterygii (class)
Amphibia (class)
Nematoda (phylum)
Figure 4.4: Partial hierarchy of the Taxonomy of Species, based on the NCBI
Taxonomy. Indentation reflects taxonomical ranks and subsumption. Only
taxa that are explicitly referred to by GO terms (by means of ‘sensu’ clauses
in their names) are shown. Ellipses signallize subtaxa referred to by GO
terms, which we omitted in the figure. Where available, taxon ranks are
given in parentheses.
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4.3.4 Slims Are Built Manually
Terms are assigned to slims manually, and each term to be included in a slim
must be explicitly tagged as such. The criteria for adding terms to a slim are
unclear, and thus it is not obvious how to implement measures for automati-
cally controlling the slim’s completeness (in the sense of the slim’s including
all those terms that are relevant for its purpose) and consistency (in the
sense of the slim’s not including those terms that are not relevant for its
purpose). Due to incomplete documentation, even a human expert may not
be able to assess the coherence of and adherence to a slim’s policy concern-
ing inclusion and exclusion of terms — because the policy is not carefully
specified. Some of the examples given above — e.g., the term extraellular
matrix (sensu Metazoa) found in the Plant slim — are likely the result of a
mistake. This is not entirely clear, however, since extraellular matrix (sensu
Metazoa) represents extracellular matrix as it is in, but not necessarily only
in animals; the term could thus reasonably be seen as describing a feature
found also in plants.15
4.3.5 Slims Are Updated Manually
GO slims do not automatically reflect changes done to the GO ontologies,
other than those involving terms already included in the slims. Consider an
insertion of a new term between two other terms already included in a slim.
The new term becomes an ancestor of one of the old terms, and a successor
of the other. However, it will not be automatically included in the slim —
the slim has to be updated manually for this change to be visible in it. The
case of the term ellular proess excluded from the Generic slim (see Fig. 4.2
again) might be a valid example here.
15Recently, extraellular matrix (sensu Metazoa) has been replaced with proteinaeous extrael-
lular matrix, and the definition no longer refers to the taxon Metazoa, and the inclusion of this new
term in the Plant slim is much more reasonable.
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4.4 Discussion
This chapter reviews GO slims as an approach to subsetting the structure of
the Gene Ontology. Since my interest lies in connecting the Gene Ontology
and the Taxonomy of Species, here we focused on how the slims address
the issue of species-specificity of GO terms. It appears that the issue of
applicability of terms in various taxonomic contexts is addressed only very
loosely in the Gene Ontology. The so-called ‘species-specificity’ of GO terms
is not defined precisely, and cannot be used for any inference regarding the
relations between terms and taxa. Likewise, nothing should be assumed or
inferred about the genericity of the Generic slim, or the species-specificity
of the Plant or Yeast slims. Slims lack precise documentation and clear term
inclusion and exclusion criteria, and should only be used with care, if by
anyone besides their original authors.
The observations made in this chapter motivate the development of a frame-
work for connecting the Gene Ontology and the Taxonomy of Species in a
precise and effective way. The following chapters present such a framework.
Chapter 5
Connecting the Gene
Ontology and the Taxonomy
of Species
This chapter informally introduces a framework that allows for a substantial
improvement in performance, consistency, and flexibility of creating taxon-
based partitions of the Gene Ontology, as compared to what can be obtained
using the traditional GO slims. The framework is not intended to be a re-
placement of slims, however, as its scope is limited to the very specific prob-
lem of selecting terms based on their relations with taxa, while slims may
be created according to criteria of any other sort.
The chapter is structured as follows:
– Section 5.1 introduces the idea of explicitly linking GO terms with
taxonomic terms from the Taxonomy of Species.
– Following this observation, Sec. 5.2 presents, in the form of informal
but precise definitions, a framework that allows one to take advan-
tage of the hierarchical structure of both the Gene Ontology and the
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Taxonomy, and to partition the GO dynamically, based on taxonomic
selection criteria.
– Section 5.3 Shows how the links between the Gene Ontology and the
Taxonomy can be automatically propagated along both structures, to
decrease the need for manual annotation.
– The framework is then illustrated with an example in Sec. 5.4.
– Section 5.5 discusses related philosophical, terminological, logical, and
other practical issues.
5.1 Introduction
The three ontologies collected under the common title ‘Gene Ontology’ —
the ontology of molecular functions, the ontology of biological processes,
and the cellular components ontology — are hierarchical structures com-
posed of linked terms. Terms represent types of biological entities, and
term-term links represent relations between those types. Currently, links be-
tween GO terms represent two kinds of relations: subsumption (represented
by the so-called ‘is a’ links) and meronymy (represented by the so-called
‘part of’ links). Both relations are partial orders; they are transitive and
antisymmetric, and do not form cyclic structures — the GO ontologies are
(representable as) directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). The following presenta-
tion focuses on the ‘is a’ relation; issues relevant for the ‘part of’ relation
are briefly discussed in Sec. 5.5. Moreover, it should be noted that the GO
is likely to undergo substantial changes in the nearest future, changes that
would introduce a number of other relations (see, e.g., Wroe et al. [391],
Mungall [260], Smith et al. [326], Myhre et al. [261]). Further study would
thus be needed if this solution were to be adapted to such an extended Gene
Ontology.
GO terms may be associated with taxa — classes (roughly corresponding
to types, kinds) of organisms. The classes are related by subsumption and
represented as a hierarchical structure called the Taxonomy of Species (TS).
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The ontological nature of species, and of taxa in general, is a matter of
philosophical debate; see, e.g., Ereshefsky [101, 102] for a detailed discus-
sion of species and of the Linnaean and other taxonomies. In what follows,
taxa of sub-species ranks will be ignored, with no loss of generality of the
discussion. The NCBI Taxonomy of Species database is referred to as a con-
crete implementation of TS; all of the information on taxa mentioned in this
chapter comes from that database. Figure 4.4 presents a small portion of the
Taxonomy of Species, including the taxa explicitly referred to by GO terms.
This chapter shows how the hierarchical structure of the Taxonomy can be
used to produce constrained views of the GO faster and more flexibly than
it is currently possible with the manual approach of GO slims.
Material The data used in this chapter come from the Gene Ontology
website and from the NCBI Taxonomy database as of January 2007 (see
Sec. 5.1).
5.2 Relations Between the GO and the TS
As argued in Ch. 4, phrases such as ‘prokaryote-specific’ are used in the
Gene Ontology rather vaguely, with an underspecified meaning. Here, we
propose to systematize the dependencies between GO terms and taxa by
creating links with precise meanings, and to classify them into three types,
designated as the validity, specificity, and relevance of a GO term with re-
spect to a taxon.1 The framework presented in this and the next sections is
illustrated with an example in Fig. 5.1.
1The terms ‘validity’, ‘specificity’, and ‘relevance’ will be used extensively in this chapter. Alterna-
tive terminologies have been discussed with members of the Gene Ontology Consortium. The terms
proposed here are only tentative and may be replaced by other terms in the future.
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5.2.1 Validity
A term g in the Gene Ontology can be put in the relation of validity with
a term t in the Taxonomy of Species if, and only if, the feature (function,
process, or component) represented by g can be found in (can be attributed
to) organisms of all species subsumed by the taxon represented by t. It can
also be said that g is valid for the taxon represented by t. Note that the
definition does not require that the feature can be found in all organisms of
the involved species, but rather that it must be present in some organisms of
every species subsumed by the specified taxon. It is possible that the feature
is present only in organisms of a particular gender, at some time during their
life, etc.
For example, the GO term sukling behaviour stands in the relation of valid-
ity with the taxonomic term Mammalia (mammals; alternatively, sukling be-
haviour is valid for the taxon Mammalia), since all mammals suckle, at some
time during their life. Likewise, the term biologial proess is valid for the
taxon Viridiplantae (green plants), because some biological processes take
place in all green plants. Note that the fact that a GO term is valid for a par-
ticular taxon does not prevent it from being valid for other taxa as well; in-
deed, biologial proess is valid not only for green plants. On the other hand,
the term onjugation is not valid for the taxon Mammalia, because there are
species of mammals that do not conjugate. (Indeed, no mammals conju-
gate, in the sense of ‘conjugation’ adopted by the Gene Ontology.) Likewise,
loomotion during loomotory behaviour is not valid for Viridiplantae, because
there are species of green plants that never locomote2 during locomotory
behaviour. In fact, most green plants never locomote, but there seem to
be plants that do locomote, at least in some sense: in the case of Oxalis, a
plant’s roots can pull the plant 60 cm around in the soil.3
2The Gene Ontology defines locomotion as a “self-propelled movement of a cell or organism
from one location to another”.
3See R. Koning,Morphology and Anatomy, Plant Physiology InformationWebsite, http://koning.-
ecsu.ctstateu.edu/Plants_Human/MorpAnat.html.
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5.2.2 Specificity
A GO term g is in the relation of specificity with a TS term t if, and only if,
the feature represented by g can be found only in organisms of some of the
species subsumed by the taxon represented by t. In other words, the feature
cannot be found in an organism of any species outside of (not subsumed by)
that taxon. It can also be said that g is specific to the taxon.
For example, the term sukling behaviour is specific to the taxon Mammalia,
because no organisms other than mammals suckle.4 The term is also trivially
specific to the taxon Metazoa, because no organisms other than animals
suckle. Likewise, apoplast is specific to Viridiplantae, because only plant cells
have apoplasts (it seems). On the other hand, the term maternal behavior
is not specific to the taxon Mammalia, because many animals other than
mammals demonstrate maternal behaviour. Likewise, extraellular region, of
which apoplast is a subterm, is not specific to Viridiplantae, because many
organisms other than green plants have extracellular regions within their
bodies.
5.2.3 Relevance
A GO term g is in the relation of relevance with a TS term t if, and only
if, the feature represented by g can be found in organisms of some of the
species subsumed by the respective taxon. The feature may be absent in
organisms of some (but not all) species subsumed by that taxon; the feature
may also be present in organisms of any species not subsumed by that taxon.
Relevance may thus be seen as a ‘weak’ form of validity.5 It can also be said
that g is relevant for the taxon represented by t.
For example, the term hathing is relevant for the taxon Mammalia, because
there are mammals that hatch — monotremes (Monotremata, an order-
4By definition: the Gene Ontology defines suckling as “specific actions of a newborn or infant
mammal that result in the derivation of nourishment from the breast”.
5 ‘Relevance’ may not be the most relevant name for this relation; ‘applicability’ is another appli-
cable term.
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ranked taxon under Mammalia) lay eggs, and presumably hatch as well.
Hathing is neither valid for nor specific to Mammalia, because mammals of
some (most) mammal species do not hatch, and animals of some (many)
non-mammal species do hatch. Likewise, ell wall is relevant for Viridiplan-
tae, because some green plants have cells surrounded by a cell wall. Cell
wall is not specific to Viridiplantae, since organisms of many non-plant spe-
cies (e.g., fungi) have cell walls as well (albeit with a different structure).
Furthermore, ell wall does not seem to be valid for Viridiplantae— plants of
some species seem not to have cell walls.6 On the other hand, the term ell
wall is not relevant for the taxon Mammalia, and hathing is not relevant for
Viridiplantae, for reasons obvious in both cases.
5.2.4 Additional Notes
With the Gene Ontology as one of their examples, Smith et al. [326] discuss
the all-some pattern recommended for relations represented in an ontology.
In the GO, the part of link between the terms ell wall and ell means that
every instance of the type cell wall (i.e., every individual cell wall) is a part
of an instance of the type cell (i.e., of an individual cell). This does not
mean, however, that every individual cell has a cell wall as its part — which
is not the case, in fact. Analogously, the link spei to between the GO term
apoplast and the taxonomic term Viridiplantae means that every individual
apoplast is found in (in this case, it is a component of a cell of) an individual
green plant. It does not mean, however, that there are in every species of
green plants some individuals in which apoplasts can be found (even if it
were true).
Relations between features and organisms can be different in nature. For
example, when GO terms come from the cellular component ontology, the
relations may be partonomic, or partonomic-like: part of, component of a
cell of, etc; other relations may hold between functions and organisms, and
between processes and organisms. Relations between terms from the Gene
6Some algae, which are green plants, seem not to have cell walls; see, e.g., http://www.biologie.-
uni-hamburg.de/b-online/e26/26d.htm.
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Ontology and terms from the Taxonomy of Species may be of practical im-
portance for the developers of the GO: whenever one wants to make the tax-
onomical characteristic of a GO term explicit, the first step may be to state
which taxa the term is valid, specific, or relevant for. This will then serve
as an indication that there is some sort of ‘found in’ relation between the
corresponding feature and the taxa, without the developer being forced to
precisely define this relation in the very first place. The nature of such a re-
lation may not yet be known precisely, and to correctly define ontologically
valid relations is not a trivial task (Bittner [44], Smith and Grenon [328],
Smith and Rosse [332], Johansson et al. [185]).
5.3 Inference Patterns — Rules of Propagation
The advantage of the GO-TS term-term relations introduced in Sec. 5.2 does
not follow merely from the fact that their meaning is precisely defined. The
idea is not simply to replace each manual annotation of a term as belonging
to a slim with a manual annotation of that term as being valid, specific, or
relevant to a taxon. In fact, these relations can be propagated along term-
term links both within the Taxonomy of Species (along its is a links) and
within the Gene Ontology (along its is a and part of7 links). This leads to a
substantial reduction in the amount of work necessary to manually associate
GO terms with TS terms, and allows one to automatically discover certain
types of inconsistency in manual assertions, and to form taxon-dependent
views of the Gene Ontology on-demand. GO-TS term-term relations can
be propagated along term-term links in both directions, i.e., both from a
parent term to a child term, and from a child term to a parent term. We
will speak of down-propagation in the former case, and of up-propagation
in the latter case. There are thus six different patterns of propagation, two
for each relation defined in Sec. 5.2. The patterns are introduced here only
informally; a logical formalization is given in Ch. A.
Propagation of validity within the Gene Ontology Validity up-propaga-
tes along the links within the Gene Ontology: if a GO term g is valid for
7See Sec. 5.5 for more discussion of the ‘part of’ relation in this context.
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a particular taxon t, then every ancestor of g is valid for t. For example,
the term sukling behavior is valid for the taxon Mammalia, and so are all
its ancestors, i.e., the terms behavioral interation between organisms, intera-
tion between organisms, etc. In practice, if there is a valid for link between
sukling behaviour and Mammalia, then all terms of which sukling behaviour
is a successor can be automatically included in a ‘valid for Mammalia’ view
of the GO — even if none of those terms is explicitly marked as valid for
Mammalia.
Propagation of validity within the Taxonomy of Species Validity down-
propagates along the links within the Taxonomy of Species: if a GO term
g is valid for a particular taxon t, then g is valid for every successor of t.
For example, the term sukling behavior is valid for the taxon Mammalia, and
thus it is valid for all taxa subsumed by Mammalia, i.e., Prototheria, Theria,
Eutheria, etc. In practice, if there is a valid for link between sukling behaviour
andMammalia, then sukling behaviour can be automatically included in every
‘valid for T’ view of the GO where T stands for any taxon subsumed by
Mammalia — even if sukling behaviour is not explicitly marked as valid for
T.
Propagation of specificity within the Gene Ontology Specificity down-
propagates along the links within the GO. For example, the term virion is
specific to the taxon Viruses, and thus are also all its successors, i.e., the
terms viral apsid, viral genome, etc. (The taxonomic status of viruses is not
clear. NCBI Taxonomy contains a term for the (unranked) taxon Viruses,
and thus we use it in the example, despite that, arguably, viruses are not
organisms.)
Propagation of specificity within the Taxonomy Specificity up-propaga-
tes along the links within the TS. For example, the term sukling behavior is
specific to the taxon Mammalia, and thus it is specific to all ancestors of this
taxon, i.e., the taxa Amniota, Tetrapoda, etc.
Propagation of relevance within the Gene Ontology Relevance up-pro-
pagates along the GO. For example, the term hathing is relevant for Mam-
malia, and thus are all its ancestors, i.e., development and biologial proess.
5.3. INFERENCE PATTERNS — RULES OF PROPAGATION 119
Propagation of relevance within the Taxonomy Relevance up-propaga-
tes along the TS. For example, the term hathing is relevant for Mammalia,
and thus it is relevant for all ancestors of this taxon, i.e., Amniota, Tetrapoda,
etc.
5.3.1 Logical Properties of the Rules of Propagation
The rules above are sound — any inference from correct assumptions may
lead only to correct conclusions (see Ch. A for more details). However, one
may not be able to infer all correct assertions. For example, from the validity
of sukling behavior for the taxon Homo we cannot infer, by propagation, that
sukling behavior is valid for Mammalia. A separate rule may be added to the
effect that if a GO term is valid for all taxa subsumed by a particular taxon,
then the term is valid also for that taxon (note that such inference would be
based on the closed world assumption; see Sec. 5.5 for further discussion).
One may also want to design other rules.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the idea of propagation in a generic case. The as-
serted and inferred GO-TS relations are also shown in Tab. 5.1. Section 5.4
presents a simple example based on actual terms from the Gene Ontology
and the Taxonomy of Species.
5.3.2 Consequences of Propagation
One practical importance of the rules of propagation is that one does not
need to explicitly link all terms in the Gene Ontology with all the terms
in the Taxonomy of Species which they are valid, specific, or relevant for.
Rather, it suffices to relate some of them and use the rules to automatically
propagate validity, specificity and relevance within both the Gene Ontology
and the Taxonomy. The following observations show how to minimize the
effort of manually associating GO terms with TS terms:
– To completely express validity for a particular taxon, only the most
specific GO terms (i.e., the terms most distant from the root) which
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are valid for that taxon need to be explicitly marked as such. Similarly,
to express the validity of a particular GO term, it suffices to explicitly
link the term with only the most general TS terms for which it is valid.
For example, if the term sukling behaviour is explicitly valid for the term
Mammalia, then it is not necessary to explicitly assert any such link
between sukling behaviour (or any of its ancestors) and Mammalia (or
any of its successors).
– To express the specificity to a particular taxon, only the most general
GO terms specific to that taxon need to be explicitly marked as such.
Similarly, to express the specificity of a particular GO term, it suffices
to explicitly link the term with only the most specific (in the sense of
their position within the hierarchy) TS terms to which the GO term is
specific.
– To express relevance, only the most specific GO terms need to be ex-
plicitly linked with the most specific TS terms for which the GO terms
are relevant.
Note also that validity implies relevance, but not vice versa. Likewise, speci-
ficity implies relevance as well, under the assumption that each GO term
represents a feature that can be found in organisms of at least one species.
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7
g1 R V, R — V, R V, R — —
g3 R, V V, S, R V, R V, R V, R V, R V, R
g6 S, R, V S, R V, R — — V, R V, R
g7 S, R, V S, R V, R — — V, R V, R
Table 5.1: Asserted and inferred GO-TS relations in the generic case pre-
sented in Fig. 5.1. All symbols as in that figure. GO terms for which no
relations are asserted or inferred are omitted.
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V S, , ( )R
Gene Ontology Taxonomy of Species
g3
g1
g2
g5g4 g6 g7
t1
t2 t3
t4 t5 t6 t7
V, R S, R
V, R( ) V, R( )S, R( ) S, R( )
Figure 5.1: An abstract example of propagation of GO-TS term-term rela-
tions based on inference from manual assertions. GO terms, gi, on the left;
TS terms, ti, on the right. V, validity, S, specificity, R, relevance in bold-
face (manually asserted) and in italics (inferred). Relevance implied from
validity or specificity appears in parentheses. Dotted arrows symbolize the
directions of inference. Validity and specificity between g3 and t2 are manu-
ally asserted. V, inferred non-validity between GO terms specific to t2 (i.e.,
g3, g6, and g6) and those TS terms for which they cannot be valid (i.e., t1,
t3, t6, and t7, light grey area). R, inferred non-relevance between these GO
terms and the TS terms for which they cannot be relevant (t3, t6, and t7,
dark grey area). See Sec. 5.5 for further explanation.
5.4 Dynamic Partitioning of the Gene Ontology —
an Illustrative Example
GO-TS term-term relations can be used to generate taxon-dependent (e.g.,
species-specific) views of the Gene Ontology on demand. The idea is il-
lustrated with a simple example involving three GO terms: ell wall, ell
wall (sensu Magnoliophyta), and seondary ell wall, and three taxa: Viridiplan-
tae (green plants, or simply plants, a kingdom), Magnoliophyta (flowering
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plants, a division), and Magnolia (magnolias, a genus). Both the GO terms
and the taxa are listed in the order of decreasing generality. It is reasonable
to assume that (some) cells of all flowering plants have cell walls, and that
cell walls as found in flowering plants can also be found in other plants —
but not in organisms other than plants. Under this assumption, the GO term
ell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta) can be explicitly linked with the the taxonomic
term Magnoliophyta, acknowledging the former’s validity for Magnoliophyta.
Cell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta) can be also linked with Viridiplantae, acknowl-
edging the specificity of the term to plants.
Table 5.2 shows the two explicit, manual links, and also all implicit links,
inferred according to the rules of propagation. Note that if seondary ell wall
is relevant (or valid) for Magnoliophyta (or for Magnolia), additional links
must be added manually, as they cannot be inferred from those made earlier.
Viridiplantae Magnoliophyta Magnolia
ell wall R V, R V, R
ell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta) S, R V, R V, R
seondary ell wall S, R
Table 5.2: Relations between three GO terms (rows) and three TS terms
(columns). The generality of GO terms decreases from top to bottom, gen-
erality of TS terms decreases from left to right. Letters in table cells indicate
associations: V — validity; S — specificity; R — relevance. Explicit (manu-
ally asserted) relations appear in boldface, inferred relations appear in ital-
ics. Validity propagates towards the top and right of the table, specificity
propagates towards the bottom and left of the table, relevance propagates
top-leftwards and also follows from validity and specificity.
It is now possible to constrain the GO to taxon-dependent views which con-
tain not only those terms that were explicitly associated with the corre-
sponding taxonomic term, but also those with inferred associations. One
may want to select, say, those GO terms that are specific to green plants (in
our example, the selection would include ell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta) and
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seondary ell wall), or all terms valid for the taxon Magnolia (the selection
would include the terms ell wall and ell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta)). It is
also possible to make inverse queries, i.e., ask for taxa that correspond to
some GO term-based criteria. For example, one may want to select the most
inclusive (general) taxa for which the term ell wall is valid — the selection
would include Magnoliophyta.
Furthermore, if, at a later time, a new GO term is added into the hierarchy,
e.g., between ell wall and ell wall (sensu Magnoliophyta), its validity for flow-
ering plants and magnolias would be inferred automatically, as would its
relevance for all three taxa in the example — without the need for a manual
update. An analogous observation can be made in the case when a new
term is added to the hierarchy of the Taxonomy of Species. In the case of
the Generic slim (see Fig. 4.2 again), if the terms ell ommuniation and ell
yle were appropriately marked as valid for all (cellular) organisms, then
it would be possible to automatically add to this slim the terms ellular pro-
ess and ellular physiologial proess at the time they were inserted into the
biological process branch of the Gene Ontology.
Observe that the hierarchy of taxonomic ranks can be used to constrain the
view of the Taxonomy of Species in a manner analogous to the way the
Taxonomy’s terms can be used to constrain the view of the Gene Ontology.
One may choose, for example, those GO terms that are valid for taxa which
are of a rank not lower than family — thus building a ‘family-level generic’
GO slim. In this way one may build slims with the level of genericity (or
specificity) precisely defined in terms of taxonomic criteria.
5.5 Discussion
Chapter 4 shows that GO slims, the current approach to building constrained
views of the Gene Ontology, have a number of properties that may render
them inconvenient as a means of subsetting the GO based on the relation
of its terms to taxa. As an alternative, this chapter proposes a framework in
which it suffices to manually assert some relations between terms from the
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Gene Ontology and the Taxonomy of Species, while others can be inferred
automatically. The framework attempts to solve a number of issues.
1. It enables one to link GO terms with taxa in an unambiguous way.
2. It reduces the effort needed to manually select all GO terms appropri-
ate for a particular taxonomic context.
3. The framework provides a means for automatically creating views of
the Gene Ontology based on criteria involving taxa that are not explic-
itly linked with GO terms.
4. The effort needed to maintain a consistent set of GO-TS term-term
links can thus be reduced.
In the Gene Ontology, there are a number of terms which represent features
that have not been found in organisms of some taxa (including features
that by definition cannot be found in some organisms). These terms are an
essential part of the GO: since the intention of its inventors was, among
others, to provide a vocabulary for cross-annotation of entries in molecu-
lar biology databases, taxon-specific terms are unavoidable; differences in
taxonomic coverage among various databases are well reflected in, e.g., the
yearly database issue of Nucleic Acids Research (Galperin [121] and other
articles in that volume). The current convention of the GO is to include any
term that can apply to more than one taxonomic class of organisms.8 How-
ever, until only recently, the only attempt to explicitly address the relations
between terms in the Gene Ontology and terms in the Taxonomy has been
the ‘sensu’ tagging of GO terms. In a newly published work, Schlicker et
al. [310] show that queries such as “Which biological processes are present
in Saccharomyces cerevisiae but not in human?” can be answered according
to measures of semantic similarity between GO terms. However, while un-
deniably useful, this data-driven approach, based on existing annotations,
may miss some of the knowledge which ontology curators already have, but
which has not yet been explicitly accounted for in the annotation databa-
ses. Until the annotation data completely cover the whole of the Taxonomy
8See GO Editorial Style Guide, http://www.geneontology.org/GO.usage.shtml#sensu.
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rather than a relatively small number of model organisms, it is desirable to
be able to make assertions about the validity, specificity, and relevance of
GO terms where they cannot be inferred from the data.
5.5.1 Implementation of the Framework
The framework sketched in this chapter (and further specified in App. A) has
been informally discussed with members of the GO Consortium (including
scientific curators), most recently during an online meeting on April 27.,
2007. The following conclusions have been reached:
– It is important to address the problem of connecting the Gene Ontology
(as well as other OBO ontologies, in particular ontologies of canonical
and pathological anatomy) as soon as possible.
– The solution proposed here is a plausible candidate, although it may
need further clarifications and modifications. The framework is not
intended as a replacement, but rather as a partially overlapping al-
ternative to GO slims. The two technologies are compatible: none of
them excludes the other, and custom GO slims may of course be de-
fined on both the current as well as a taxonomically enhanced version
of the Gene Ontology.
– The framework is a candidate for implementation within OBO-Edit,
the tool used by scientific curators of OBO ontologies (Day-Richter et
al. [88]). There is also an ongoing discussion on use cases.
5.5.2 Manually Created and Inferred Assertions
For practical reasons, linking terms from the Gene Ontology with terms from
the Taxonomy of Species may not be a trivial task. Ideally, for each GO term
and each TS term (specifically, each species term) a curator would decide
whether the feature represented by the former may be found in organisms
of the taxon represented by the latter. However, to examine over 20,000 GO
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terms and over 300,000 TS terms in this way would hardly be a plausible
task, and automated support is therefore highly desirable. In the case of
roughly 500 GO terms, hints are provided by the ‘sensu’ clauses.9 Unfor-
tunately, the meaning of such clauses is imprecise (as discussed earlier in
Ch. 4), and only relevance could be inferred in this way.10 In other cases,
inspection of the lexical structure of terms and search for qualifiers such as
‘viral’, ‘bacterial’, ‘fungal’, ‘microbial’, may provide some more hints. Again,
manual curation would be indispensable, since such qualifiers may be mis-
leading. For example, baterial binding: interating seletively with any part of a
baterial ell is not necessarily specific to or valid, though clearly relevant for
bacteria.
It is also possible to draw on the existing GO annotations of protein, se-
quence, and other data, since such annotations are typically species-specific.
Yet another possibility is to employ text mining techniques to retrieve tenta-
tive links from scientific literature, in a manner similar to how suggestions
for annotations of gene products with GO terms are found (see, e.g., Camon
et al. [66] and Couto et al. [84]). Plans for such a study have been made in
our local research group, though no practical work has been started yet.
5.5.3 Epistemological issues
In the field of biomedical ontology, it is not uncommon to confuse ontolog-
ical claims with those of epistemological nature (Bodenreider et al. [51]).
The framework proposed here is intended to capture claims about the rela-
tions that hold between types of features — cellular structures, molecular
functions, and biological processes — on the one hand, and types of organ-
isms on the other hand. As in the case of any other representational artifact,
such ontological claims are made to reflect the best of one’s knowledge, and
are thus subject to further revisions, both due to the progress of science and
9While the number of GO terms with ‘sensu’ in the preferred name may have decreased due to
the recent modifications, the previous names are kept as synonyms, and may still be used as hints.
10Under the — rather reasonable — assumption that ‘as in, but not restricted to t’ may be inter-
preted as claiming that the respective feature has been in fact been observed in organisms of the
taxon t.
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due to changes in the underlying portion of reality.
While the proposed solution does not include any mechanism for explicitly
expressing epistemological claims, it is possible to add, e.g., evidence codes
such as those used in the Gene Ontology Annotation Database (Camon et
al. [65]). We could thus say, for example, that the assertion ‘suckling be-
haviour is a feature of all mammals’ was made by a curator, or that it was
automatically inferred from other assertions or from annotation data. Epis-
temological claims may also be used to implement a more advanced on-
tology change-tracking system, such as the one proposed by Ceusters and
Smith [70].
5.5.4 Logical Implications
In the discussion throughout the chapter, we have implicitly adopted the
open world assumption (OWA): What is not explicitly stated, is assumed
to be unknown rather than false. Under the complementary closed world
assumption (CWA;11 Reiter [296]), the lack of any explicit link between a
particular GO term and any taxon would mean that the term is not relevant
for any taxon — which would contradict the essential assumption that every
GO term represents a feature found in some organisms.12 Note that under
the OWA it is not possible, with the relations defined above, to state that
a GO term is not relevant or that it is not valid for a particular taxon.13
Should such statements be desirable, explicit negation may be added, or the
framework can be extended with ‘negative’ relations such as ‘non-valid’ (not
valid, though possibly relevant), ‘non-relevant’ (not relevant, and thus also
not valid), or ‘non-specific’ (not specific, though possibly relevant or even
valid).
Another obvious logical consequence of the definitions of validity, relevance,
and specificity is that it is possible to make contradictory assertions. For
11If neither p nor ¬p can be proven from a knowledge base K, add ¬p to K.
12The Gene Ontology does not represent features of unicorns — every feature represented there
must have been observed in some organisms.
13Except for when the term can be asserted to be specific to another taxon disjoint with the one
in question.
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example, one may state both that a GO term g is specific to a taxon t1 and
that g is relevant for a taxon t2, which would be a contradiction if neither
t1 nor t2 are subsumed by the other. While this may seem a drawback, it
is, in fact, a virtue: such contradictions can be detected by a reasoner, and
either reported to the curator, or fixed according to some default rules. This
property might also be used to detect contradictory annotations.
5.5.5 Propagation along ‘Part of’ Relations
The rules of propagation introduced above focus on the ‘is a’ relation be-
tween terms within the Gene Ontology (as well as between terms within
the Taxonomy of Species). However, the GO contains also ‘part of’ relations
between its terms. With the all-some quantification of type-level relations in
the GO,14 the patterns of propagation of validity, specificity, and relevance
are the same in the case of ‘part of’ relations as those in the case of ‘is a’
relations. Specifically:
1. Validity up-propagates along ‘part of’: if a GO term g1 is valid for
a taxonomic term t, and there is another GO term, g2, such that g1
is part of g2, then g2 is valid for t. Let F1, F2, and O be the types
represented by g1, g2, and t, respectively; then every instance of O
has some instance of F1 as a feature (assumed validity), every instance
of F1 is a part of some instance of F2 (assumed part of), and thus every
instance of O must have some instance of F2 as a feature (inferred
validity) — it is not possible for an instance of O to have as a feature
an instance of F1, but no instance of F2.
2. Specificity down-propagates along ‘part of’: if a GO term g1 is specific
for a taxonomic term t, and there is another GO term, g2, such that g2
is part of g1, then g2 is specific for t. Let F1, F2, and O be as above (but
now F2 is part of F1); then every instance of F1 is a feature of some
instance of O (assumed specificity), every instance of F2 is a part of
some instance of F1 (assumed part of), and thus every instance of F2
14T1RT2 ≡ all instances of T1 are R-related to some instances of T2.
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must be a feature of some instance of O (inferred specificity) — it is
not possible for an instance of F2 to be a part of some instance of F1
but not be a feature of some instance of O.
3. Relevance up-propagates along ‘part of’: if a GO term g1 is relevant for
a taxonomic term t, and there is another GO term, g2, such that g1 is
part of g2, then g2 is relevant for t. (The reasoning behind this pattern
is analogous to those above.)
5.5.6 A Note on the Terminology
The careful reader should have noted that our treatment of terms such as
‘relation’ and ‘link’ is somewhat relaxed. While it may add to the termi-
nological inconsistence observed in the literature on ontological enginering
(Kus´nierczyk [218]), it was desirable to simplify the text and avoid philo-
sophical discussions here. For purity, the term ‘relation’ may be reserved for
referring to that in which two or more entities stand to each other, and the
term ‘link’ may be used only to denote a representational unit in an ontol-
ogy used to represent a relation. See Smith et al. [331] for a more detailed
discussion on related terminological issues.
In this context, links such as part of or is a between GO terms represent
relations that hold between what the terms represent; the links valid for, spe-
i to, and relevant for between GO terms and TS terms represent different
quantification characteristics of relations such as component of, function of,
etc. that hold between the types represented by the GO terms and the TS
terms. For example, a valid for link between the GO term sukling behavior
and the TS term Mammalia amounts to the ontological statement that some
organisms of all mammal species suckle. It should also be noted that what
‘found in’ means is context dependent, and that precisely defining the scope
of a context may not be trivial task. For even if viral capsids are not pre-
sent in uninfected cells, they may be found in infected cells. However, viral
components are not elements of canonical (normal, prototypical) cells, and
it is the context of physiological cellular components, functions, and pro-
cesses that we implicitly adopt here. With some effort, the framework may
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be adopted to cover other contexts. See, e.g., Neuhaus and Smith [265] for
a discussion and logical account of canonicity.
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
This chapter briefly summarizes the work done so far, revisits the goals and
questions presented in Ch. 1, and discusses some possibilities for further
research.
6.1 Goals and Questions Revisited
Phase I Section 1.1.4 outlines the goals, questions, methods, and con-
tributions related to the research underlying this dissertation. Among the
three major goals, goal G1 has been achieved to a large extent, though we
are still far from having a complete understanding of the molecular basis of
gastric acid secretion and pathogenesis of gastric and liver carcinoma. For
example, one of our activities focused on protein-coding genes responding to
activation of the the peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor α (PPAR-α);
however, it has been recently shown that miRNA-mediated signalling is crit-
ical for PPAR-α agonist-induced liver proliferation and tumorigenesis (Shah
et al. [313]). Clearly, much further work will have to be done in order to
explain these and other interactions and regulatory pathways.
Related to G1 were three questions. In our publications we show that mi-
131
132 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
croarray gene expression experiments can provide substantial evidence for
confirming or rejecting hypotheses about the functioning of organs in the
gastrointestinal system (Q1). We have also experimented with various ap-
proaches to the design and analysis of microarray experiments (Q2); how-
ever, microarray experiments are typically very costly, and optimal designs
(e.g., full factorial designs)1 are seldom feasible in practice, especially with
so many variables to be investigated. This also implies difficulties in analyz-
ing the data, with further complications due to various sources of system-
atic bias and random noise. Quite often, we were (unfortunately) forced to
make ad hoc decisions as to the filering and normalization of the data; there
has been some progress made in this domain, but experts are far from an
ultimate agreement. Multiple testing is another example of a problem yet
to be fully addressed (see, e.g., Storey and Tibshirani [355, 356], and also
Langaas et al. [230]).
Regarding question Q3, preliminary study aimed at selecting a variety of
machine learning and data mining technologies has been done, but as the
primary research interest of the group was to develop classifiers based on
the rough set theory, no more detailed reviews have been made. In princi-
ple, any technique well-grounded in statistical theory should be appropriate
for the purpose of classification of gene expression patterns. We have pro-
vided evidence that rough-set based classifiers are a reasonable choice (Q4);
however, the sets of rules produced during learning were usually too large
to be examined manually by an expert (several thousand rules in a typical
experiment), and thus one of the benefits of using the rough set approach
(classifiers in the form of human-readable rules) was not really achieved. It
is possible, in general, to design sophisticated rule-pruning algorithms, yet
in our studies performance was the most important feature of the classifiers.
If I were to continue this line of research in the future, I’d focus on us-
ing external sources of domain knowledge for the selection of features to be
used for the purposes of classification, in addition to using them as sources
of preliminary classifications, as it was done in our studies. Furthermore,
while rough set-based classifiers seemed a reasonable alternative, any estab-
lished data mining technique should, in principle, be good enough, although
1See, e.g., Cox and Reid [85, Chh. 5 and 6], Hinkelmann and Kempthorne [167, Chh. 7–13].
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the high-dimensional low-sample nature of the data makes some techniques
more appropriate than others.2
Phase II The goal G2 has not been, unfortunately, reached, and the project
remained in the design phase, except for some initial prototype components.
One of the reasons was that the available structured (‘computer-readable’)
sources of general domain knowledge were (and still are) mostly at a rather
preliminary and instable stage (Q5, Q9). While the Gene Ontology, for ex-
ample, has been extensively used for the purpose of indexing data in online
databases3 and, more recently, for extensive annotation of free-text scientific
publications,4 the loose specification of relations between its terms and the
lack of formal semantics for the underlying representation language5 made
it difficult to perform any sort of reasoning with the GO, except for (and even
here with care) navigating from more specific to more general terms, and
vice versa. It is plausible that, given the recent improvements in OBO on-
tologies, the project would enjoy more successful progress if turned back to
life now. Furthermore, the network-building tools we were examining were
mostly commercial; the recent development of the Cytoscape suite for visu-
alizing biological networks6 make it a good candidate for further research
on knowledge-guided network construction. Other considerable sources of
general domain knowledge include free-text publications, but text-mining
of scientific literature is notoriously difficult due to a number of reasons.7
2Specifically, linear discriminant analysis (LDA) is an often used technique, with nearest
shrunken centroids (also called ‘predictive analysis of microarrays’, PAM) and shrunken centroids
regularized discriminant analysis (SCRDA) among the most popular variants. Recently, Tai and
Pan [362] show how LDA can be augmented with prior knowledge extracted from the Gene Ontol-
ogy.
3Indeed, the need for such consistent indexing was one of the motivations for the development
of the GO.
4One of the most notable and successful examples of employing the GO and other ontologies
and controlled vocabularies for indexing scientific literature (the ‘bibliome’) is the GOPubMed
(http://www.gopubmed.org/), a knowledge-based search engine tuned for the exploration of bio-
medical literature.
5See, e.g., Köhler et al. [209], Kumar and Smith [215, 216], Smith and Kumar [330], Smith et
al. [318, 329], and other.
6http://www.cytoscape.org/. Cytoscape was first publicly released in 2002, and the substantially
improved version 2.0 was released in 2004.
7See, e.g., Sætre [303] for an overview.
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Another obstacle met in the project was achieving task-specific, episodic
knowledge necessary for the design of the case-based component (Q6, Q7).
We have experienced the ‘curse of dimensionality’:8 with few experts willing
to make an effort to provide a detailed account of how they build biological
association networks, and a large number of usually not-so-obvious clues
used by them, it was difficult to build a representative library of cases and
thus a robust representation of case-specific knowledge, with accurate mea-
sures of similarity and case retrieval criteria. An initial analysis of the avail-
able literature was of little help, since scientific publications usually include
a presentation and discussion of the final results, rather than a description
of the stepwise process of exploration and integration of publicly available
and local experimental and other data. While knowledge-acquisition tech-
niques more advanced than mere observation and discussion with the ex-
perts9 might provide additional hints, no technique is likely to compensate
for the lack of collaborating experts.
As discussed in Midelfart [253], Gunther et al. [152, 153], etc., the hierar-
chical structure of the GO — and thus dependencies between its terms —
pose difficulties for testing the overexpression of genes annotated with spe-
cific GO terms (Q8), and likewise for GO annotation-basedmachine learning
approaches for classificationn of gene expression profiles. With our eGOn
tool, we showed that it was possible to use the Gene Ontology— not only its
terms and annotations, but also its structure — to analyze gene expression
data; however, it should be noted that the results of our tests are strongly
dependent on the (imperfect) structure of the GO, and mistakes in the on-
tology may easily lead to incorrect results, despite sound testing procedures.
Recently, a number of new methods for assessing the overrepresentation of
specific GO terms in lists of genes have been proposed, e.g., the parent-child
analysis (Grossmann et al. [142]), the ontology-based pattern identification
8A term introduced by Richard Bellman [36], relates (roughly) to the fact that in higher-
dimensional spaces the number of points needed to sample the space with a density corresponding
to that of sampling a lower-dimensional space grows exponentially in the number of dimensions.
This means that one needs a huge number of observations to achieve a a reasonable accuracy in
sampling a higher-dimensional space. The problem of dimensionality is particularly visible in mi-
croarray gene expression experiments, where there typically are tens of thousands of variables and
only tens of samples.
9See, e.g., Awad and Ghaziri [20] for an introduction.
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(Zhou et al. [395]), the categorization approach implemented in the Gene
Ontology Categorizer (Joslyn et al. [188], Verspoor et al. [375]), and many
others. The idea of using the structure of the GO for classificationn pur-
poses is definitely of interest to a broad community; in addition, the recent
developments in the GO and other biomedical ontologies — perhaps most
significantly the introduction of multiple, well-defined relations (Smith et
al. [326]) — require further studies on how such enhanced ontologies can
be used in, e.g., the analysis of microarray gene expression data. This line
of research is an interesting option for future my work.
Phase III Essentially, the main goal of this phase (G3) has been reached,
although further improvements are certainly possible. I contributed to im-
provements in the structure and contents of a few OBO ontologies, and pro-
vided a detailed study and suggested a solution to the problem of connecting
the GO to the Taxonomy of Species in a consistent, structured manner. As
already mentioned earlier in this chapter, it appears that many of the biome-
dical ontologies, including those built by the OBO community, had not been
built in a particularly consistent and coherent way. However, the situation
seems to have been substantially improved; I have participated in discus-
sions on a number of issues related to OBO ontologies, hopefully having
made contributions to both adoption of the OBO Foundry principles and to
further development of the principles themselves. While a few years ago the
question Q10 would have to be answered rather negatively — biomedical
ontologies hardly shared any design principles beyond that they consisted
of hierarchically organized terms linked by a handful of vaguely defined
relations, encoded in an underspecified format10 — the current situation
is much better. Not only are OBO ontologies based, for the most part, on
common syntactic and semantic principles; rather than remaining separate,
completely independent and unrelated artifacts, OBO ontologies are now
10Terminologies such as the SNOMED CT (http://www.ihtsdo.org/) and the multi-vocabulary
UMLS (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/) do have a richer structure than OBO ontologies
in their initial form, yet they have hardly been considered ontologies — representations of the
reality — and, despite having been formalized in a description logic (in the case of SNOMED), have
been shown to suffer from a number of flaws that make reasoning based on these resources difficult
and unreliable (Schulze-Kremer et al. [312], Kumar and Smith [215]).
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being organized into a framework of tightly connected (in the form of so-
called ‘cross-products’).11
Arguably, much of this unification and integration has been achieved follow-
ing the adoption of BFO and the OBO Foundry ontology design principles
(Q11). The Gene Ontology, for example, has been substantially revised to
meet the requirements imposed by BFO, which could be seen as a proof
of concept (Q12). But while using a common top-level ontology seems a
reasonable way to go (at least, in a limited context such as the biomedical
ontologies initiative), it is by no means clear that BFO is the best solution
possible. For one thing, there exist a number of top-level ontologies, and the
BFO team has not been able, despite considerable efforts, to convincingly
show the superiority of the BFO approach. Furthermore, it appears that the
community of biologists who develop ontologies in compliance with BFO do
not do so without substantial criticisms towards it; it has been argued by
some12 that enforcing a wide adoption of BFO may in fact slow down the
development of biomedical ontologies without any obvious benefit (beyond
mere integration, see above) to counterweight the effect. It is not clear what
modifications to BFO would make it more suitable as a top-level ontology
for the biomedical community (Q14); it is also unclear how willing the BFO
team is to give up on some of its philosophical opinions that shape BFO in
order to better satisfy the needs of the domain experts.
It is clear that the way associations between terms in the GO (and, more
generally, in OBO ontologies) and terms in the Taxonomy of Species are
addressed is not well-structured and does not provide a good basis for in-
ference (Q15); a detailed discussion of this issue is one of the contributions
central to my dissertation. A plausible explanation for this is that the GO
was initially intended to be a standalone resource rather than a part of a
larger framework of cross-linked ontologies (Ashburner et al. [365]),13 and
11See http://www.berkeleybop.org/obol/, the OBO cross-product website, and Mungall [260] for
an introduction to Obol, the tool used to create cross-products.
12The discussion here is based on public and private communication on various online fora and
mailing lists; currently, there are no publications criticizing the OBO Foundry approach, which can,
arguably, be attributed to the fact that among the biologists who develop biomedical ontologies
there is little understanding or interest for the philosophical issues central to BFO. The discussions
typically invlove up to ten different people, including the BFO team.
13The cross-product initiative mentioned above is relatively recent, with Mungall [260] being one
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explicit references to taxa, in the form of ‘sensu’ clauses, have been used to
syntactically differentiate terms that have different meanings for different
research communities. Only recently has it been recognized that the sparse,
underspecified ‘sensu’ associations can be replaced by a more comprehen-
sive and logically structured framework. I believe that the solution proposed
in Chh. 5–A is a step towards such a framework (Q16); however, final eval-
uation has to be postponed until the first trial version of the GO including
explicit, well-defined links to the Taxonomy of Species is constructed and
subjected to critique and practical tests. Such experimental version is under
development and is planned to be announced in June 2008.14 Since the use-
fulness of the framework partially depends on the quality of the taxonomic
resource, an exploration of how resources other than the NCBI Taxonomy
Database (Q17) might or might not give better results is an interesting sub-
ject for future research.
of the earliest steps towards integration of OBO ontologies.
14Private communication with Jennifer Deegan (http://www.ebi.ac.uk/Information/Staff/).
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Appendix A
A Logical Formalization of
the GO-TS Framework
Chapter 5 explored how the relations between terms in the Gene Ontol-
ogy and terms in the Taxonomy of Species can be used to select GO terms
based on various taxon-related criteria. The framework described there in-
formally provides basic inference mechanisms to propagate such assertions
along the hierarchies of both the GO and the TS, and thus to reduce the ef-
fort needed for manual annotation and allow a user to query for biological
features relevant for taxa even in the absence of appropriate explicit asser-
tions. This appendix provides a logical formalization of the framework; its
purpose is to provide an unambiguous semantics for the relations and rules
of propagation, and thus provide a sound basis for an implementation of the
framework.
The appendix is structured as follows:
– Section A.1 provides a concise recapitulation of the essential elements
of the framework.
– In Sec. A.2 we introduce a very simple representation language that
allows to declaratively define the semantics of the framework.
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– Section A.3 provides formal definitions of the all-some, some-some,
recursive some-some, and only-some patterns.
– Section A.5 provides further discussion.
A.1 Introduction
Terms in Gene Ontology represent features of organisms. Some of those fea-
tures are commonly found in organisms of all taxa; others are specific to a
particular taxon or group of taxa. Some features are found in all organisms
of a particular taxon; others are found only in some organisms of that taxon.
Based on these observations, the following patterns of organism-feature de-
pendencies may be distinguished:
1. The all-some pattern. For example, cells are structures present in all
vertebrates — all vertebrates have some cells as parts.
2. The some-some pattern. For example, wings are structures present in
some vertebrates — some vertebrates have some wings as parts.
3. The recursive some-some pattern. For example, vertebrae are structures
present in some organisms of every vertebrate species — all vertebrate
species include some organisms that have some vertebrae as parts.
4. The only-some pattern. For example, plant cell walls are structures
present only in plants — only plants have some plant cells walls as
parts.
In a system operating under the open world assumption (OWA, Reiter [296]),
there is also a need for negative assertions, i.e., assertions to the effect that
it is not that all (some, only, etc.) organisms of a particular taxon have fea-
tures of a particular type. Under OWA, the lack of a statement that some
organisms of the type O have some features of the type F does not imply
that no O’s have F’s; likewise, the lack of a statement that only O’s have F’s
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as features does not imply that there in fact are any organisms that are not
O’s, yet have F’s as features. Therefore, the following negative patterns may
be useful as well:
1. The negative all-some pattern. For example, it is not the case that all
formicidae (ants) have some wings as parts — some ants do not have
wings, though some ants of all ant species have wings.
2. The negative some-some pattern. For example, it is not the case that
some vertebrates have plant cell walls as parts — no vertebrate features
a plant cell wall.
3. The negative recursive some-some pattern. For example, it is not the
case that some organisms of all vertebrate species have wings as fea-
tures — there are no wings to be found in any organism of some ver-
tebrate species.
4. The negative only-some pattern. For example, it is not the case that cell
walls are found only in plants — fungi and bacteria have cell walls as
well (though not plant cell walls).
In many cases, the relation between organisms and features exemplifies
more than one pattern: for some type O of organisms and some type F
of features, it may be both that all O’s have F’s as features and that only
O’s have F’s as features. Some of the patterns imply the others: if all O’s
have some F’s, then some O’s have some F’s. This chapter provides a formal
account of such rules (Sec. A.3).
A.2 LOF — A Formalism for the GO-TS Framework
To provide a formal account of the framework introduced informally in Ch. 5
and summarized in Sec. A.1, a simple knowledge representation language,
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LOF,1 is defined in this chapter. LOF has limited expressivity, designed specif-
ically for the current purposes.
A.2.1 The Vocabulary of LOF
The vocabulary V of LOF contains two disjoint sets, the set VG of GO terms
and the set VT of TS terms.
V = VG ∪ VT , (A.1)
VG = {g | g is a term in the Gene Ontology} , (A.2)
VT = {t | t is a term in the Taxonomy of Species} . (A.3)
A.2.2 The Syntax of LOF
The syntax of LOF includes the following sets of valid sentences:
ΦAS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (all-some t g)
}
, (A.4)
ΦSS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (some-some t g)
}
, (A.5)
ΦRSS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (reursively-some-some t g)
}
, (A.6)
ΦOS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (only-some t g)
}
, (A.7)
where t ∈ VT and g ∈ VG.
In addition, LOF includes the set Φ⊆ of subsumption sentences:
Φ⊆ =
{
φ | φ is of the form (subsumed-by c1 c2)
}
, (A.8)
where c1 and c2 are such that either c1, c2 ∈ VT or c1, c2 ∈ VG.
Negative Patterns LOF may be extended to accommodate for negative pat-
terns. Negation can be realized by explicitly negating sentences, e.g.,
ΦNAS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (not φAS)
}
,
1For the lack of a better name, we call the language ‘LOF ’, a language for expressing relations
between classes of organisms and their features.
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where φAS ∈ ΦAS, or by introducing sentence form with embedded negation,
e.g.,
ΦNAS =
{
φ | φ is of the form (not-all-some t g)
}
.
In this text, negative patterns will not be discussed in further detail.
Links between the GO and the TS versus sentences in LOF The corre-
spondence between the types of statements involving terms from the Gene
Ontology and terms from the Taxonomy of Species, introduced previously
in Ch. 5, and the sentence forms of LOF is as follows:
– Validity, as defined in Ch. 5, corresponds to the recursive some-some
pattern, expressable with LOF sentences of the form ΦRSS.
– Relevance, as defined in Ch. 5, corresponds to the some-some pattern,
expressable with LOF sentences of the form ΦSS.
– Specificity, as defined in Ch. 5, corresponds to the only-some pattern,
expressable with LOF sentences of the form ΦOS.
Sentences from ΦAS do not have a corresponding pattern in the framework
of Ch. 5.
A.2.3 The Semantics of LOF
The language LOF is given a declarative, model-theoretic semantics. An
interpretation I is a tuple 〈U, I〉:
I = 〈U, I〉 (A.9)
U = UO ∪UF ∪Uo ∪Uf (A.10)
UO = {O | O is a class of organisms} (A.11)
UF = {F | F is a class of features} (A.12)
Uo = {o | o is an organism} (A.13)
Uf = {f | f is a feature} (A.14)
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where the sets UO, UF, Uo, and Uf are disjoint:
UO ∩UF ∩Uo ∩Uf = ∅ (A.15)
I is a mapping from the symbols of LOF to the elements of U:
I : VT → UO (A.16)
I : VG → UF (A.17)
Thus, for any symbol s ∈ VT ∪ VG, sI = I(s). For simplicity, LOF is given
an extensional semantics, in which classes2 are treated as sets of objects.
Alternatively, intensional semantics might be used; see, e.g., Hayes and
Menzel [162] and Guha and Hayes [151]. Choosing extensional seman-
tics allows to simplify the notation (no additional symbol for the extension
function is needed) without interfering with the essential properties of the
framework. (Identifying classes with their extensions — timeless sets of
instances — as in the extensional semantics adopted here is acceptable if
temporal issues can be ignored, e.g., if classes can be assumed to have the
same instances at all times. If classes are assumed to gain and lose instances
within time, intensional semantics is more appropriate.)
The interpretation of a sentence φ of the form (subsumed-by c1 c2) (i.e.,
φ ∈ Φ⊆) is defined in the usual way: φ is true if, and only if, the class
represented by c1 is a subclass of the class represented by c2:
(subsumed-by c1 c2)
I
=
{
T if ∀x ∈ U : x ∈ I(c1) ⇒ x ∈ I(c2),
F otherwise,
(A.18)
with T and F being special symbols denoting the binary logical truth values
in an obvious way.
For convenience, the symbol ‘⊲’ will be used to denote the relation between
an organism and a feature possessed by that organism. For example, ‘o ⊲ f’
will mean that the organism o possesses the feature f.
2As discussed in Kus´nierczyk [218] and Smith et al. [331], the term ‘class’ is used in the literature
on ontological engineering with various intentions; for the purposes of this article, ‘class’ and ‘type’
are treated as synonyms.
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Definition A.2.1 (Semantics of ΦAS-sentences) Let I be an interpretation
of LOF. Let φ be a LOF sentence of the form (all-some t g), with t ∈ VT and
g ∈ VG. The sentence φ is interpreted under I as true if all instances of the
class of organisms represented by the TS term t possess as a feature at least one
instance of the class of features represented by the GO term g; otherwise, φ is
interpreted as false:
(all-some t g)
I
=
{
T if ∀o∈I(t) ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f,
F otherwise.
(A.19)
The all-some pattern is by far the most common semantics of formulas ex-
pressing relations between classes in logic-based knowledge representation
languages. For example, the LOF sentence of the form (all-some t g) is se-
mantically equivalent to the following expression in description logics, given
equivalent interpretation of t and g:
t ⊑ ∃hasFeature.g
where the symbol ‘hasFeature’ denotes the relation ⊲ that holds between
an organism and its features. (See Sec. 5.5.6 for a brief discussion of the
corresponding term ‘found in’.) Note that the description logic must allow
for full existential quantification.3
Definition A.2.2 (Semantics of ΦSS-sentences) Let I be an interpretation
of LOF. Let φ be a LOF sentence of the form (some-some t g), with t and g as
in Def. A.2.1. The sentence φ is interpreted under I as true if some instances
of the class of organisms represented by the TS term t possess as a feature an
instance of the class of features represented by the GO term g; otherwise, φ is
interpreted as false:
(some-some t g)
I
=
{
T if ∃o∈I(t) ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f,
F otherwise.
(A.20)
3Full existential quantification is a concept description of the form ∃R.C, where R is a role and
C is a concept description. A description logic with full existential quantification is marked by the
letter ‘E’ in the name (Baader and Nutt [23]).
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Unlike the all-some pattern, the some-some pattern involves an existential
claim: there is at least one instance of tI (an organism of the taxon O =
I(t) denoted by t), and at least one instance of tI is such that it has as
a feature an instance of gI (an instance of the class F = I(g) of features
denoted by g). The ontological consequences of this semantics are discussed
in Sec. A.5.1. In description logic-based formalisms, existential claims about
individuals are made only by asserting, in the ABox,4 the existence of a
particular instance of a class. (Thus, one cannot say that there is an instance
of a particular class without actually naming the instance.)
Definition A.2.3 (Semantics of ΦRSS-sentences) Let I be an interpretation
of LOF. Let φ be a LOF sentence of the form (reursive-some-some t g), with t
and g as in Def. A.2.1. The sentence φ is interpreted under I as true if every class
of the rank species or above subsumed by the class of organisms represented by
the TS term t includes at least one instance which possesses as a feature an
instance of the class of features represented by the GO term g; otherwise, φ is
interpreted as false:
(reursive-some-some t g)
I
=


T if ∀O∈UO :
(O ⊆ I(t) ∧ c(O)) ⇒
∃o∈O ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f,
F otherwise,
(A.21)
where O ranges over classes of organisms in UO and c, the condition of recur-
sion, is a boolean function c : UO → {T, F} such that c(O) = T iff O is of the
taxonomic rank species or above.
This pattern is called ‘recursive some-some’ because of its recursive na-
ture: a sentence of the form ΦRSS implies any other sentence of this form
in which the TS term t is replaced by another TS term t ′ such that both
(subsumed-by t ′ t) and c(I(t ′)) = T are true. This is obviously not the case
for sentences of the form ΦSS.
4An ABox is the assertional component of a description logic system, where individuals are de-
scribed, as opposed to a TBox, the theory component of a DL system, where classes (known as
‘concepts’ in DLs) are described (Nardi and Brachman [262], Nebel [263]).
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Similarly to the some-some pattern ΦSS, the recursive some-some pattern
ΦRSS is based on an existential claim.5 The condition c is essential for the
semantics to correspond to the definition of validity given in Ch. 5. In the
general case, c may be replaced with any other condition that circumscribes
the set of classes in UO to be considered. If the most specific classes for
which c is true are singleton classes (one-instance classes), then, effectively,
the recursive some-some pattern is equivalent to the ΦAS pattern. In the
case of the Taxonomy of Species, however, the most specific classes (taxa
of the rank subspecies, in the case of the zoological part of the TS, or of the
rank subforma, in the case of the botanical part of the TS) are not singletons,
and thus can all be considered without the consequence of equating ΦRSS-
formulas with ΦAS formulas. That is, c can be chosen so as to be true for
any class covered by the Taxonomy of Species, not only those that are of
the rank species or above. The reason for choosing the rank species for the
condition c is explained further in Sec. A.5.2.
As in the case of the some-some pattern, ΦRSS formulas cannot be translated
to a conventional DL language. Here, we need to quantify over classes; class
terms (corresponding, roughly speaking, to what is called in DLs ‘concepts’)
play in DLs the role of predicates, and these languages typically do not allow
for such higher-order quantification.
Definition A.2.4 (Semantics of ΦOS-sentences) Let I be an interpretation
of LOF. Let φ be a LOF sentence of the form (only-some t g), with t and g as
in Def. A.2.1. The sentence φ is interpreted under I as true if only instances of
the class of organisms represented by the TS term t can possess as a feature an
instance of the class of features represented by the GO term g; otherwise, φ is
false:
(only-some t g)
I
=
{
T if ∀f∈I(g) ∀o∈Uo : o ⊲ f⇒ o∈I(t),
F otherwise,
(A.22)
where o ranges over all organisms in Uo.
5This is only partially true. The existential claim ∃o ∈ O in the semantics of ΦRSS is condi-
tioned on there being a subclass of tI for which the condition c holds. A sentence of the form
(reursive-some-some t g) is trivially true when t is such that ∃O∈UO(O⊆ I(t)∧c(O)) is false.
If desirable, this can be repaired by adding ∃O ∈ UO(O ⊆ I(t) ∧ c(O)) as a condition in the
definition ofΦRSS.
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The only-some pattern is approximately the inverse of the all-some pattern.
However, it is not exactly the case: a sentence of the form (only-some t g)
demands only that if something is an instance of the class gI and it is a fea-
ture of an organism, then the organism is of the class tI. On the other hand,
a sentence of the form (all-some g t), if allowed in LOF (with ⊲ replaced
by ⊳ in the semantics, the symbol ‘⊳’ denoting the inverse of the relation
denoted by ‘⊲’), would claim that every instance of the class gI is actually
possessed by an instance of tI. This non-equivalence is also clearly seen in
the translation of (only-some t g) into the corresponding DL formula:
g ⊑ ∀hasFeature
−
.t ,
which is not equivalent to t ⊑ ∃hasFeature.g (where hasFeature− is the in-
verse of hasFeature). Again, this is related to the problem of existential cla-
ims, mentioned earlier in this section, and discussed further in Sec. A.5.1.
A.3 Monotonic Inference in LOF
The purpose of the framework for asserting relations between classes of or-
ganisms and classes of their features, as introduced in Ch. 5, is to allow one
to create taxonomically specified partitions of the GO on demand. This sec-
tion describes a number of rules that can be used to perform such inferences
in LOF. It can be proven that the rules are sound — the relation of logical
consequence between the premises and the conclusion of each rule is that
of entailment, i.e., the inference rules are monotonic. The proofs are trivial,
and are not given in this text.
A.3.1 Inference from ΦAS-Sentences
The following rules specify inference patterns involving sentences of the
form ΦAS as premises.
Theorem A.3.1 (Down-propagation of ΦAS within the TS) Let g ∈ VG be
a term in the Gene Ontology and t ∈ Vt be a term in the Taxonomy of Species,
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and I be a LOF-interpretation such that (all-some t g)
I
= T. Then for every
t ′ ∈ VT such that (subsumed-by t ′ t)
I
= T, (all-some t ′ g) is also true under
I:
(all-some t g), (subsumed-by t ′ t)
(all-some t ′ g)
RAS|T (A.23)
The rule RAS|T says that the relation ⊲ (‘has as a feature’) propagates with
the all-some semantics downwards along the hierarchy of the Taxonomy of
Species (i.e., it is inherited by more specific taxa from more general taxa).
Theorem A.3.2 (Up-propagation of ΦAS within the the GO) Let t, g, and
I be as in Theorem A.3.1. Then for every g ′ ∈ VG, (subsumed-by g g ′) implies
(all-some t g ′) under I:
(all-some t g), (subsumed-by g g ′)
(all-some t g ′)
RAS|G (A.24)
The rule RAS|G says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the all-some seman-
tics upwards along the hierarchy of the Gene Ontology (i.e., it is inherited
by more general classes from more specific classes).
A.3.2 Inference from ΦSS-Sentences
The following rules specify inference patterns involving sentences of the
form ΦSS as premises.
Theorem A.3.3 (Up-propagation of ΦSS within the TS) Let g ∈ VG, t ∈
VT , and I be such that (some-some t g)
I
= T. Then for every t ′ ∈ VT ,
(subsumed-by t t ′) implies (some-some t ′ g) under I:
(some-some t g), (subsumed-by t t ′)
(some-some t ′ g)
RSS|T (A.25)
The rule RSS|T says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the some-some se-
mantics upwards along the hierarchy of the Taxonomy of Species.
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Theorem A.3.4 (Up-propagation of ΦSS within the GO) Let g, t, and I be
as in Theorem A.3.3. Then for every g ′ ∈ VG, (subsumed-by g g ′) implies
(some-some t g ′) under I:
(some-some t g), (subsumed-by g g ′)
(some-some t g ′)
RSS|G (A.26)
The rule RSS|G says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the some-some se-
mantics upwards along the hierarchy of the Gene Ontology.
A.3.3 Inference from ΦRSS-Sentences
The following rules specify inference patterns involving sentences of the
form ΦRSS as premises.
Theorem A.3.5 (Down-propagation of ΦRSS within the TS) Let g ∈ VG,
t ∈ VT , and I be such that (reursive-some-some t g)
I
= T. Then for any t ′ ∈
VT such that c(t
I) = T, (subsumed-by t ′ t) implies (reursive-some-some t ′ g)
under I:
(reursive-some-some t g), (subsumed-by t ′ t), c(t ′I)
(reursive-some-some t ′ g)
RRSS|T (A.27)
The rule RRSS|T says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the recursive some-
some semantics downwards along the hierarchy of the Taxonomy of Species
— provided that the recursion condition c is fulfilled. Note that the rule is
not purely syntact, as it explicitly refers to the semantics: it requires that
c holds for tI. This inconvenience can be avoided if the requirement c(t ′I)
is converted into a syntactic statement, which can be easily achieved if the
universe of LOF is extended with taxonomic ranks (kingdom, class, order,
etc.), and the vocabulary of LOF is extended with the corresponding rank-
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terms (kingdom, lass, order, etc.:
V = VG ∪ VT ∪ Vr (A.28)
Vr = {kingdom, lass, order, . . .} (A.29)
U = UO ∪UT ∪Uo ∪Ut ∪Ur (A.30)
Ur = {kingdom, class,order, . . .} (A.31)
A new syntactic form is needed for asserting the ranks of taxa; for example,
(rank-of r t), where r ∈ Vr and t is as before, with the following semantics:
(rank-of r t)
I
=
{
T if tI is of the rank rI,
F otherwise.
(A.32)
Using this notation, (A.27) can be rewritten by replacing c(t ′I) with
(
(rank-of speies t ′) or (rank-of genus t ′) or . . .
)
that is, a disjunction of all sentences of the form (rank-of r t ′), where r ∈ Vr
is such that c(t ′I) is true if (rank-of r t ′), i.e., and where speies, genus, . . . ∈
Vr are individual terms representing taxonomic ranks above a certain level
(e.g., species), as demanded by the condition c. (See App. B for more details
on taxa and ranks.)
Theorem A.3.6 (Up-propagation of ΦRSS within the GO) Let t, g, and I be
as in Theorem A.3.5. Then for any g ′ ∈ VG, (subsumed-by g g ′) implies
(reursive-some-some t g ′) under I:
(reursive-some-some t g), (subsumed-by g g ′)
(reursive-some-some t g ′)
RRSS|G (A.33)
The rule RRSS|G says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the recursive some-
some semantics upwards along the hierarchy of the Gene Ontology. Note
that ΦRSS|G does not invoke the condition c; this is because c applies to taxa,
and in ΦRSS|G the condition and the consequence refer to the same taxon.
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A.3.4 Inference from ΦOS-Sentences
The following rules specify inference patterns involving sentences of the
form ΦOS as premises.
Theorem A.3.7 (Up-propagation of ΦOS within the TS) Let g ∈ VG, t ∈
VT , and I be such that (only-some t g) is true under I. Then for every t
′ ∈ VT ,
(subsumed-by t t ′) implies (only-some t ′ g) under I:
(only-some t g), (subsumed-by t t ′)
(only-some t ′ g)
ROS|T (A.34)
The rule ROS|T says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the only-some se-
mantics upwards along the hierarchy of the Taxonomy of Species.
Theorem A.3.8 (Down-propagation of ΦOS within the GO) Let g, t, and I
be as in Theorem A.3.7. Then for every g ′ ∈ VG, (subsumed-by g ′ g) implies
(only-some t g ′) under I:
(only-some t g), (subsumed-by g ′ g)
(only-some t g ′)
ROS|G (A.35)
The rule ROS|G says that the relation ⊲ propagates with the only-some se-
mantics downwards along the hierarchy of the Gene Ontology.
A.3.5 ΦSS-Sentences versus ΦRSS, ΦAS, and ΦOS-Sentences
In addition to the rules specified earlier in this section, it is also desirable to
specify rules that would allow to infer assertions of one form from assertions
of a different form.
Theorem A.3.9 (ΦRSS implies ΦSS) Let g ∈ VG and t ∈ VT , and I be such
that (reursive-some-some t g)
I
= T. Then (some-some t g) is true under I:
(reursive-some-some t g)
(some-some t g)
RRSS→SS (A.36)
A.4. NON-MONOTONIC INFERENCE IN LOF 153
The rule RRSS→SS says that the recursive some-some pattern implies the
some-some pattern. Similarly, the rules RAS→SS and ROS→SS say that the
some-some pattern can be inferred from the all-some and the only-some
patterns, respectively:
(all-some t g)
(some-some t g)
RAS→SS (A.37)
(only-some t g)
(some-some t g)
ROS→SS (A.38)
Note, however, the subtle issue that sentences of the form ΦSS involve ex-
istential claims, while sentences of the other forms do not. For the rules
ΦAS→SS and ΦOS→SS to be valid, the definitions A.2.1 and A.2.4 would have
to be modified accordingly, to involve such existential claims as well. This
issue is further discussed in Sec. A.5.1.
A.4 Non-Monotonic Inference in LOF
The rules specified above allow for monotonic (deductive) inference about
the relations between classes of organisms and classes of features. However,
it might be useful to include non-monotonic reasoning as well.6 For exam-
ple, one might want to interpret sentences of the form ΦSS as expressing
some sort of prototypicality or defaultness. One could thus perform down-
ward propagation of the some-some pattern along the hierarchy of the Tax-
onomy of Species — in addition to the monotonic upward propagation.
Furthermore, with an appropriate extension to LOF allowing one to speak
about instances (individual organisms and features) it would be possible
to make both monotonic and non-monotonic inferences about individuals.
An assertion of the form (some-some t g) could thus be used to defeasibly
infer that, given a particular organism from the taxon denoted by t, the
organism does have a feature of the type denoted by g, while the analogous
inference from an assertion of the form ΦAS would be non-defeasible — that
6See, e.g., Antonelli [16], Koons [211], and Jaszczolt [182] for a brief but informative introduc-
tion to non-monotonic logic, defeasible inference, and default reasoning.
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is, if o is an organism from the taxon denoted by t, then from the assertion
(all-some t g) it follows deductively that o has a feature of the type denoted
by g. Note that the definition of the some-some pattern given in Sec. A.2.3
does not refer to prototypicality, and that defeasible inference is not directly
supported by the formalism. Other extensions, e.g., involving numerical
quantitation of prototypicality allowing for reasoning with various degrees
of support or certainty, are of course possible.
A.5 Discussion
This chapter provides a logical specification of the framework informally
introduced earlier in Ch. 5. It defines patterns that can be used to assert re-
lations between classes of organisms and classes of their features, by mean-
ingfully connecting terms in the Gene Ontology with terms in the Taxonomy
of Species. It also specifies a number of deductive inference patterns, and
explains that patterns for non-deductive inference can be defined in addition
to what is provided by the framework.
A.5.1 Existential Claims
In Sec. A.2.3, the Definition A.2.2 introduces semantics for sentences that
make existential claims: a sentence of the form (some-some t g) says that
there exists such an organism of the type tI that has as a feature of the type
gI. The some-some and the recursive some-some patterns make existential
claims, while the all-some and the only-some patterns do not. One explana-
tion for this could be that sentences of the latter form are definitional, while
those of the former are descriptional. That is, definitional sentences say that
for an organism to be classified as an instance of a particular taxon, it must
have some specific features. Conversely, the descriptive sentences do not
say that if an organism is classified as an instance of a particular taxon, then
it must have some specific features — what they say is simply that some
organisms of the taxon happen to have such features. Furthermore, it is
A.5. DISCUSSION 155
reasonable to read ‘exists’ as has existed, or perhaps as has been observed or
there is evidence for that there existed, which allows the framework to be used
to make assertions about extinct species. In any case, the exact meaning of
‘exists’ has to be defined carefully and precisely.
To avoid the incoherence between sentences involving existential claims and
those that do not involve such claims, two general solutions can be consid-
ered.
1. Avoid the existential claim by conditioning the semantics of existential
sentences (sentences of the form ΦSS) on the existence of the pur-
ported instances. For example, consider this modified definition of the
semantics of ΦSS-sentences:
(some-some t g)
I
=
{
T if ∃o∈I(t) ⇒ ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f,
F otherwise,
(A.39)
Analogously, the (conditioned) existential claim in the semantics of
ΦRSS-sentences can be further conditioned as follows:
(reursive-some-some t g)
I
=


T if ∀O∈UO :
(O ⊆ I(t) ∧ c(O)) ⇒
(∃o∈O ⇒ ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f),
F otherwise,
(A.40)
2. Alternatively, extend the existential claim to hold for non-existential
sentences as well. For example, consider this modified definition of
the semantics of ΦAS-sentences:
(all-some t g)
I
=


T if ∃o∈I(t) ∧
∀o∈I(t) ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f
F otherwise,
(A.41)
Existential claims made at the level of concepts (class descriptions) are
rather uncommon in description logics-based KR formalisms, and such cla-
ims are usually made by asserting the existence of particular instances. That
is, existential claims are made not in TBoxes, but rather in ABoxes (Baader
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and Nutt [23] Baader et al. [22]). However, in the context of the develop-
ment of biomedical ontologies which are intended to speak of the real world
and the organisms which exist, or have existed in it, existential claims are
essential, and they are actually included in the ontologies, albeit not neces-
sarily explicitly. While the model-theoretic semantics of statements such as
(part-of apoptosome ytosol) is that all apoptosomes are parts of cytosols,
though there need not be any apoptosomes at all to make the statement
true, the implicit assumption is that there actually are (or at least have
been) apoptosomes out there. That is, the inclusion of a term in a bio-
medical ontology automatically implies the existence (whether present or
past) of instances of the corresponding type.
A.5.2 The Choice of species
In Sec. A.2.3, the recursion condition c on taxa needed for defining the
recursive some-some pattern ΦRSS was based on the rank species. Why spe-
cies? What is so special about species for it to be chosen as the basis for the
condition c? There are two reasons for which this choice has been made:
1. Species are not just like any other taxa, in that a species is typically
defined as a population of organisms that are capable of interbreed-
ing with each other and have fertile offspring; taxa of higher ranks
cover organisms that are not necessarily capable to interbreed, and
taxa of subspecies ranks cover organisms that are capable of inter-
breeding with organisms outside of those taxa. Of course, this is just
one possible way of understanding the notion of species; there are
over a dozen different so-called ‘biological species concepts’ (which
amounts to the so-called ‘species-pluralism’), and there are also dif-
ferent ontological views on what species are (individuals, sets, types).
See, e.g., Ghiselin [126], Mayden [247], or Ereshefsky [102] for fur-
ther details. Nevertheless, however defined, species have long been in
the center of interest of biologists and philosophers alike.
2. Species are explicitly referred to by the Gene Ontology: its documen-
tation speaks fo ‘species-specificity’, ‘species-specific terms’, etc.
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The sentence ‘all birds lay eggs’, for example, should (usually) not be taken
literally as meaning that every individual bird lays eggs, but rather as mean-
ing that in every species of birds there are individuals who lay eggs. But to
explain the meaning as in the latter case, one has to be able to refer to spec-
ies. If desirable, other ranks may be used to specify the recursion condition,
as in Sec. A.3.3.
A.5.3 Translation to Other Formalisms
As discussed earlier in this chapter (Sec. A.2.3), it may not be straightfor-
ward to translate some of the forms in LOF into a description logic-based
representation formalism. However, more expressive formalisms may be
used, such as IKL, a recently proposed, “extremely expressive” logical for-
malism designed for interchange and archiving of information in a network
of logic-based reasoners.7 For example, the recursive some-some pattern
(reursive-some-some t g) (validity) can be defined in IKL as in Fig. A.1.
(iff (valid-for go-term tax-term)
(forall ((taxon t) (organism o))
(if (and (subsumed-by t (tnb tax-term))
(has-rank t speies))
(exists ((feature f))
(and (instane-of f (tnb go-term))
(has-feature o f))))))
Figure A.1: Definition of validity expressed in IKL. taxon and organisms de-
note the class of taxa and the class of organisms, respectively; speies de-
notes the rank species. tnb is a dereference function (‘thing named by’).
7http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/IKL/GUIDE/GUIDE.html.
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Appendix B
The Taxonomy of Species and
Taxonomic Databases — A
Critical Assessment
Since its conception by Carl Linnaeus some 250 years ago, the Linnaean
Taxonomy of Species (TS) has been one of the most important inventions
designed with the intention of systematizing knowledge about life and its
forms.1 And although it doesn’t currently seem to be a hot topic in general
biology-related journals, it has always been used as a source of reference
and a standard vocabulary for indexing information about biological syst-
ems. Chapters 4, 5, and App. A discuss various aspects of the dependencies
between the Gene Ontology and the Taxonomy of Species. This appendix
takes a closer look at the data in publicly available taxonomic databases.
1One could argue that it is life forms that are systematized, rather than our knowledge about
them. However, one could also argue that we classify life forms, and that the Taxonomy of Spe-
cies is a systematization of such classifications into a single, coherent taxonomy — thus, it is a
systematization of knowledge.
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B.1 Introduction
In Ch. 4, 5, and A, the discussion has been constrained to the particular im-
plementation of the Taxonomy provided by the National Center for Biotech-
nology Information (NCBI; Wheeler at el. [385]) — the NCBI Taxonomy.2
However, there are a number of problematic issues related to the classifica-
tion (or rather, classifications) of life forms. Specifically:
1. There isn’t just one definition of ‘species’. There is no unique, com-
monly agreed view on what species are. While from the point of view
of a knowledge engineer developing an ontology a species is just a
class like any other, its representation as a class is not so obvious to a
biologist or a philosopher.
2. There isn’t just one taxonomy of species. Besides the traditional Lin-
naean one, originally based on morphological similarity, there is, for
example, the phylogenetic (evolutionary, cladistic) classification based
on clades.3
3. There isn’t just one taxonomical database. Even when only (some ver-
sion of) the Linnaean Taxonomy is considered, there is no unique im-
plementation of it — there are a number of taxonomic databases, and
they are not consistent in details.
B.1.1 The Need for Taxonomic Annotation
The issues mentioned above are important not only in the context of the
framework proposed earlier in this thesis. The use of a species classification
system4 is essential for successful navigation among public resources for
2http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Taxonomy/
3PhyloCode (see further text) defines a clade as “an ancestor (an organism, population, or spec-
ies) and all of its descendants.”
4More generally, an organism classification system; the distinction between various infraspecies
groupings, such as strains, is crucial for annotation of experimental data from studies conducted in
model organisms.
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supporting research in biology. Among the databases and services listed in
the annual database supplement to Nucleic Acids Research (Galperin [122]),
many either are dedicated to a particular species or to a more inclusive ta-
xon, or, if they claim to be generic, include content that is usually associated
with taxonomic information that specifies, e.g., the taxonomic status of the
organisms used in original studies from which the data come.
For example, there are databases that specialize in gene regulation in eu-
karyotes, plant gene expression, or plant comparative genomics, and those
that are specific to plant and fungal virus genes and genomes, or to struc-
tural virology. There is an Archaeal genome browser, and databases for bac-
terial comparative genomics and bacterial insertion sequences, sequences in
prokaryotic genomes, microbial genomes, oomycetes and microbial geno-
mes. There are phylogenetic databases for primate species and animal gene
families; databases of mammalian microRNAs and gene promoters, inverte-
brate genes, and cereal genomes; human meiotic recombination hot spots,
and mouse protein subcellular localization, Drosophila RNAi screening, com-
parative genomics of Shigella, comparative genomics of Listeria species, etc.
On the other hand, there are databases of orthologous promoters,5 mul-
tiple genomes, and multi-species orthologs. There is Homologene, a sys-
tem for annotated genes of 18 completely sequenced eukaryotic genomes;
RefSeq, including protein sequences, representing almost 3000 organisms;
EntrezGenome, which provides access to over 250 complete microbial ge-
nomic sequences, more than 2100 viral genomic sequences, and over 800
reference sequences for eukaryotic organelles. Those databases are compre-
hensive (in the sense of their taxonomic scope) and may, in some not so
distant future, evolve to provide information on virtually any class of organ-
isms studied well enough. It is thus essential that the data be indexed with
references to those classes of organisms the records apply to.
The situation is no different in the case of biomedical ontologies. The
OBO Foundry website lists ontologies covering gross anatomy of C. elegans
(WBbt), cereal plant development (GRO), anatomy of Dictyostelium dis-
5Orthologous features are features that are homologous (similar due to shared ancestry) and are
the result of a speciation event (emergence of new species from an old one).
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coideum (DDANAT), human diseases (DOID), fungal gross anatomy (FAO),
adult gross anatomy of mice (MAO), Plasmodium life cycle (PLO), etc. The
OBO Foundry is an effort focused on providing controlled, structured vocab-
ularies for the annotation of biological data — but, notably, the ontologies
it lists are not explicitly annotated with the taxonomic groups they corre-
spond to. (The taxonomic scope of OBO ontologies is addressed only in the
ontologies’ names, e.g., ‘C. elegans gross anatomy’, ‘Plant structure’, or ‘Plas-
modium life cycle’. Otherwise, there is no way to automatically select those
ontologies that are relevant or specific to a particular taxon. The problem
is more general: there is no explicit, structured classification whatsoever
of the ontologies according to various properties of the domains they cover
— structure, function, metadata (e.g., the Evidence Codes ontology, ECO).
Indeed, as the number of ontologies collected under the umbrella of OBO
increases, an ontology of OBO ontologies would be much in place.)
In what follows, first two issues are reviewed briefly — the ‘concepts’ of
species and the distinction between the cladistic (phylogenetic, evolutional)
and the traditional (morphology-based) classifications. It shall then be in-
teresting to explore the issue of discrepancies between taxonomic databases.
B.2 The Problem of Species
In his Species Concepts: the Basis for Controversy and Reconciliation, Ghis-
elin [126] provides a brief discussion of (and argues for) the notion of spe-
cies as individuals. Ghiselin distinguishes two perspectives on the ‘concept’
of species: species according to what he calls the ‘biological consensus’ (i.e.,
species as populations), and species according to what he calls the ‘philo-
sophical consensus’ (i.e., species as individuals). Following this view, species
are not immutable, extensionally defined entities. Rather, species are indi-
viduals, individual populations of organisms; each particular species is an
individual of which the organisms are components or parts. A species is
neither a class nor a set of which the organisms would be instances or mem-
bers, respectively. (Ghiselin uses the term ‘extensional class’ as a synonym
to ‘set’, and in opposition to ‘class’ used to talk about abstract entities which
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may have different instances at different times. He also distinguishes classes
from natural kinds in that all of the latter are classes, but not all classes are
natural kinds — natural kinds are those classes “for which there exist laws
of nature”.)
Thus, the species Homo sapiens is an individual; all individual species are
instances of the category species.6 The class of species, in turn, is subsumed
by the class of populations: all species are populations, though not all pop-
ulations are species. Furthermore, any other taxonomic group is also an
individual. However, as Mayden [247] explains, the systematic community
argues that supraspecific taxa7 do not exist in nature; they are manifesta-
tions of the historic past through ancestor-descendant relationships and are
given proper names that systematists superimpose on a phylogenetic tree
to identify monophyletic groups. One consequence of this is that taxa, like
all individuals,8 “can change indefinitely without ceasing to be the same
individual”.
Opposed to this view are, of course, a number of theories that would like
to see species (and other taxa) as classes of organisms, understood either
extensionally (as sets) or intensionally (as kinds, universals). Mayden [246,
247] provides an overview of quite a few9 such accounts of the nature of
species; besides the Biological Species Concept (BSC) mentioned above,
there are the Evolutionary Species Concept (ESC), Phylogenetic Species
Concept (PSC), Genetic Species Concept (GSC), Ecological Species Concept
(EcSC), and others, most of which assume that species are classes. It seems
that such views are more intuitive for the inexperienced. As Turner ex-
pressed it,
“Some people even like to think of them [of species] as ‘individuals’,
although, whether the use of the technical philosophical definition
of this word is helpful to many biologists, is perhaps debatable.”
(Turner [373])
6Ghiselin also seems to synonymize the terms ‘class’ and ‘category’.
7Taxa of a rank above species.
8More precisely, like all continuants; according to BFO, occurrents — which are individuals —
are changes, but themselves do not change.
9In this case, ‘quite a few’ means more than 20.
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To avoid such discussions, the earlier chapters adopted the naive view and
talked about species as of classes. If desirable, the definitions given there
may be modified so that organisms are not instances, but rather parts of
taxa; for example,
(all-some t g)
I
=
{
T if ∀oI(t) ∃f∈I(g) : o ⊲ f,
F otherwise,
(B.1)
where ‘o  I(t)’ replaces ‘o ∈ I(t)’ and is taken to mean that the organism
o is a part of the taxon I(t). (But I have no intention to engage here in a
discussion on whether an organism can be a part of a non-species taxon.)
B.2.1 OntoClean: Species are Metaclasses
Interestingly, the case of species is an excellent example of how philosophi-
cal considerations may influence the requirements for expressivity of a rep-
resentational formalism. In their Evaluating Ontological Decisions with On-
toClean, Guarino and Welty argue:
“Perhaps the most confusing of all distinctions is between the two
relations subsumption and instantiation. We have often found the
subsumption relationship misused when instantiation was actually
intended. The canonical example of this is species/animal. While
most introductory courses teach the difference between classes, such
as Mammal or Human, and instances, such as Chris, they stop short
of explaining how second-order classes, such as Species, would fit
into the picture. Human is a subclass of Mammal, and Chris is a Hu-
man and therefore a Mammal. Is Human also a subclass of Species?
“When we perform the analysis described on all these classes, we
find that the identity criteria of Species are quite different from that
of Human. Intuitively, species seem to be identified by their position
in a biological taxonomy (for example, genus and differentia). On
the other hand, we can assume that instances of Human are identi-
fied, in the simplest case, through the location in space/time of their
bodies; two humans are different if they are at different places at
the same time.
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“If Humanwas a subclass of Species, it would inherit its identity crite-
ria. This can’t be the case, since genus and differentia do not help in
distinguishing one human from another. Therefore, Species cannot
subsume Human. In fact, Human turns out to be an instance of Spec-
ies, and subsumption is not instantiation.” (Guarino and Welty [150,
original emphasis])
Clearly, Guarino and Welty argue that Chris is an instance of Human; fur-
thermore, Human is an instance of Species. Thus, Human must be a class,10
and Species must be a class of classes, a metaclass.11 Therefore, to represent
the (meta)class Species those authors seem to require (though they do not
say that in their article) a higher-order language, in which they could not
only apply the predicate Human to the constant Chris, but also the predicate
Speies to the predicate Human, e.g.:
Human(Chris), Speies(Human) (B.2)
However, the issue here seems to be the result of confusing a class with
an individual, both of which are called with the same name ‘Human’. Un-
der the assumption that species are individuals, the problem can be easily
solved. Species is a class, but its instances are not classes themselves, they
are individuals. Humans are individuals as well, but they are not instances
of Human-the-species, but rather its parts. Of course, one may argue that
humans do instantiate a class which we’d like to call ‘Human’; but then
Human-the-class and Human-the-species are obviously not the same: they
are two distinct and quite different entities, which just happen to have been
given the same name (which obviously breaks the principle of univocity;
see, e.g., Smith [321]). This can be formalized as follows:
Humanclass(Chris), Speies(Humanindividual),
PartOf(Chris,Humanindividual),
(B.3)
10It appears that Guarino and Welty do not make sufficiently clear what they mean by ‘class’ in
that article: they talk about classes representing wholes, polysemous classes, and also about instances
of classes.
11And if Species is a metaclass of species classes, Species itself is an instance of the metametaclass
Taxon of taxonomic metaclasses such as Genus, Order, etc.
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where subscripts are used to distinguished the two identically named enti-
ties, and Humanclass 6= Humanindividual.
Note that, unlike to Chris, Humanindividual does not denote an individual hu-
man, but rather a species (i.e., an individual, an instance of the class Spec-
ies). In a formalism where names of classes are distinguished from names of
individuals syntactically, e.g., by using lower case for the former and upper
case for the latter, B.3 can be rewritten as
human(Chris), speies(Human), partOf(Chris, Human). (B.4)
There is an interesting consequence of the distinction exemplified in the
Humanclass-Humanindividual, or human-Human, case. In general, we would talk
about a species, say s, referred to with a name, say ns, and a class, say c,
referred to with a name, say nc. (The confusion discussed above arises if
ns=nc.) Suppose that c is such that, at some time t, all and only organisms
of the species s are of the class c. That is, every organism o that exists at t is
an instance of c if and only if it is a part of s. However, species evolve: they
are individuals that gain and lose parts, and the same species s may have
an organism o as part at some time t, but not at another time t ′, t ′ 6= t.12
If we take classes to be extensional entities (entities defined by their exten-
sions, i.e., by the totalities of those entities taken to be their instances), then
classes cannot change, but rather cease to exist when any of their instances
cease to exist.13 If, on the other hand, we take classes to be intensional enti-
ties (entities defined by their intension, i.e., by how the entities taken to be
their instances are), then a class may have different extensions at different
times, depending on the existence of different entities that match the class’s
intension, i.e., entities that instantiate the class at different times. (Thus,
in a sense, classes understood intensionally can evolve, though it is their
extensions and not intensions that change in time.)
12We may assume that an organism is part of one and only one species, and also that it is part of
the same species throughout its life, though this is not essential here, and may even be wrong. But
if we do, then ‘o t s’ and ‘o 6t′ s’ may only mean that o does not exist at t ′.
13Alternatively, a class, understood as an extensional entity, might be said to be partly present
or non-present when some or all, respectively, of their instances cease to exist. See, e.g., Bittner
et al. [45] for an account in which extensional entities (called ‘collections’ there) can be attributed
partial presence or non-presence.
B.3. TAXONOMIC CLASSIFICATIONS AND NOMENCLATURES 167
In the first case (classes as extensional entities), if s gains a part (a new
organism), it no longer corresponds to the same class c, because the totality
of all organisms of s is not the one that defines c. Since c is the class of all
and only those organisms that are parts of the species s at t, then c cannot
be the class of all and only those organisms that are parts of s at t ′, after s
has gained (or lost) a part. In the other case (classes as intensional entities),
smay still correspond to the same class c after it has gained or lost parts; but
species evolve not only in that they gain or lose parts, but also in that their
new parts may be (and usually are) different in some respect from all other
parts the species have ever had before. It may thus be that, at some time t ′,
s has as part an organism o which does not match the intension of the class
c, and thus, again, c is not, at t ′, the class of all organisms of the species s.
Let us now return to the example taken from Guarino and Welty. We may
provide an intensional definition of what it means to be a human in a way
such that all and only those entities that are instances of the class human
are also parts of the species human. But as the species evolves, new part-
of-human-the-species organisms may appear that no longer are instances of
human-the-class thus defined.
B.3 Taxonomic Classifications and Nomenclatures
The Linnaean Taxonomy of Species is based on morphological criteria: or-
ganisms are classified into more or less inclusive taxa according to the de-
gree to which they resemble each other structurally. This traditional ap-
proach is accompanied by fairly complex naming schemes, e.g., the Inter-
national Code of Botanical Nomenclature (ICBN; St. Louis Code [1]), the
International Code of Zoological Nomenclature (ICZN),14 and others. On
the other hand, there is a phylogeny-based approach to the definition of bi-
ological taxa, which is the basis of the recently proposed alternative nomen-
clature for naming groups of organisms, the PhyloCode;15 this approach —
the phylogenetic systematics — is based on evolutionary relations between
14http://www.iczn.org/ .
15http://www.ohiou.edu/phylocode/ .
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groups of organisms, past and present. These two schemes are largely in-
compatible, and are the topic of fierce debates. In Stems, nodes, crown clades,
and rank-free lists: is Linnaeus dead?, Benton notes:
“The proposals of phylogenetic nomenclature are to translate cladi-
stic phylogenies directly into classifications, and to define taxon na-
mes in terms of clades. The method has a number of radical conse-
quences for biologists: taxon names must depend rigidly on the par-
ticular cladogram favoured at the moment, familiar names may be
reassigned to unfamiliar groupings, Linnaean category terms (e.g.
phylum, order, family) are abandoned, and the Linnaean binomen
(e.g. Homo sapiens) is abandoned. . . . The consequences of this
semantic maelstrom have not been worked out. In practice, phy-
logenetic nomenclature will be disastrous, promoting confusion and
instability, and it should be abandoned. It is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the difference between a phylogeny (which is
real) and a classification (which is utilitarian). Under the new view,
classifications are identical to phylogenies, and so the proponents of
phylogenetic nomenclature will end up abandoning classifications
altogether.” (Benton [38])
The Linnaean Taxonomy is by far the most widely used one. The Gene
Ontology, as well as other OBO ontologies, refers to it by means of the iden-
tifiers of the NCBI Taxonomy database. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter
it is mostly the traditional taxonomy and the corresponding taxonomic da-
tabases that are in focus, though, occasionally, PhyloCode is also mentioned
where relevant.
B.4 Problems with the Taxonomy
B.4.1 Taxonomic Databases
The NCBI Taxonomy database neither is, nor purports to be, an authori-
tative source of ultimate taxonomic information. Where desirable, several
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different sources are used further in this appendix, such as:
– the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS),16 one that cla-
ims to be authoritative, but yet still incomplete and possibly inaccu-
rate;
– the Tree of Life Web Project (ToL),17 a collaborative effort which pro-
vides information about the diversity of organisms on Earth, their evo-
lutionary history (phylogeny), and characteristics;
– the Universal Biological Indexer and Organizer (uBio),18 a set of tools
that includes a taxonomic name server, a name bank, and a classifica-
tion bank;
– the World Biodiversity Database (WBD),19 a continuously growing tax-
onomic database and information system that allows you to search and
browse a number of online species banks covering a wide variety of or-
ganisms.
B.4.2 Taxonomic Ranks
While building a classificatory hierarchy, it is usually desirable to have a
clearly specified, but possibly extendable, set of criteria, which serve to dis-
tinguish the more or less inclusive classes into which individuals would be
classified (see, e.g., Frank [117]). In the case of the Linnaean Taxonomy,
taxa are assigned to various ranks which can reasonably be seen as play-
ing the role of predefined levels of generality or specificity. With ranks, it
is possible, e.g., to compare the generality of two taxa that are not related
directly, that is, taxa such that none of them is an ancestor of the other. For
example, both Mammalia (mammals) and Amphibia (amphibians) are taxa
of the rank class; they can be said to be of the same generality, even though
16http://www.itis.gov/ .
17http://tolweb.org/tree/ .
18http://www.ubio.org/ .
19http://nlbif.eti.uva.nl/bis/ .
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they are not siblings in the taxonomy (as reported by the NCBI Taxonomy
database).
Whether ranks are or are not an essential part of the Taxonomy, has long
been the matter of much debate. Although ranks are used by both ICBN
and ICZN to specify nomenclatural conventions, they were abandoned in
the original version of PhyloCode. Yet, recently, the advocates of PhyloCode
seem to have modified their views and admit ranks as a component of the
classification scheme (Pickett [282]). Ranks of taxa beyond the species level
are often denied to have a precise and practical meaning, and seem to be
treated as a historical legacy. In PhyloCode, the nomenclatural conventions
are not dependent on ranks — a taxon can have a name which corresponds
syntactically to a rank other than the actual rank of the taxon. However, de-
spite their lack of clear, direct correspondence to, e.g., temporal and genetic
distances between species and their common ancestors, ranks have proved
useful for the purpose of building and maintaining the Taxonomy. Irrespec-
tively of what ranks do or might mean, they are interesting from the point
of view of supporting automated inference about the relative significance of
taxa.
Both ICBN and ICZN use ranks; unfortunately, the codes differ in details,
and it is not clear what approach to ranks will PhyloCode adapt. It is thus
difficult to speak of just one hierarchy of ranks.20 Table B.1 shows a hierar-
chy of ranks compiled from ICBN, ICZN, and the NCBI Taxonomy. (Ranks
mentioned in the codes but for which no taxa were found are omitted.)
For most ranks sanctioned by ICZN, there are ranks sanctioned by ICZN
that have identical names. However, it is not clear whether such homony-
mous ranks should be seen as reflecting the same significance of taxa.21 The
ranks Division (ICZN) and Phylum (ICBN) are supposed to be equivalent.
ICZN sanctions only a fixed set of ranks in the Genus and Species groups,
namely, Genus and Species, and their subranks Subgenus and Subspecies, re-
spectively.22 ICBN is more liberal: it allows more non-primary ranks in these
20Ranks form a linear order. The hierarchy of ranks can thus be seen as a tree in which each
non-leaf node has exactly one successor.
21Or, perhaps, the same names are used in both codes to refer to the same, rather than homony-
mous, ranks.
22http://www.iczn.org/, Art. 42 and 45.
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groups, e.g., the secondary ranks Section and Series, and their further-order
subranks Subsection and Subseries — in the Genus group — and the sec-
ondary ranks Variety and Form, and their further-order subranks Subvariety
and Subform — in the Species group, and, in principle, this list is extend-
able.23 (Both ICBN and ICZN use the term ‘rank group’, but with slightly
different meanings. In ICBN, a rank group encompasses a primary rank and
all non-primary ranks that lie below this rank, but above the next primary
rank below. In ICZN, a rank group includes any non-primary rank whose
name is derived from the name of the primary rank in the group.)
While ICZN sanctions only to a fixed set of named ranks, ICBN allows new
ranks to be created if needed. Although primary and secondary ranks are
fixed (see Sec. B.4.3), and thus only further-order ranks can be added to the
existing system, it is not entirely clear what are the rules for creating and
naming such new ranks. The hierarchies of ranks used by ICBN and ICZN
already differ, and an arbitrary extension made to one of them may only
increase incoherence. There are in use (in the NCBI Taxonomy database)
ranks that are not mentioned in any of the codes. The position of such ranks
in the hierarchy is not explicitly given, and can only be inferred from the
position of the taxa that are of these ranks. For example, in the zoological
part of the Taxonomy,24 there are in use ranks such as Superclass, Superorder,
Infraclass and Infraorder, which are sanctioned by ICBN but not by ICZN;
there are also in use primary and other ranks which are not sanctioned by
ICZN: the ranks Kingdom and Domain are unofficial in this sense. Further
examples are the ranks Species group and Species subgroup.
B.4.3 Rank Orders
The hierarchy of ranks is linear (totally ordered) — every rank is either
above or below any other rank. Yet the hierarchy is not quite a flat list, in
that each rank is assigned to one of several levels or orders: there are prin-
cipal (or primary) ranks, secondary ranks, and further ranks. These levels
23http://www.bgbm.org/iapt/nomenclature/code/SaintLouis/0000St.Luistitle.htm, Art. 4.
24The taxon Metazoa (a Kingdom taxon) and all taxa below it.
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presumably reflect some form of significance or importance of ranks (which
should not be confused with the significance of taxa). There are also ranks
that do not have any explicit level of importance; in what follows, such
ranks are called ‘no-order’ ranks, and the term ‘further’ is reserved to those
ranks that are mentioned as such in ICBN. ICZN does not explicitly assign
orders to its ranks. As shown in Tab. B.1, the counts of taxa of further- and
no-order (unofficial) ranks are not marginal.
Is there any real meaning behind the rank orders? Intuitively, secondary
and further ranks, understood as supplementary to the primary ranks, pro-
vide finer levels of detail for the classification of organisms. In this sense,
one might use rank orders to view the taxonomy at different levels of de-
tail, simply by hiding or revealing taxa that are of ranks beyond or below
a particular order. For example, one might want to see only the primary
taxa included in the classification of a particular species-level taxon. Fig-
ure B.1 shows the taxonomic classification of the subspecies Homo sapiens
sapiens; if only primary taxa were selected, the view would be compressed
to that shown in Fig. B.2. However, for this intuition to make sense, any
classification should include a taxon of a lower-order rank only if it also
includes a taxon of that higher-order rank which the lower-order rank is
a refinement of; i.e., a classification should not include a subclass taxon
if it does not include a class taxon, etc. (see Tab. B.1 again). Otherwise,
fine-grained details would be provided when no coarse-grained information
is present. Unfortunately, this intuition fails, as there are many cases that
contradict this should-be rule. For example, the classification of the species
Citrus limon includes a subclass taxon, but no class taxon; the classification
of Lama glama includes a suborder taxon, but no order taxon; Corydalis
sempervirens is classified under a subfamily, but not under a family.
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Rank name In ICBN In ICZN Taxon count
· · · · Superkingdom (Domain) 3
Kingdom • 3
· · · · Superdivision (Superphylum) 4
Division (Phylum) • 79
· · · Subdivision (Subphylum) • 14
· · · · Superclass 5
Class • 212
· · · Subclass • 101
· · · · Infraclass 11
· · · · Superorder 53
Order • 1010
· · · Suborder • 339
· · · · Infraorder 72
· · · · Superfamily • 649
Family • • 5735
· · · Subfamily • • 1629
· · Tribe • • 1053
· · · Subtribe • • 202
Genus • • 37336
· · · Subgenus • • 576
· · · · Species group 182
· · · · Species subgroup 80
Species • • 222438
· · · Subspecies • • 6240
· · Variety • 1683
· · Form • 142
no rank 19840
Table B.1: Taxonomic ranks according to ICBN and ICZN, ordered by the
purported significance of taxa assigned to them. Primary ranks in boldface.
Secondary, further, and unordered ranks marked with · · , · · · , and · · · · ,
respectively. Taxon counts as found in NCBI Taxonomy, June 2006.
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domain: Eukaryota
—: Fungi/Metazoa group
kingdom: Metazoa
— (subkingdom): Eumetazoa
— (superphylum): Bilateria
—: Coelomata
—: Deuterostomia
phylum: Chordata
subphylum: Craniata
— (subphylum): Vertebrata
superclass: Gnathostomata
—: Teleostomi
—: Euteleostomi
—: Sarcopterygii
—: Tetrapoda
—: Amniota
class: Mammalia
—: (subclass): Theria
—: (infraclass): Eutheria
superorder: Euarchontoglires
order: Primates
suborder (infraorder): Simiiformes
—: Catarrhinii
superfamily: Hominoidea
family: Hominidae
(subfamily: Homininae)
—: Homo/Pan/Gorilla group
genus: Homo
species: Homo sapiens
subspecies: Homo sapiens sapiens
Figure B.1: Complete classification of Homo sapiens sapiens. Ranks and taxa
found in databases other than the NCBI Taxonomy are in parentheses. Taxa
with no ranks in the NCBI Taxonomy are preceded by an em-dash (‘ — ’).
Ranks explicitly mentioned by ICZN are in boldface.
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kingdom: Metazoa
phylum: Chordata
class: Mammalia
order: Primates
family: Hominidae
genus: Homo
species: Homo sapiens
Figure B.2: Modified classification of Homo sapiens sapiens — only taxa of
primary ranks are shown. Only primary ranks are visible. Ranks explicitly
mentioned in ICZN are in boldface.
To estimate the scale of the problem, we have conducted a small experi-
ment: Among 5,000 randomly picked species taxa, in nearly 500 cases —
approximately 10% — the rule was disobeyed. (The study was based on
data from the NCBI Taxonomy database. NCBI Taxonomy and other tax-
onomic databases, notably ITIS, often disagree on taxon names and their
ranks, and the results may reflect an idiosyncrasy of the source used.) Rank
orders seem to be a quite ad hoc invention, and persist presumably only for
historical reasons. Primary ranks are primary because they were conceived
first: the original taxonomy devised by Linnaeus contained only the ranks
Kingdom, Order, Genus and Species, while secondary and further ranks, as
well as no-order ranks, are those added by later systematists. But apart from
providing this historical insight, rank orders seem to bring no real benefit to
the somewhat chaotic system.
B.4.4 Rank Names
The taxonomic ranks are named (see Table B.1). Primary and secondary
ranks have arbitrary names; further-order ranks have (according to ICBN)
names formed by extending the names of primary and secondary ranks with
the prefix ‘sub-’. This naming policy is too constrained — what if new ranks
are to be added? The sets of primary and secondary ranks are fixed (none
of the codes allows one to create a new primary rank); ranks may be added
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only with names created according to the prefixing scheme. But this means
that there may only be a relatively small number of ranks, and that it may
be impossible to assign a rank to some taxa.
For example, in the classification of H. sapiens sapiens (see Fig. B.1), what
would be the names and orders appropriate for ranks to which the five
taxa placed between the superclass Gnathostomata and the class Mammalia
might be assigned? Clearly, due to the rank naming and ordering policy, a
separation of the ranks Superclass and Class by another rank is inconceiv-
able. Should a rank such as Subsubsuperclass be introduced?
B.4.5 Taxa and Their Ranks
One possible use of the rank system could be to provide a means for char-
acterizing the significance of ranks. The category selected for any particular
taxon reflects the significance of the group in some way, and it is determined
by the placement of that taxon in a classification list (Benton [38]). In prin-
ciple, it would be useful to consider two taxa of the same rank as equally
general, irrespective of their actual taxon-wise distance from the root of the
Taxonomy, or, alternatively, from their leaf-level subtaxa.25 However, this
may be difficult in practice: a large proportion of taxa do not have ranks,
and ranks are not used in a coherent manner.
Few species have classifications including taxa of all available ranks. Worse
still, in many cases such classifications include taxa of secondary and fur-
ther-order ranks, but not of some of the primary ranks (see Sec. B.4.3).
Unranked taxa may be divided into two groups: those for which it is possible
to assign an existing rank without contradicting the respective code’s rules,
and those for which there is no rank available, unless a new one is created.
In the former case it is, in principle, possible to infer the rank from the ranks
of the closest ancestor and successors, but there may be more than one rank
available. In the latter case, new ranks should be created, but this may be
hindered by the rank-naming policy of taxonomic codes (see Sec. B.4.4).
25In the Taxonomy, leaf-level taxa are of different ranks: not only species, but also subspecies and
other taxa may be leaves.
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Many of the taxa found in the classification of H. sapiens sapiens (Fig. B.1)
are unranked — according to the NCBI Taxonomy database, only 50% of
taxa in this classification have ranks. The taxa Theria and Eutheria can only
be assigned to the ranks Subclass and Infraclass, respectively, since they are
placed immediately between a Class and a Superorder. (Indeed, this is how
they are ranked according to ITIS.) There is no guess, however, to be done
about the ranks of Teleostomii, Euteleostomii, Sarcopterygii, Tetrapoda, and
Amniota, as there are no ranks between Superclass and Class. Five new ranks
between Superclass and Class would have to be invented; what would be the
names and orders of these five ranks?
If all taxa were ranked, comparing the generality of two taxa would be
straightforward and could be done in constant time (e.g., by using a two-
dimensional matrix of precomputed rank-rank comparisons). For unranked
taxa, the process is more complicated: the closest ranked ancestors and
successors of the respective taxa must be found and compared, and the
result may still be uncertain. In the absence of explicit ranks, the count of
intermediate taxa on the path to the root of the taxonomy may be used, but
this purely structural measure of depth does not necessarily correspond well
to how systematists understand the generality of taxa. A species taxon may
be placed very shallowly (e.g., Pleurochrysis sp. is only 4 (NCBI) or 7 (ITIS)
taxa from the root) or very deeply (e.g., Jordanella pulchra is 39 (NCBI) or
15 (ITIS) taxa from the root). Likewise, for every rank in the Species group,
there is at least one leaf taxon of that rank in the Taxonomy.
For example, the taxon Didelphidae could thus be seen as more general than
the taxon Homo, because the former is of the rank Family and the latter is
of the rank Genus (Table B.1) — even though none of them is an ancestor
or successor of the other. Clearly, the taxon Teleostomii is more general
than the taxon Catarrhinii, because the latter is subsumed by the former
(Fig. B.1) — even though none of them has an explicit rank. Teleostomii is
also more general than Pterygota (Fig. B.3), because the former is placed
between a superclass and a class, while the latter is placed between a class
and a subclass.
However, it is impossible to decide whether the taxon Bacillariophycidae is
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more, equally, or less general than any of the taxa Dicondylia, Pterygota and
Palaeoptera (Fig. B.3). If no rank information were available and structural
depth were used as an estimate of taxon generality, any of the latter three
taxa would have to be considered muchmore specific than Bacillariophyceae,
simply because they are placed three times deeper in the hierarchy.26
. . . † . . . ‡
class: Insecta = class: Bacillariophyceae
(no rank): Dicondylia
(no rank): Pterygota ≈ (no rank): Bacillariophycidae
subclass: Palaeoptera
order: Odonata = order: Naviculales
. . . . . .
Figure B.3: Rank-based mapping of taxa between two partial lineages of
Odonata and Naviculales; data from NCBI Taxonomy. Omitted ancestors:
†13 taxa above, ‡4 taxa above. Symbols: = unambiguous taxon-taxon map-
ping (corresponding explicit ranks); ≈ uncertain mapping.
B.4.6 Taxa and Their Names
One of the principal goals of ICBN and ICZN is to normalize the nomen-
clature of taxa. Some of the central rules employed by these systems are:
each taxon has exactly one official name; no two taxa have the same offi-
cial name; the name of a taxon reflects its rank. Unfortunately, taxonomic
databases do not necessarily obey these rules in a consistent and coherent
manner.
In the NCBI Taxonomy, all taxa have exactly one official name. However,
some taxa seem to have been given different names in different databases.
Since each database employs its own system of unique taxon identifiers,
26Comparing the generality of taxa such as Insecta and Bacillariophyceae seems to be a highly
speculative business, but the very term ‘rank’ is directly suggestive of there being some sort of
generality or significance that is common to both those class-ranked taxa mentioned above.
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the only way to match such differently named taxa across databases is to
use additional information, e.g., their ranks and position in the respective
hierarchies. For example, the kingdom that includes all plants is named
‘Viridiplantae’ in NCBI Taxonomy, but ‘Planta’ in ITIS. Since both databases
include exactly one kingdom taxon that covers plants,27 it is reasonable to
believe that ‘Viridiplantae’ and ‘Planta’ are two distinct official names for
the same taxon. There is no taxon named ‘Planta’ in NCBI Taxonomy, and
no taxon named ‘Viridiplantae’ in ITIS — so that these two names are not
treated as a synonyms by either database alone.
Table B.2 shows further two examples: the taxonomic classification of two
genera, Bacillus and Ficus. In the case of Ficus, one may be relatively con-
fident that the alignment is correct, and that ‘Sorbeoconcha’ is synonymous
with ‘Neotaeniaglossa’, though it would not be easy to align these two names
on a purely lexical basis. Alignment in the case of Bacillus is less obvious.
Rank
Bacillus Ficus
NCBI ITIS NCBI ITIS
kingdom — Monera Metazoa Animalia
phylum Firmicutes Bacteria Mollusca Mollusca
class Bacilli Schizomycetes Gastropoda Gastropoda
order Bacillales Eubacteriales Sorbeoconcha Neotaenioglossa
family Bacillaceae Bacillaceae Ficidae Ficidae
genus Bacillus Bacillus Ficus Ficus
Table B.2: Partial classifications of two genera, Bacillus and Ficus, as in NCBI
Taxonomy and ITIS. Names that differ in NCBI and ITIS appear in boldface.
ICZN employs what it calls the ‘principle of homonymy’:28 “When two or
more taxa are distinguished from each other they must not be denoted by
the same name.” On the other hand, ICBN does allow homonyms.29 Al-
though rules for the acceptance and rejection of new taxon names are rel-
27It would have been rather surprising had it been otherwise.
28ICZN, Art. 52.
29ICBN, Art. 53.
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atively simple, a considerable number of exceptional situations make the
whole system unreasonably complicated and difficult to maintain. There are
many examples of multiple taxa with the same name, both within a single
taxonomic database and between databases, and both in the zoological and
the botanical part of the taxonomy. NCBI’s attempt to disambiguate such
cases is based on what they call ‘unique names’: homonymous taxon names
extended with a disambiguation string that may, very irregularly, reflect a
taxon’s rank, the name of one of its ancestors, or a general, non-scientific
description of the organism.30
While most cases of homonymy to be found in both NCBI and ITIS involve
taxa placed in distinct kingdoms,31 there are also cases of homonymous
taxon names within one kingdom. For example, the name ‘Morganella’
denotes three distinct genera: one proteobacterial, one fungal (in NCBI),
and one animal (in ITIS). For disambiguation, the two former are given,
in the NCBI Taxonomy, the unique names ‘Morganella 〈proteobacterium〉’
and ‘Morganella 〈fungus〉’, respectively. There are also two taxa named
‘Branchiura’: one of them is a genus under the phylum Annelida, the other
is a subclass under the phylum Arthropoda, both in the zoological part
of the taxonomy. NCBI disambiguates them as Branchiura 〈Annelida〉 and
Branchiura 〈Crustacea〉. Similarly, the name ‘Chlamydiae’ is used to re-
fer to both the phylum Chlamydiae as well as to its subordinate class ta-
xon Chlamydiae. To disambiguate, NCBI uses the unique name ‘Chlamy-
diae (class)’ for the latter. Analogous solution has been adopted for the
case of ‘Spirochaetes’, ‘Actinobacteria’, ‘Fusobacteria’, etc. Another inter-
esting case from the NCBI Taxonomy is that of the genus Drosophila and
its homonymous subgenus. While officially the latter is called ‘Drosophila
subg. Drosophila’, NCBI reports ‘Drosophila’ as the official name, and hence
needs to disambiguate the name, using the unique names ‘Drosophila 〈fruit
fly, genus〉’ and ‘Drosophila 〈fruit fly, subgenus〉’, respectively.
While there is no formal requirement, taxon names should best reflect some
30And, indeed, this scheme resembles the ‘sensu’ clauses of species-specific GO terms.
31Which, by the way, is legal according to the codes, as neither of them seems to care about what
the other does: “The name of an animal taxon identical with the name of a taxon which has never
been treated as animal is not a homonym for the purposes of zoological nomenclature.” ICZN,
Art. 52.7.
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essential properties of the organisms covered; unfortunately, names of lower-
rank taxa (e.g., genera and species) often do not reflect any such proper-
ties.32 Examples such as Agathidium bushi, Bufonaria borisbeckeri, Abra
cadabra, Ytu brutus, and others, abound.33 Yet another kind of nomenclat-
ural problems is related to the principles of forming names of higher-order
taxa. The are a few naming rules, which do not, however, guarantee a clean
naming practice, and may be somewhat cumbersome to use. Consider the
example of the family Asteraceae (see Fig. B.4):
“The subfamily of the family Asteraceae Martinov (nom. alt., Com-
positae Adans.) including Aster L., the type of the family name, is ir-
respective of priority to be called Asteroideae Asch., and the tribe and
subtribe including Aster are to be called Astereae Cass. and Asterinae
Less., respectively. However, the correct name of the tribe includ-
ing both Cichorium L., the type of the subfamily name Cichorioideae
W. D. J. Koch (1837), and Lactuca L. is Lactuceae Cass. (1815), not
Cichorieae D. Don (1829), while that of the subtribe including both
Cichorium and Hyoseris L. is Hyoseridinae Less. (1832), not Cichori-
inae Sch. Bip. (1841) (unless the Cichoriaceae Juss. are accepted as
a family distinct from Compositae).” [ICBN, Art. 19.4, Ex. 4]
Interestingly, taxonomic databases (e.g., NCBI Taxonomy) use the names
‘Cichorieae’ and ‘Cichoriinae’ for the tribe and subtribe mentioned above,
which appears to be a more intuitive solution, despite ICBN’s instructions.
As a final example of inconsistently realized nomenclatural conventions,
consider the rule, adopted by both ICBN and ICZN, demanding that the
name of a taxon should reflect the rank of the taxon by means of a rank-
specific suffix added to the respective type name. Unfortunately, the two
codes use different suffixes to express corresponding ranks, as well as use
the same suffixes for different ranks. For example, the suffix ‘-oidea’ is re-
served by ICZN for superfamilies, but is also legal in names of taxa of other
ranks, as in, e.g., Ranoidea (a genus), Asteroidea (a class). The suffix ‘-idae’
32The name of a genus “may be taken from any source whatever, and may even be composed in
an absolutely arbitrary manner”. ICBN, Art 20.1.
33http://home.earthlink.net/m˜isaak/taxonomy.html provides an impressively extensive archive
of such (un)usual taxon names.
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family
subfamily
tribe
subtribe
genus
Asteraceae
Cichorioideae
Lactuceae(Cichorieae)
Hyoseridinae (Cichoriinae)
Hyoseris Cichorium Lactuca
Figure B.4: Partial classification of the family Asteriaceae, according to ICBN,
Art. 19.4. Taxon names discouraged by ICBN, but used by the NCBI Taxon-
omy database as official names, are in parentheses.
is reserved by ICZN for families, but rather for subclasses in ICBN, as in, e.g.,
Hominidae (a family), Bryidae (a subclass), etc. Other codes may decide on
yet other nomenclatural principles. In consequence, it may be difficult to
predict the rank of a taxon from its name alone. In PhyloCode, taxon names
are completely independent of ranks. Although clades are hierarchically
related, assignment of a categorical rank (e.g., genus, family, etc.) is not
part of the formal naming process and has no bearing on the spelling or
application of taxon names (PhyloCode, Art. 3).
B.5 Discussion
This appendix provides a qualitative and quantitative insight into the cur-
rent state of taxonomic information available in public databases, such as
the NCBI Taxonomy database, the Integrated Taxonomic Information Sys-
tem, etc. The information distributed among those different sources does
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not seem to be coherently represented, and the Taxonomy of species itself is
not internally consistent. Chapter 5 and App. A show how the Gene Ontol-
ogy and the Taxonomy of Species can be meaningfully connected to provide
for automated partitioning of the GO. However, App. B should be convincing
that it is important not to rest on the assumption that the NCBI Taxonomy is
the only available source of taxonomic data, or that it is a reliable source, or
even that such a source exists at all. Therefore, all reasoning over the Gene
Ontology based on links with the Taxonomy of Species should be done with
care.
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